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In his 1974 Holmes Lectures, Anthony Amsterdam likened the Supreme Court
in search and seizure cases to a committee "attempting to draft a horse by placing
very short lines on a very large drawing board at irregular intervals during which
the membership of the committee constantly changes." ' On that perception of the
matter he cautioned against precipitous criticism when the completed draft resembles a camel. That advice, in my judgment, is reliable only in part. On the
one hand, only the most arrogant of armchair critics would not concede that the
Court's work is as difficult as it is important. Faced with enormous complexity in
search and seizure cases, inscrutable history, and imponderable competing interests,
the Court is, to use another metaphor, like Dr. Johnson's dog, whose trick was to
walk on its hind legs. It is not that it performs well. The wonder is that it performs
at all.2
On the other hand, there is much in Professor Amsterdam's description that is
misleading. For the men who have come to the Court in the' last eight years have
not only failed to draft an identifiable horse. They have given up the drafting task
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Alabama. A.B. 1968, J.D. 1973, University of Kansas;
LL.M. 1974, Harvard University. Research for this Article was supported by The University of Alabama
Graduate School Summer Faculty Research Fellowship Program.
'Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv." 349, 350 (1974).
•
'I J. BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 280 (entry of 31 July 1763), (R. Ingpen ed. 1925).
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entirely. The thesis of this paper is that in a flurry of decisions the Burger Court'
has destroyed what little structure search and seizure doctrine had achieved and
replaced it with a fact-oriented, elastic, case by case approach to the recurring conflict
between citizen and police. The Court's examination of search and seizure questions
is by its very nature unprincipled and unpredictable. It resembles in many respects
the "fundamental fairness" approach to the fourteenth amendment taken by the
Court prior to the Warren era, and like that approach it strikes the balance between
the individual and state power decidedly in favor of the latter.
This is blunt language. It seems to me the occasion calls for it. I believe that
the Burger Court is well advanced on a campaign to curtail the protections for individual liberty offered by the provisions of the Constitution pertaining to search
and seizure, and my effort in this paper to identify the major theme of that campaign is not tempered by an outsized appreciation for the difficulty of the Court's
task. In a real sense, the task has been abandoned. There are times when prudence
and discretion counsel caution and restraint, times when the Court should be applauded for what it does right rather than condemned for what it does wrong.4
But given the evidence accumulating in the reports, this is not such a time for search
and seizure. This is a time for alarm.
At the outset, I must beg indulgence-for an abbreviated survey of the history
of search and seizure in Anglo-American law. I know of no fair way to approach
the Burger Court's decisions that does not place them in historical and analytic
perspective. To be understood they must be contrasted with the early cases and the
work of the Warren Court, and compared with the decisions falling between those
two periods-when the Roosevelt appointees allied with Justice Frankfurter resisted
those allied with Justice Black and applied a murky, toothless standard of review
to cases governed by the fourteenth amendment. Next, I will take up the three
major theoretical and practical problems encountered in search and seizure cases.
I will sketch the Court's attempts to deal with these problems in earlier times and
examine the performance of the Burger Court in the last few years. In a final
Section, I will suggest some of the considerations that may lie behind the Burger
Court's departures in the search and seizure field and contend that none of the
possibilities that come to mind justifies the position the Court has taken.
'No bright line can be drawn, of course, between what may be called the Warren and Burger Courts.
Some of the Warren Court holdovers, Justices Black and White in particular, generally found allies in the
newcomers to the Court after the October 1968 Term, Chief Justice Warren's last. See L. LEVY, AGAINST
THE LAW 37, 42 (1974). In addition, the Nixon appointees came to the Court only in stages, leading to
what Justice Douglas once described as the usual period of "unsettlement" while the Court groped for
its new identity. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949). The new Chief Justice
hardly assumed intellectual command of the Court when he took his chair in the fall of 1969, but he

soon began to affect the Court's handling of criminal procedure cases-teaming with Justices Black and
White in an assault on the very premises of the Warren Court's analysis. E.g., United States v. Harris,

403 U.S. 573 (1971) (opinion of Burger, C.J.); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 36 (1970) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (opinion of White, J.). With the arrival of
Justice Blackmun in 1970, followed by Justices Powell and Rehnquist in 1972, the reconstituted Court's

different slant on search and seizure issues was apparent. In a bitter dissent from the Court's disposition
of United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), delivered on the last day of the 1975 Term,
Justice Brennan lamented that "[t]oday's decision is the ninth this Term marking the continuing evisceration of Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. at 567. In the
course of my discussion of these developments, I will ascribe responsibility for decisions to the Burger Court
whenever they exhibit the analytical approach that was urged by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Black
and White in 1970 and 1971, and came to flower thereafter with the coming of the additional Nixon
appointees.
'E.g.,

Yackle, The Burger Court, "State Action," and Congressional Enforcement of the Civil War
ALA. L. REV. 479 (1975).

Amendments, 27
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I. A SYNOPSIS OF FOURTH AMENDMENT HISTORY

With the possible exception of Hugo Black,' the Justices who have held seats
on the post-1937 Court have, perhaps without saying so, rejected out of hand the
notion that in interpreting the Constitution they should place themselves "as nearly
as possible in the condition of the men who framed the instrument."' No one
seriously contends these days that the Court can recreate the conditions of 1791,
ascertain the "intent of the framers," and resolve the case at hand consistent with
the "original understanding."7 Those times are lost forever, and even if it were
possible to poll the signers of the Bill of Rights it is most unlikely that they would
speak with one voice." Indeed, no one seriously contends that the Court should even
attempt to decide twentieth century cases by reference only to the hopes and desires
of eighteenth century men.9 I do not offer what follows, then, to build an argument
or win a point on the basis of history alone. It is merely a point of departure-the
one chosen by the Court itself in virtually every field of constitutional adjudication.'"
A. The Framingof the Fourth Amendment
After forty years, Nelson Lasson's little book remains the principal authority on
the history of the fourth amendment." His treatment of the available sources reveals
what one might have expected-that we Americans hardly fashioned our protections
against unreasonable search and seizure from whole cloth. Nor, for that matter,
'In

his 1968 Carpentier Lectures, Justice Black quoted with approval the language that appears at

the end of the sentence in the text. H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 8 (1968).

His most noteworthy

opinions were spiced with biting criticism of the Court's attempt to "adapt the Constitution to new times."
Id. at 21. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 364 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (insisting
that electronic surveillance is little more than sophisticated eavesdropping-which the framers might have
explicitly prohibited in the fourth amendment if they had intended the Constitution to speak to it). Nevertheless, Black's jurisprudence was never so rigid as his rhetoric, and the record hardly warrants the charge
that he had a "limitless ability to persuade himself that truth, history, wisdom, and the exact words of
the Constitution were on his side and governed by his opinions, which did little more than declare what
the fundamental law is." LEvY, supra note 3, at 36-37. Charles Reich's description of Black's views is,
in my judgment, a far more accurate appraisal:
By "faithful adherence" Black has demanded adherence to the spirit and objectives of the Bill
of Rights, rather than to any particular interpretation of its provisions. His approach is functional
in nature. He asks what a given provision of the Bill of Rights was designed to accomplish-what
evils it was intended to prevent. Then he seeks to give the provision a meaning which will, in a
contemporary setting, accomplish the same general purposes and prevent the same kinds of evils.
Thus he interprets the Bill of Rights in the same way in which the Court has often interpreted the
enumerated powers in the Constitution.

Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REV. 673, 733 (1963) (citations omitted).
Inasmuch as this "functional" analysis focuses upon the values the framers sought to protect with the Bill
of Rights and attempts to safeguard those same values from new and then-unimagined threats, it is
certainly more appealing than the rigid historicism that at times flavored Black's opinions. Nevertheless,
it still falls considerably short of a thoroughgoing, intellectually satisfying approach to search and seizure
problems. A discussion of further, necessary refinements-and Justice Black's ultimate failure to grasp
them-must be put off for now. See Landynski, In Search of Justice Black's Fourth Amendment, 45
FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (1976); text at note 368 infra. Suffice it to say here that Black's understanding of
the Constitution and the role of the Court in interpreting it was not so wooden as at times it seemed.
His contributions to the growth of individual liberty in other fields are well known; perhaps he can be
forgiven for "nodding" in search and seizure cases. See L. HtANDs,THE BILL OF RIGrrs 58-59 (1958).

'Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887).
"See Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 397-401.
5

T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12-15 (1969).

United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).

See Rehnquist, The Notion of a iving Constitution,

54 TEx. L. REV. 693 (1976). See also J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT:
A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 19-20 (1966).
"oSee C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY (1969).
t N.

LAssON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES

CONSTITUTION (1937).
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was the notion that "a man's house is his castle"' 2 born in the breasts of Englishmen,
whose ideas of liberty the colonists embraced as readily as they condemned taxation
without representation." Attention must turn, nevertheless, to England where for
four hundred years Crown and Parliament assumed and abused the power to authorize broad ranging searches and seizures, and where opposition to such practices
culminated in the judicial decisions that inspired libertarian thought on this side of
the Atlantic. Legislation affecting search and seizure in England dates from the

first half of the fourteenth century, when both private and official customs searches
were authorized in the sea ports. 4 Later, organized tradesmen were permitted to
conduct searches to enforce their trade regulations.' 5 In the sixteenth century the
Tudor and Stuart campaigns against seditious libel employed the general warrant,
mingling the historical antecedents of the fourth and first amendments. 6 The Stationers Company was chartered in 1557, and ten years later Star Chamber issued the
first of its ordinances authorizing the Company to "open all packs and trunks of
papers and books brought into the country, to search in any warehouse, shop, or any
other place .... to seize the books printed contrary to law .... -17 For decades
thereafter Star Chamber, together with High Commission and the Privy Council
itself, used the general warrant with abandon in the persecution of religious and
other dissenters."8
Even as the Crown and Parliament went their way, employing the general warrant in aid of their needs of the moment, the courts of common law were fashioning
more restrictive doctrine. There was some debate on the matter at the time. Lord
Coke relied on Magna Carta for the view that a warrant could not issue for the
search of a house even for a felon or for stolen goods,'" while Chief Justice Hale
maintained that such warrants were lawful so long as they were issued by a magistrate, supported by a sworn statement of cause, and limited to a particular place to
be searched and particular things to be seized.20 Disclaiming the practices of justices
of the peace who often executed their own warrants, acting as both judicial and executive officers, Hale insisted that the issuance of a warrant was a "judicial act," to
be undertaken by a magistrate on the basis of another's sworn allegations.2 ' His
views, of course, eventually found their way to the colonies, to the declarations of
22
rights in several states, and ultimately to the fourth amendment.
The development of search and seizure doctrine by the common law courts thus
conflicted with the practices of both King and Parliament, and in the very nature
of things confrontation was inevitable. It came in the North Briton cases, 28 named
" Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1604).
"It seems probable that, on the contrary, Lord Coke's epigram was founded on the Roman maxim:

Nemo de domo sua extrahi debet. M. RADIN, ROMAN
"LASSON, supra note 11, at 23.
"Id. at 24.
18 LANDYNSKI, supra note 9, at 20-21.
'LASSON, supra note 11, at 25. See F. SIEBERT,

LAW

475 n.28 (1927).

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND (1952).
LANDYNSKI, supra note 9, at 22-24; LASSON, supra note 11, at 25-34.
1 IV E. COKE, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 176-77 (London 1797). Coke's position,
"

described by Lasson as "ambiguous," was that a justice of the peace was a creature of Parliament, which
had no power to authorize a search in light of the thirty-ninth chapter of Magna Carta. Evidently, however, Coke approved a forced entry after the fugitive had been indicted.
II M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 149-50 (1st Am. ed. Philadelphia 1847).
LANDYNSKI, supra note 9, at 27.
HALE, supra note 20, at 150.
Money v. Leach, 97 Eng. Rep. 1050 (K.B. 1765); Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763);
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for John Wilkes' series of pamphlets that appeared on the streets of London shortly
after George III assumed the throne 4 The Secretary of State, Lord Halifax, issued
general warrants for the arrest of those responsible and the seizure of their papers,
and in short order his messengers ransacked the printers' houses and broke open
their chests looking for anyone and anything connected with the scurrilous pamphlets.
It soon became apparent, however, that Halifax had misjudged the judges. The
printers hauled the messengers into court, and Chief Justice Pratt, then a relatively
25
obscure jurist but later declared a "zealous supporter of English liberty by law,"
instructed the jury that "[t]o enter a man's house by virtue of a nameless warrant,
in order to procure evidence, is worse than the Spanish Inquisition; a law under
which no Englishman would wish to live an hour. ' 26 So charged, the jury returned
27
a judgment for the plaintiffs, and Pratt sustained it on all counts.
The stage was set for Entick v. Carrington," the most celebrated English precedent in search and seizure lore.2 The Entick warrant differed from those involved
in the North Briton cases in that it specifically named John Entick, the editor of
the Monitor, and designated the place to be searched. If it was specific as to person
and place, however, it was general as to the items to be seized. Emboldened by
the success Wilkes and the others had achieved, Entick sued the messengers in
Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763). The description of these cases in the text follows LAsSON,
supra note 11, at 43-47, and LANDYNSKI, supra note 9, at 28-29. Similar accounts appear in II T. MAY,
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 124-29 (1912), and Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures,
34 HARv. L. REv. 361, 362-64 (1921). See also T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 299-308 (2d ed. Boston 1871); F. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 410 (1926). The issue whether general warrants were
valid was joined less well on a few earlier occasions. In 1662, Parliament enacted the Licensing Act,
which provided for "powers of search as broad as any ever granted by Star Chamber decree," another
statute creating writs of assistance as an enforcement tool, and a third establishing open-ended powers of
search in daylight hours for the collection of the "hearth money" tax. LAssoN, supra note 11, at 37.
When, in 1679, Charles II found it impolitic to call a Parliament to renew the Licensing Act, he asked the
12 judges of England whether the common law would permit him to regulate the press in the same way
-absent statute. The 12, led by Chief Justice Scroggs, gave the King the opinion he wanted, and he
immediately issued a proclamation against libelous publications, together with general warrants for the
enforcement of his decree. Lasson notes that while this first meeting of the common law and the general
warrant in libel proved fruitless, in the end Scroggs suffered for his failure to take a stronger position.
One of the articles of impeachment brought against him by the House of Commons in 1680 specifically
condemned his issuance of general warrants. Id. at 38. After the Revolution, the "hearth money" taxincluding its search provisions-was abolished, and in succeeding years taxation measures containing
broad powers of search were the subject of debate whenever they were offered in Parliament. Lasson
attributes the failure of Walpole's Excise System to opposition to its search provisions and mentions
William Pitt's condemnation of the general warrant in the course of his speech against the Cider Tax.
Id. at 40-42.
'See C. WESTON, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND THE HOUSE OP LORDS 149-50 (1965). Wilkes'
vigorous opposition to the Halifax warrant and other excesses of royal power won the admiration of
English commoners who rallied to support him for Parliament again and again in the face of repeated
expulsions. M. KNAPPEN, CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 486-87 (1964). In the end,
he had become a "popular idol," who in his correspondence with Otis and others connected the "strands
of rebellion at home and in the colonies." Ogg, Builders of the Republic, in 8 THE PAGEANT OP AMERICA
78 (R. Gabriel ed. 1927).
'This description of Pratt was penned by Dr. Johnson for a portrait that later hung in public houses
all over England. LAsSON, supra note 11, at 46, citing E. Foss, JUDGES OF ENGLAND 536 (1870) and III
W. LECKY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 79-80 (1882).
56
Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (K.B. 1763).
The Crown appealed Pratt's ruling to King's Bench, where Chief Justice Mansfield affirmed-holding
only that the messengers had exceeded even their general warrant by arresting persons not connected with
the publication of the North Briton. In dicta, however, all the judges sitting condemned what Halifax
had done. Money v. Leach, 97 Eng. Rep. 1050 (K.B. 1765).
" 19 Howell's State Trials 1030, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
'The term is Amsterdam's. Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 356. It fits. Having once heard it, I am
compelled to use it.
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trespass for the seizure of his papers. The declaration stated that Nathan Carrington
and three other messengers had searched through Entick's house for four hours,
breaking through doors and into locked boxes, chests, and drawers. And they had
"pried into and examined all the private papers ...of the plaintiff ...whereby
the secret affairs . . .of the plaintiff became wrongfully discovered and made public."" ° In the end, they had carried away hundreds of printed pamphlets and charts.
Chief Justice Pratt, now Lord Camden, rendered an opinion he considered "of
the utmost consequence to the public" as well as to the parties."' Coming to the
question whether the warrant was valid and thus a fair defense to the claim,3 2 he
said that if the warrant were upheld "the secret cabinets and bureaus of every subject in this kingdom" would be "thrown open to the search and inspection of a
messenger" whenever seditious libel was suspected.3 Couched that way, the issue
could hardly be decided against the plaintiff. It was not. While the lengthy opinion
obscured the narrow ground of decision, it appears that the necessary and sufficient
basis for rejecting the messengers' defense was the absence of authoritative precedent
for such a warrant. If Lord Camden was clear on nothing else, he was explicit that
"[i]f it is law, it will be found in our books. If it is not to be found there, it is
not law.'

'3 4

Laying aside nice distinctions between ratio decidendi and dictum, the opinion
in Entick contained much else to guide, or misguide, its American readers. First,
the court made it plain that the common-fast becoming the constitutional-law
of England protected the individual from unjustified intrusions upon property.' 5
The papers seized from Entick were "the owner's goods and chattels" and their
seizure demanded explanation on pain of a judgment for damages.', Second, the
court intimated that privacy, too, might be protected. While stopping short of embracing the theory suggested by Entick's declaration-that the messengers had committed an independent trespass by prying into his secret affairs and making them
public-the court allowed that private papers are an individual's "dearest property;
and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspection."' 7
o19 Howell's State Trials at 1030.
"Id. at 1042.
The court first disposed of the messengers' contention that they and Halifax were immune from
liability under a statute prohibiting suit by a plaintiff such as Entick unless he first demanded to see the
warrant they relied upon and was refused. Id. at 1046-53.
"3Id.at 1063.
Id. at 1066. It is plain that Lord Camden did not consider Scroggs' opinion delivered to Charles II
worthy of more than passing note and summary rejection:
Can the twelve judges extrajudicially make a thing law to bind the kingdom by a declaration,
that such is their opinion?-I say No.-It is a matter of impeachment for any judge to affirm it.
There must be an antecedent principle or authority, from whence this opinion may be fairly collected; otherwise the opinion is null, and nothing but ignorance can excuse the judge that subscribed it. Out of this doctrine sprang the famous general search warrant, that was condemned
by the House of Commons; and it was not unreasonable to suppose, that the form of it was settled
by the twelve judges that subscribed the opinion.
Id. at 1071. See note 23 supra.
Reflecting the common law's preoccupation with property rights, or perhaps merely fusing individual
liberty with the institution of private property, the court said:
The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property. That right is
preserved sacred and incommunicable in all instances, where it has not been taken away or abridged
by some public law for the good of the whole . . . . By the laws of England, every invasion of
private property, be it every so minute, is a trespass.
19 Howell's State Trials at 1066.
Id.
'Id.
See text at note 30 supra.
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Accordingly, while conceding that "the eye by the laws of England cannot be
guilty of a trespass," the court agreed that "where private papers are removed . . .
the secret nature of those goods will be an aggravation of the trespass."3 It seems
that the messengers in Entick had not only to answer for breaking into the plaintiff's house and rifling his drawers, but for "bruising the grass" within his close;
and not only for "treading upon the soil," but for aggravating the trespass by exposing the "secret nature" of his papers to the public eye.39
As might be expected, the defendants contended that the Halifax warrant in
this libel case was not really so far removed from the common practice of issuing
warrants for stolen goods. In response, the court all but rejected the premise of the
argument, commenting that the issuance of warrants even for stolen goods had only
"crept into the law by imperceptible practice,"4 ° that Coke had questioned the validity
of that practice, 4' and that in any event warrants for stolen goods had always been
more specific than the warrant issued for all this plaintiff's papers." The analogy
the court did accept, however, seemed to blur a search for evidence with the already
developed privilege against self-incrimination :3
It is very certain, that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself; because the
necessary means of compelling self-accusation, falling upon the innocent as well as
the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust; and it should seem, that search for evisame principle. There too the innocent would be
dence is disallowed upon the
44
confounded with the guilty.

It was this pithy passage that troubled the American Supreme Court, perhaps more
than any other, in the years to follow.45
Still, Lord Camden was not finished. As though to anticipate every argument
raised against him, he specifically rejected the contention that this warrant must be
approved in order to facilitate the enforcement of the libel laws:
Lastly, it is urged as an argument of utility, that such a search is a means of
detecting offenders by discovering evidence. I wish some cases had been shewn,
where the law forceth evidence out of the owner's custody by process ...
In the criminal law such a proceeding was never heard of; and yet there are
some crimes, such for instance as murder, rape, robbery, and house-breaking, to

'

19 Howell's State Trials at 1066.
D

0

Id.

' 1d. at 1067.
"Id. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
"Tracing Hale's views somewhat but also adding further restraints, the court had it that even in the
"singular" case of searches for stolen goods rather stringent safeguards had been established.
There must be a full charge upon oath of a theft committed.-The owner must swear that the
goods are lodged in such a place.-He must attend at the execution of the warrant to shew them
to the officer, who must see that they answer the description.-And, lastly, the owner must abide
the event at his peril: for if the goods are not found, he is a trespasser; and the officer being an
innocent person, will be always a ready and convenient witness against him.
19 Howell's State Trials at 1067. It appears that in Lord Camden's view warrants for stolen goods must
not only be based on evidence and a particular description of the place to be searched and the things to
be seized, but they must in fact lead to the stolen things identified by the complainant.
"By 1765, when Enlick was decided, the inquisitorial method of trial used by Star Chamber and
High Commission before the Long Parliament had long since been swept from English criminal procedure.
John Lilburne had left his mark and died more than a century earlier. See generally L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968) [hereinafter cited as ORIGINS].
" 19 Howell's State Trials at 1073.
"See notes 258-88 and accompanying text infra.
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say nothing of forgery and perjury, that are more atrocious than libelling. But our
law has provided no paper-search in these cases to help forward the conviction.
Whether this proceedeth from the gentleness of the law towards criminals, or
from a consideration that such power46would be more pernicious to the innocent
than useful to the public, I will not say.
With a note of sarcasm, then, the court acknowledged that the law might restrict
the powers of law enforcement authorities not only to ensure fair and reliable prosecu47
tions, but to safeguard the extraneous interests of wholly innocent people.
The popular reading of contemporaneous events in the colonies credits James
Otis' spirited oratory with gathering public opposition to general searches.48 Beginning at least by 1755, the superior court in Boston issued writs of assistance, which
directed constables and other law enforcement officers to accompany customs officials
when they conducted searches for smuggled goods." The commissions of the
customs officials actually conferred the power to search, but that power was circumscribed by the requirement that searches could be undertaken only in the presence
of a constable. The courts, which controlled the constables, thus controlled customs
searches by issuing writs of assistance as they saw fit. 0 In practice, the writs were
issued freely at the request of customs officials. The writs were in general form and
valid for the life of the reigning sovereign. In effect, they granted customs officials
a roving commission to search when and where they pleased, so long as they were
accompanied by a constable whose duty was to maintain the peace as they searched. 6'
In 1761 enforcement of the smuggling laws was stepped up, just as the writs needed
renewal after the death of George II. Otis levelled a devastating attack upon them,
citing precedent back to Magna Carta just as did his English counterparts.5 2 In
" 19 Howell's State Trials at 1073.
' LASSON, supra note 11, at 48-50. After Entick, the scene of the debate over general warrants in

England shifted to Parliament where William Pitt led the assault. In 1766, the House
clared such warrants to be unlawful in libel cases, but other attempts to outlaw general
arrest of persons and for the seizure of papers proved unsuccessful, particularly in the
It was in the course of these debates that Pitt made his eloquent and classic plea for

of Commons dewarrants for the
House of Lords.
the "privilege of

house":

The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be
frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter;
but the King of England may not enter; all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined
tenement.
Id.

5

Id. at 58-61. For a new description of the colonists' views and practices regarding personal privacy

see D. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND (1972).

" There is some evidence that customs officials in Massachusetts originally conducted general searches
without the aid of official sanction, and when that proved unsettling to the colonists the Governor issued
writs himself. Before long, even that practice seemed troublesome, and the task was turned over to the
courts. It was in 1755 that Charles Paxton, the Surveyor of the Port of Boston, obtained his first writ from
the Superior Court. LAssoN, supra note 11, at 55-56.
' Despite Lasson's contention that, at least in England, customs officials had no authority to search
based solely on their commissions, id. at 55, and that the writs of assistance "empowered" them to conduct searches, id. at 54, the description in the text states the better view. It is drawn from Dickerson,
Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the Revolution, in THE ERA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 40, 43-46

(R. Morris ed. 1939). At the very least, Dickerson's explanation accounts for the name of the hated writs.
It seems plausible that something called a writ of assistance did not itself empower the customs officials
to search, but only authorized them to prevail upon constables for help in maintaining order as they
searched. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 9, at 32 n.53. But see Gray, What are Writs of Assistance?, in
J. QuINcY, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE

PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772, at Appendix IA 395 (Boston 1865).
Dickerson, supra note 50, at 45-46.
"LANDmSKI, supra note 9, at 33-34. The argument in Paxton's Case was in two parts and roughly
reported in J. QUINCY, REPORTS OF THE CASES ARGUED AND ADjUDGED
JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY BETWEEN 1761 AND

IN

THE SUPERIOR

COURT OF

1772, at 51-57 (Boston 1865),
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Adams' telling fifty years later, Otis' speech could have been no more moving. "Then
and there," said Adams, "was the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbi-

trary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the Child Independence was born. '

3

By the time of the Constitutional Convention, seven states had constitutional provisions concerning search and seizure, ranging from the simple prohibition on
general warrants in Virginia 4 to the more elaborate formulation in Massachusetts.' 5
The Bill of Rights, of course, was not part of the original Constitution and in fact
was drafted later only in response to anti-Federalist criticism.5 Madison's list of
proposals, containing a provision on search and seizure, was sent to a Committee of
Eleven for consideration, and three weeks later the Committee returned with the
following language: "The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, shall not be violated by warrants issuing without probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and not particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 5 7 From the floor, Gerry
managed to alter the draft to read "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.""8
and in II C. ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 521-25 (1856). Dickerson contends that Otis primarily
attacked the form of the warrant with the argument that it unlawfully recited that the Superior Court of
Massachusetts Bay had assumed the jurisdiction of all three common law courts in England, and that it
failed to restrict searches to a particular time. Dickerson, supra note 50, at 46-47. Less charitably, it
has been suggested that Otis had no real interest in the merits at all, but made the argument only out of
pique that Thomas Hutchinson, rather than his father, had been appointed to the Superior Court to hear
the case. See Gray, Writs of Assistance granted in Massachusetts Bay in the Reign of George 1I,in QUINCY,
supra at Appendix 1B 411 (mentioning but disputing the charge).
s'Letter from John Adams to William Tudor (March 29, 1817), quoted in Fraenkel, supra note 23,
at 365. See 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL or RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 192-94 (1971). Adams' appraisal almost certainly exaggerated the effect of Otis' efforts. Otis' speech, however eloquent, was delivered to a panel of judges in a small room in Boston. It was not reported in the newspapers at the
time, and certainly the colonies to the south could not have been influenced greatly by it. Dickerson,
supra note 50, at 42-43. I mean to denigrate neither Otis' argument nor its contribution to American
constitutional law. Both were remarkable. Professor Corwin has, for example, cited Otis' use of Dr.
Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B. 1610), as perhaps the earliest assertion in the colonies of the
principle of judicial review of legislative action. E. CoRwIN, LIBERTY AOAINST GOVERNMENT 39 (1948).
See generally Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 603-04 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); W. TUDOR,
LIFE OF JAMES OTIS 58-87 (1823).
" Section 10 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 53, at 235, appeared to speak only to general warrants:
The general warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded to search suspected
places without evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or whose
offense is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and
ought not to be granted.
' Section 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights of 1780, reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note
53, at 342, provided:
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures of his person,
his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right,
if the cause or foundation of them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation; and if the
order in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more
suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special designation of the
persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure: and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases,
and with the formalities, prescribed by the laws.
Leonard Levy has put it best.
Considering its immediate background, our precious Bill of Rights was in the main the chance
result of certain Federalists' having been reluctantly forced to capitalize for their own cause the
propaganda that had been originated in vain by the anti-Federalists for ulterior purposes. Thus the
party that had first opposed a Bill of Rights inadvertently wound up with the responsibility for its
framing and ratification, while the party that had at first professedly wanted it discovered too late
that its framing and ratification were not only embarrassing but inexpedient.
L. LEvy, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 233 (1960). See Nolan, The Constitution of the United States and the
First Ten Amendments, 4 NOTRE DAME LAW. 308 (1929).
67
LAssoN, supra note 11, at 101.
T
Sld.
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Then, Benson objected to the words "by warrants issuing" and proposed that they
be replaced with "and no warrant shall issue."59 That proposal was overwhelmingly
defeated, but when the final draft of the Bill of Rights emerged from the Committee
of Three, which had been assigned to arrange the provisions in the proper order
and was chaired by Benson, the very language the House had rejected was in place.
It was that language that stayed with the amendment in the Senate and throughout
the ratification processf 0
B. The Development of Search and Seizure Doctrine in the Supreme Court
The Court's development of search and seizure case law began slowly."' Early
on, Chief Justice Marshall held that arrest warrants, like search warrants, must be
supported by probable cause,62 but it was fifty years later before the Court took
more fourth amendment cases, then holding that the fourth amendment did not
protect against the actions of state officials 3 and that in any event it applied only in
criminal cases. 4 Late in the nineteenth century, however, a dictum in the Jackson
case 65 assumed that "letters and sealed packages" placed in the mail were personal
papers protected by the fourth amendment and thus could be opened only under a
warrant "as is required when papers are subjected to search in one's own household."6"
Then, in the Boyd case 7 a few years later, the Court took the even more dramatic
step of applying the fourth amendment to a subpoena duces tecum. The Boyds were
charged with having imported a quantity of structural glass without paying the
duty, and in order to prove its case-and justify confiscating the glass-the Government obtained an order from the trial court requiring the Boyds to produce an invoice concerning the transaction. Writing for the Court, Justice Bradley allowed
that the constitutional question raised was "not only an important one in the deterId., quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 783 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1834) (remarks in the House Judiciary
Committee on Aug. 24, 1789).
t Fraenkel, supra note 23, at 366 n.30. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 316-17 (1967)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
' Landynski suggests that the reason is easy enough to identify. The Congress did not exercise its
criminal jurisdiction extensively in the nineteenth century; the Court was not even given appellate jurisdiction of criminal cases until 1891. LANDYNSK, supra note 9, at 49. Yet that explanation is hardly
satisfying. Prior to its adoption of the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914),
the Court would have had no occasion to deal with the validity of a search or seizure in a criminal case.
Moreover, the Court's habeas corpus jurisdiction had been established since 1789 and certainly provided
a vehicle for fourth amendment decisions. E.g., Ex parte Buford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806). At
bottom, the explanation for the paucity of search and seizure cases in the early years must lie in the
failure of ordinary, civil lawsuits for trespass or false imprisonment to reach the Court. Those matters,
of course, rarely were pursued to the federal forum.
' Ex parte Buford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806).
'Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 76 (1855), citing Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S.
(7Pet.)
180 (1833).
"4Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 285-86 (1855).
The precise issue in the case was whether a distress warrant used to convey land was invalid because it
had been issued without oath or affirmation. The Court summarily rejected the argument that the fourth
amendment spoke to "civil proceedings for the recovery of debts." Id. Although the question whether the
fourth amendment applies to intrusions for purposes other than a search for evidence of crime cropped
up in later cases, see notes 202-39 and accompanying text infra, and, indeed, the issue still has not been
resolved, the treatment in Murray's Lessee has, so far as I know, never been recalled for service by the
Court. See note 71 infra.
'Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
' Id. at 733. Although the Court in Jackson rather clearly intended to speak of the fourth amendment, albeit in dictum, in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928), Chief Justice Taft suggested that any protection for the privacy of the mails derives from the statutes giving the government a
monopoly in postal services.
o Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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mination of the present case," but "a very grave question of constitutional law, involving the personal security, and privileges and immunities of the citizen ....""
While he acknowledged that the production order was "divested of many of the
aggravating incidents of actual search and seizure,""9 Justice Bradley nevertheless
concluded that it could not be approved:
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form;
but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way,
namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.
This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for
the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal
construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation
of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of
courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any
stealthy encroachments thereon. 70
Approaching the case in that way, Bradley held that since the forfeiture proceeding was "quasi-criminal," 71 and since the subpoena accomplished "the substantial
object" of a physical search, the production order had to be measured against the
fourth amendment.72 Coming to the merits, he distinguished searches for stolen
property, smuggled goods, and other contraband. In those cases, the owner of the
goods or the government had a superior property interest in them, and officers could
accordingly "keep them under observation" or "pursue and drag them from concealment. 7 3 In this case, in contrast, an attempt had been made to force from the
Boyds their "private books and papers" as mere evidence of wrongdoing. 74 Going
on, Bradley borrowed extensively from Entick in order to weave the fourth and
fifth amendments together.75 He was "unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's
private books and papers to be used in evidence against him" was "substantially
different from compelling him to be a witness against himself. '76 Accordingly, the
production order violated both the ban on unreasonable search and seizure and the
privilege against self-incrimination. Finally, Justice Bradley held that "the inspection by the district attorney of said invoice, when produced in obedience to said
'Id. at 618. More specifically, it was alleged that the Boyds had abused their special privilege to
import an amount of glass without duty in order to replace glass sold to the government. To determine
whether they had failed to pay the duty on more than the allotted amount, it was necessary to know how
much glass had been included in a certain shipment of 29 cases. The district court's order required the
Boyds to produce the invoice concerning that shipment.
id. at 635.
71Id.

Id. at 634. Landynski suggests that in this holding the Court meant to distinguish Murray's Lessee.
See note 64 and accompanying text supra. The Court did not, however, cite that case and distinguish it
by name.
"116 U.S. at 622.
"Id. at 624.
"Bradley's view-that the fourth amendment prohibited searches, even on a warrant, when the only
object was the discovery of evidence rather than contraband-might have been tied back to Entick. That
case, too, suggested that while warrants might issue for stolen or smuggled goods, they could not be used
merely to gather evidence. See note 44 and accompanying text supra. The key passage in Entick, however, did not rely on any supposed superior property interest in the owner of goods or the government.
That rationale was apparently original in Boyd. See notes 258-59 and accompanying text inira.
116 U.S. at 633. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
"116 U.S. at 633.
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notice, and its admission in evidence by the court, were erroneous and unconstitu77
tional proceedings."
Boyd has been much criticized. It has been said that the constitutional questions
might have been avoided altogether7 and that, in any event, it was gratuitous over-

kill to hold that the production order violated both the fourth and the fifth amendments.7 9 Other decisions have undermined the case,8 ' and very recently it has been

all but overruled.8" Nevertheless, Boyd was the mainstay of search and seizure development for decades. Its impact on later decisions cannot be overestimated, or
its lessons about the proper approach to constitutional protections for personal liberty

too well learned. 2
Two events dramatically increased the flow of search and seizure cases to the
Supreme Court in the years following Boyd. One was the adoption of the exclusionary rule, and the other was the ratification of the eighteenth amendment. The
movement toward a blanket rule that evidence seized by federal officers in an illegal
search and seizure is inadmissible in a federal criminal trial was anything but smooth.
Such a rule was suggested in Boyd,"5 but eighteen years later it was flatly rejected
"Id. at 638. There were no dissents in Boyd, but Justice Miller, joined by Chief Justice Waite, concurred separately. He would have disposed of the case on the fifth amendment and avoided Justice Bradley's
innovative search and seizure discussion. Indeed, Justice Miller found not a "hint" of a search in the case.
Id. at 640. He pointed out that the statute under which the trial court had acted did not authorize the
seizure of the Boyds' invoice. It provided only that the court might require them to produce it in court
to be examined by the prosecutor and perhaps introduced into evidence. All this, Justice Miller thought,
could be accomplished without depriving the Boyds of custody. Finding neither a search nor a seizure
in the case, and commenting that in any event the framers had been concerned only with prohibiting
unreasonable searches on a general warrant, Justice Miller rejected Justice Bradley's fourth amendment
analysis.
78Nelson, Search and Seizure: Boyd v. United States, 9 A.B.A.J. 773 (1923). The argument is that
as part of its statutory scheme governing imports, the Congress had required the Boyds to supply the
Government with certified copies of import invoices. The Boyds, however, had not complied with the
statutory requirement; if they had, the authorities would have already had a copy of the invoice in
question and would not have needed the production order. As it was, in requiring the Boyds to produce
the original the trial court arguably obtained for the government no more information than should have
been available earlier. Of course, given the Congress' broad power to regulate foreign commerce, there
is no serious question that the statutory requirement that copies of invoices be made available to the
authorities was valid.
"LANDYNSKI, supra note 9, at 58-59. Dean Wigmore pointed out that the histories of the two provisions were entirely different and that the Boyd Court's suggestion that they had been mingled in the
minds of Englishmen and the colonists was simply incorrect. 8 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLOAMERICAN SYSTEM Os EVIDENCE § 2184, at 31 (3d ed. 1940). Professor Chafee observed that while the
fifth amendment ordinarily has to do with compelling a suspect to "do something active," in search and
seizure cases "he usually remains passive." Chafee, The Progress of the Law, 35 HARv. L. REV. 673,
697-98 (1922).
"See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 72-73 (1906) (commenting that in cases following Boyd the
fourth and fifth amendments had been treated as "quite distinct" and that the former had primarily to
do with physical trespass); ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894) (approving a subpoena ordering witnesses before the ICC to produce documents relating to their testimony). Even as he declared that in
1930 most of the dicta in Boyd had matured into positive law, Professor Corwin acknowledged that the
precise holding in the case could not survive the Court's more recent decisions indicating that the invoice
would have been seizable as an instrumentality of the offense charged. Corwin, The Supreme Court's
Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MicH. L. REV. 1, 19 (1930). The Court's subsequent
refusal to extend the fifth amendment privilege to corporations, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S.
361 (1911); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944), or partnerships, e.g., Bellis v. United States,
417 U.S. 85 (1974), would also have required a different result. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391, 408 (1976).
'United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 n.1 (1976). See notes 278-84 and accompanying text infra.
'5Justice Brandeis, for example, proclaimed Boyd as "a case that will be remembered as long as civil
liberty lives in the United States." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (dissenting
opinion).
' See text at note 77 supra.
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in the Adams case,8 4 when the Court preferred the common law rule that "courts
do not stop to inquire as to the means by which ... evidence was obtained.""5 Then,
in another turn about, the Court embraced the principle of exclusion in a series of
cases beginning with Weeks.8" In Weeks, the petitioner had been arrested without
a warrant by a police officer while other officers conducted a warrantless search of
his home. The officers seized various articles thought to be relevant to a charge of
unlawful use of the mails and turned them over to a federal marshal.8 7 Later, the
marshal conducted his own warrantless search, seizing still more documentary evidence. Prior to trial, the petitioner moved for the return of everything taken from
his house, but the trial court ordered the return only of those things not needed as
evidence. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Day distinguished his own opinion
in Adams on the tenuous ground that in the instant case the petitioner had filed
his motion before trial and had thus given the trial court an opportunity to rule
upon it without disrupting orderly procedures.88 Then, relying on the Boyd-Entick

proposition that the principles at hand reached "farther than the concrete form of
the case then before the court, with its adventitious circumstances" and applied "to

all invasions ... of a man's home and the privacies of life,"8 9 he said that the Court
simply could not sanction the marshal's concededly unconstitutional actions. 90

Narrowly stated, the holding in Weeks was that a criminal defendant's illegally
seized property must be returned if the defendant makes a "seasonable application." 91

Although there was talk in the opinion of the impropriety of admitting such property
into evidence, that issue was always tied to the trial court's refusal to order the return of the property before trial.92 The case dealt, then, with the lawfulness of a
failure to return illegally seized property to its owner rather than the use to which
such property is put when not returned. In later cases, however, the Court made
it clear that Weeks had been intended to have substantial impact on the gathering
and use of evidence in federal prosecutions. In the Silverthorne case,' 3 the Court
held that a prosecutor could not avoid difficulty simply by copying unlawfully seized
documents before returning them and introducing only the copies at trial. Justice
Holmes declared that Weeks had not meant that all would be well if the government took two steps rather than one to get its evidence. The law was "not merely"
that "evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not
" Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904). Although Adams posed the question whether the
fourteenth amendment spoke to the method by which state officers had obtained evidence used in a state
criminal trial, the Court chose to leave that issue untouched and focused instead on the threshold question
whether the lawfulness of the seizure should be considered in any case. Id. at 594.
5 Id.
"oWeeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
Id. at 386.
Particularly in light of subsequent cases relaxing the "seasonable application" rule, Day's treatment
of Adams was entirely inadequate. It is generally agreed that that case could not survive the Court's
departure in Weeks, but that the Court simply had no taste for overruling it expressly. See People v.
Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 20, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926) (reading Weeks and subsequent cases to have rejected Adams sub silentio); J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 233 & n.17 (1959); Comment, Admissibility
of Illegally Seized Evidence-The Federal Exclusionary Rule-A Historical Analysis, 38 U. DET. L.J.
635 (1961).
' 232 U.S. at 391, quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
"°As Justice Day had it, "[t]o sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a
manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution." 232 U.S. at 394.
"I d. at 398.
'2Justice Day's express holding was that the trial court had committed prejudicial error in "holding
[the papers] and permitting their use upon the trial." Id.
" Silvcrthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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be used at all."'94 Then, further extending Weeks and undermining Adams, the
Court held in Gouled9 5 that if a defendant does not know that the government has
seized his or her property until it is introduced, a motion for return must be heard
even then-irrespective of the delay occasioned by treatment of the collateral issue."
Accordingly, by the early 1920s the exclusionary rule had become a vehicle for raising
search and seizure claims in a large percentage of the criminal cases coming before
the federal courts.97
The second event that brought cases by the score to the Court was the adoption
of Prohibition.9" The Volstead Act was the most far-reaching criminal legislation
ever enacted by the Congress. It sent a national police force into the field, charged
with enforcing a law that was habitually violated in the privacy of one's home,
office, or automobile." To accomplish their virtually impossible task, federal agents
resorted to search and seizure in a wide variety of circumstances. Those convicted
often pursued their cases to the Supreme Court, urging that the evidence used against
them at trial-usually contraband whiskey or paraphernalia used in its productionhad been unlawfully seized. Accordingly, the Court was increasingly called upon
to develop meaningful and workable standards for determining when and how the
fourth amendment comes into play. In the Hester case,' 00 Justice Holmes held that
moonshine flung in desperation from a window and picked up outside by federal
agents had been abandoned in the open fields and was thus unprotected by the
Constitution. 101 In Olmstead,'12 Chief Justice Taft ruled that the petitioners' conviction for an elaborate unlawful conspiracy to import liquor was not invalid simply
because federal agents had "seized" their conversations in a surreptitious wiretap.
Not only had there been no physical trespass, but there had been no seizure of
"effects" or "things" within the meaning of the fourth amendment.1a 3 In those cases

'4 Id. at 392.
' 5 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
"See also Segurola v. United States, 275 U.S. 106 (1927); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921)
(recognizing a demand made after the jury had been sworn). For a description of the steady march
toward a generally applicable exclusionary rule apart from its source in the requirement that illegally
seized items be returned to their owner on request see Comment, Search, Seizure, and the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments, 31 YAL L.J. 518 (1922) [hereinafter cited as Search].
' Cf. Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1109, 1150 n.17 7 (1969) (pointing out that
prior to Weeks the only remedies for unlawful search and seizure had been civil suit, criminal prosecution
of the offending officer, and self-help); Grant, Constitutional Basis of the Rule Forbidding the Use of
Illegally Seized Evidence, 15 S. CAL. L. REV. 60, 60-61 (1941) (same).
08WIGMORE, supra note 79, at 10-11. See Atkinson, Prohibition and the Doctrine of the Weeks Case,
59 Am. L. REv. 728 (1925).
"See H. JOHNSTON, WHAT RIGHTs ARE LEFT 26 (1930); Wilson, Attempts to Nullify the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments to the Constitution, 32 W. VA. L.Q. 128 (1925).
'°Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
"0'This "open fields" exception to the scope of the fourth amendment was stated in a cryptic passage
at the very end of the opinion:
The only shadow of a ground for bringing up the case is drawn from the hypothesis that the
examination of the vessels took place upon Hester's father's land. As to that, it is enough to say
that, apart from the justification, the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the
people in their "persons, houses, papers, and effects," is not extended to the open fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the common law.

Id. at 59, citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES*

223, 225, 226.

"1Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
"0The Court's opinion dwelt at length upon the facts of the case. The petitioners had been convicted of maintaining a conspiracy "of amazing magnitude," involving at least 50 persons and several ships
operating at various ports on the West Coast. The Court estimated that the conspiracy had sales of more
than $2,000,000 a year. Id. at 455-56. In order to gather the evidence needed to prosecute such an important case, the Government had tapped telephone lines for "many months" and had listened to numerous
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in which the fourth amendment was applicable, the Court found itself increasingly
asked to fill out vague and ambiguous terms-such as "unreasonable" and "probable
0 4
cause." Responding on the most fundamental level in Nathanson,1
the Court
held that a warrant to search for unlawfully imported liquor must rest upon a
"statement of adequate supporting facts" rather than "a mere affirmation of
suspicion and belief."' 5 Inasmuch as many searches for illicit liquor were carried out
without a warrant, the Court was called upon to determine the relationship between
the two clauses of the fourth amendment and to explain the circumstances in which
a warrantless search could be lawful. The automobile cases, principally Carroll 6
and Husty,10 7 established the rule that the failure of federal agents to obtain a
conversations. Id. at 457. Still, the Court could find no bar in the fourth amendment. There had been
no physical trespass and no seizure of "material things." Id. at 464.
By the invention of the telephone, fifty years ago, and its application for the purpose of extending communications, one can talk with another at a far distant place. The language of the
Amendment can not be extended and expanded to include telephone wires reaching to the whole
world from the defendant's house or office. The intervening wires are not part of his house or
office any more than are the highways along which they are stretched.
Congress may of course protect the secrecy of telephone messages by making them, when intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal criminal trials, by direct legislation, and thus depart from
the common law of evidence. But the courts may not adopt such a policy by attributing an enlarged
and unusual meaning to the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 465-66. As part of the Communications Act of 1934, Congress did prohibit at least the publication
of communications obtained by wiretapping. Ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605
(1970)). See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937) (holding that the statute applied to federal
law enforcement authorities). The Crime Control Act of 1968 amended the Communications Act to
permit some electronic surveillance-but only on a warrant issued by a magistrate. Pub. L. No. 90-351,
§ 802, 82 Stat. 212-23 (current version codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970)). See Y. KAMISAR,
W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 418-20 (4th ed. 1974).
It was in dissent in Olmstead, of course, that Justice Brandeis contributed his warning that the fourth
amendment should not be given "an unduly literal construction." 277 U.S. at 476. Citing Boyd, he reminded the Court that "[w]hen the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were adopted 'the form that evil had
theretofore taken,' had been necessarily simple . . . . But 'time works changes, brings into existence new
conditions and purposes.' " Id. at 473, citing 116 U.S. at 630. The electronic surveillance in Olmstead
was only the beginning, according to Justice Brandeis. "Ways may some day be developed by which the
Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which
it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home." 277 U.S. at 474. He
insisted that the Court should interpret the fourth amendment to deal with the approaching technological
revolution, lest the government become armed with espionage tools that made the writs of assistance
"but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression" in comparison. Id. at 476. Finally, wholly apart from
the constitutional issue, Justice Brandeis urged that the convictions be set aside because the wiretapping
in the case had been conducted in violation of state law. While at the outset the unlawful wiretapping
had been the criminal activity only of the individual officers, in this case the Government had attempted
to take advantage of the fruits of that wrongdoing and had thus "assumed moral responsibility for the
officers' crimes." Id. at 483. By permitting the Government to do just that, the majority had sanctioned
those crimes. "The governing principle has long been settled," he said. "It is that a court will not
redress a wrong when he who invokes its aid has unclean hands." Id. In conclusion, he delivered the
language that made his Olmstead dissent famous:
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the
same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the
government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the
potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.
Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it
invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the Government may
commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible
retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.
Id. at 485.
'o' Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933).
'Id. at 46.
" Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
" Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931).

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

warrant might be excused in exigent circumstances when seeking a warrant would
frustrate the purpose of the search.'
Finally, the whiskey cases called into question
the fourth amendment standards governing searches incident to arrest. Here, too,
09
the Court was hard at work developing guidelines, however inadequate. Agnello,'
Marron," ° Go-Bart,"' and Lefkowitzl 12 come to mind. In those "ill-starred prohibition cases,"' " 3 the Court began to fashion the principle that a search incident to
arrest might extend beyond the suspect's person to the surrounding area." 4
By the end of the Prohibition Era, the Court had begun to develop a body of
search and seizure doctrine. It was flawed, of course, and worse. Indeed, it was in
many respects unpredictable, self-contradictory and even unintelligible." 5 Yet, in
its own way and time the Court was attempting to build a framework within which
search and seizure cases might be decided with justice to the litigants and to the
values underlying the fourth amendment. All this was going on, of course, as the
Court reviewed federal criminal convictions to determine whether evidence introduced at trial should have been excluded under the Weeks rule. In state cases, on
the other hand, the standard of review was "fundamental fairness" derived from the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court had held since
Twining"' that a state conviction could be set aside only if the accused was denied
procedure "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.""' 7 That standard was troublesome at best. Not only was it extraordinarily difficult to express, it was virtually
impossible to apply with consistency. And slowly it lost ground to Justice Black's
" At the core of the cases was the proposition that an automobile was a mobile container that could be
moved out of the jurisdiction while the agents took time to seek a warrant from a magistrate. Accordingly,
it made sense, at least to the Supreme Court, to permit the agents to make their own determination of
probable cause and to conduct a warrantless search on the spot-subject to review by a court when the
defendants moved to suppress any evidence found. The Court's position won some praise, e.g., Nelson,
supra note 78, at 776, but a good deal of criticism, e.g., Black, A Critique of the Carroll Case, 29 CoLum.
L. REV. 1068 (1929).
'o Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
"'Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
"'Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
"'United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
"' F. BLACK, ILL-STARRED PROHIBITION CASES (1931).
".See notes 340-42, 348-49, 357-64 and accompanying text infra.
"See Grant, Circumventing the Fourth Amendment, 14 S. CAL. L. REV. 359' (1941) (complaining
that so many exceptions to the exclusionary rule had been recognized that "any value it might otherwise
have had" had been destroyed).
"Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). Of course, even before Justices Black and Douglas
began pressing Black's incorporation theory in the 1940s, there had been occasional talk in the cases
about applying the Bill of Rights to the states through the fourteenth amendment. E.g., O'Neil v. Vermont,
144 U.S. 323, 370 (1892) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment
Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140 (1949). But a majority on the Court had never
taken that position seriously. E.g., McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155 (1891); Hurtado v. California,
110 U.S. 516 (1884); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
" Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). Palko was perhaps the most interesting of the
cases illustrating the growth of the incorporation idea. The case was cited both by those who consistently
urged the flexible due process approach, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 (1947) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring), and by Justice Black-who supposed the case to adopt the intermediate, "selective incorporation" approach. E.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 163-64 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
The basic case, however, was Twining, in which the Court said:
[I]t is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments
against National action may also be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would
be a denial of due process of law .... If this is so, it is not because those rights are enumerated in
the first eight Amendments, but because they are of such a nature that they are included in the
conception of due process of law.
211 U.S. at 99.
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incorporation theory."' Wolf" 9 was a watershed in this process. Compromising
in some measure with Justice Black, Justice Frankfurter acknowledged that
"[t]he security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which
is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society."12 Accordingly,
he said, that interest was protected against state invasion by the due process clause.
Nevertheless, to drive home his rejection of "jot-for-jot" incorporation,' he drew
a distinction between the intrusion itself-which violated due process-and the use
of illegally seized evidence at trial. The latter issue, he insisted, was a question
"of a different order."' 2 2 Since two-thirds of the states and the members of the
Commonwealth did not find the exclusionary rule vital to liberty, he declined to
force it upon Colorado.'
Wolf's dichotomy between right and remedy caused immediate difficulty. Frankfurter himself seemed unconcerned. In Rochin, 24 where California officers dragged
the petitioner from his bed and forced him to regurgitate capsules of morphine,
Justice Frankfurter abruptly upset the conviction, declaring that "the proceedings
by which this conviction was obtained do more than offend some fastidious squeamishness . . . . This is conduct that shocks the conscience.""' 5 The police conduct
had been not only bad, but shocking-so shocking, indeed, that the conviction that
followed could not stand consistent with due process. That result was hardly objectionable, but the "shock the conscience" test Justice Frankfurter used to reach it,
and his total neglect of Wolf,"' confused even his colleagues. Two years later, in
" This is not the place for yet another labored description of the debate over incorporation that raged
on the Court for 20 years before Justice Black finally had his way, albeit through the intellectually
troubling process of "selective incorporation." See Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property", 62 CORNELL
L. Rav. 405 (1977). Materials on this most critical question in constitutional law are easy enough to find.

E.g., G. GUNTHER,

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw

486-656 (9th ed. 1975); Comment, The Adamson Case: A

Study in ConstitutionalTechnique, 58 YALE L.J. 268 (1949).
"Wolf
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). The facts were not set out in the opinion, prompting
speculation that the Court saw the case as raising only the dry and abstract question of incorporation,
divorced from any significant concern for the fairness of the procedure in Colorado. E.g., Perlman, Due
Process and the Admissibility of Evidence, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1304 (1951). It is noteworthy that in other
Frankfurter opinions handed down on the same day, the Court was not at all adverse to calling state
police to account for coercive interrogation tactics. See, e.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
'20338 U.S. at 27. 1 do not read this language as some have to mean that "because the core of the
fourth amendment is incorporated into the fourteenth, it is unconstitutional for state officers to search
for and seize evidence in a manner which would violate the standard applicable to federal officers under
the fourth amendment." Kohn, Admissibility in Federal Court of Evidence Illegally Seized by State
Officers, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 229, 242. Indeed, given Justice Frankfurter's persistent opposition to "incorporation," it seems plain that he was trying to avoid precisely that implication. See Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 237-40 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Of course, after Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961), the Court openly assumed that the same standards governed federal officers subject to
the fourth amendment and state officers subject to the fourteenth. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30-31
(1963). Professor Amsterdam accepts the identity of the two standards as settled law. Amsterdam, supra
note 1, at 440 n.23. But there is substantial evidence the matter is far from closed in the minds of the
Justices now sitting. See note 668 and accompanying text infra.
" See generally Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 181 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
338 U.S. at 28.
' In conclusion Justice Frankfurter noted that, in his view at least, the exclusionary rule was not itself
a part of even the fourth amendment, but rather arose by "judicial implication" in Weeks. In what was
yet another expression of his dilemma between protecting individual privacy and maintaining the proper
respect for federalism, he implied that Congress might abrogate the rule in federal cases or force it upon
the states through the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 33. See Allen, The Wolf
Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REv. 1, 10 (1950).
"'Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
5
1d.
I at 172.
" There was in Frankfurter's Rochin opinion no mention of Wolf whatever and certainly no mention
of a dichotomy between the individual's constitutional protection from arbitrary intrusions upon privacy
and property and the consequences of an unlawful intrusion. At the time, Professor Allen offered that
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lrvine,121 when other California officers trespassed repeatedly into the petitioners'
bedroom to plant several bugs and listened to dozens of private conversations, a
majority found Wolf rather than Rochin controlling. To be sure, the police had
violated the due process clause by arbitrarily intruding into the petitioners' privacy; 28
but however aggravated their trespass, it did not follow that the evidence they obtained must be excluded from the trial. Justice Frankfurter dissented,' 29 but the
Court would not relent. The police had acted badly, but evidently not badly
3 0

enough.1

Irvine, and cases like it, demonstrated to the entering Warren Court that the
Frankfurter "flexible due process" standard was utterly unmanageable. Just as in
the cases involving the right to counsel'.' and coerced confessions,"' 2 the new Justices
ultimately rejected the flexible test in favor of the more precise standards developed
13
under the fourth amendment in federal cases. The case, of course, was Mapp.
Writing for the plurality, 34 Justice Clark re-examined the experience of the states,
now finding that more than half had adopted the exclusionary rule as the only effective protection against unreasonable search and seizure. 3 5 Moreover, in the time
in Rochin Frankfurter had wanted to avoid the "rigidities inherent in the privilege against self-incrimination" but could not make stomach-pumping "fit comfortably in the search and seizure category." Allen,
Due Process and State Criminal Procedures: Another Look, 48 Nw. L. REV. 16, 24-25 (1953).
" Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
"ndeed,
Justice Jackson was so outraged at what had occurred in the case that he suggested that
copies of the record be forwarded to the Attorney General for possible criminal prosecution. Id. at 137-38.
' He insisted that Wolf was simply inapplicable. This case, like Rochin, presented a fundamental
fairness question under the due process clause, and the absence of physical coercion could not save the
conviction. Wolf, on the other hand, had concerned only unreasonable search and seizure. Id. at 144.
" Justice Clark concurred bitterly in Irvine, indicating that if he had been on the Court for Wolf he
would have voted for exclusion. Id. at 138. But see Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957) (opinion
of the Court). That attitude, expressed by a new appointee not known for coddling criminals, suggested
that even then Wolf was ripe for re-examination. McKay, Mapp v. Ohio, The Exclusionary Rule and the
Right of Privacy, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 327, 331 (1973). See generally Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years
Later, 43 MiNN. L. REV. 1083 (1959) (surveying the difficulties left in Wolf's wake).
' Compare Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) and Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) with
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
" Compare Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) and Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949)
with Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
" Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
"The case involved an unusually extensive and brutal search for a bombing suspect and evidence of
gambling, during which officers broke down the door of a two-family dwelling, flashed what they claimed
was a warrant, hand-cuffed the suspect and dragged her through the house as they searched, and ultimately
seized only some allegedly obscene materials from a trunk in the basement. In the state courts, the
principal issue had been whether a state statute making it an offense to knowingly possess obscene materials was consistent with the first amendment. Id. at 672-73 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). Only the amicus curiae urged the Court to treat the search question.
367 U.S. at 646 n.3 (opinion of the Court). Accordingly, the surprise decision uprooting Wolf found
three Justices, Harlan, Frankfurter, and Whittaker, in dissent and one, Justice Stewart, declining to pass
on the exclusionary rule issue. The deciding vote in Mapp was cast by Justice Black, who could find no
exclusionary rule in the fourth amendment alone, see id. at 661 (Black, J., concurring), citing Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 39-40 (1948) (Black, J., concurring), but now relied on Boyd's conjunction of the
fourth and fifth amendments to impose the rule of exclusion in both federal and state cases. In an apparent nod to Justice Black, Justice Clark's opinion for the Court rested the rule in federal cases on both
the fourth and fifth amendments and in state cases on the "intimate relation" between constitutional protections against "unconscionable invasions of privacy" and "convictions based upon coerced confessions."
367 U.S. at 656-57. In light of Weeks' reliance on the fourth amendment alone, the reference to the
coerced confession and self-incrimination cases was troubling. It must be understood as yet another
carry-over from the confusing blurring of safeguards against unreasonable search and seizure and selfincrimination begun in Entick and wedged into American constitutional law in Boyd. See notes 44, 75-76
and accompanying text supra.
"" 367 U.S. at 651. The Court particularly cited California, the state from which the obnoxious Rochin
and Irvine cases had come. Although the California court had long rejected the exclusionary rule, e.g.,
People v. Gonzales, 20 Cal. 2d 165, 124 P.2d 44 (1942) (in bank), after Wolf the court had embraced it
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since Wolf, the Court's decisions discarding the "silver platter doctrine,"1" 6 relaxing
"standing" requirements, 1 7 and prohibiting federal officers from passing unlawfully
seized evidence to state courts138 had gradually come to look in the direction of
uniformity between the federal and state systems. Finally, Justice Clark squarely
rejected the distinction between right and remedy devised by Justice Frankfurter
in Wolf, saying that at the time "the Court held in Wolf that the Amendment was
applicable to the States" it was clear that "as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. '" 9
"Therefore," he said, "in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches-state or federal-it was logically and constitutionally necessary [that the exclusionary rule be recognized as] an essential ingredient
of the right newly recognized by the Wolf case."14
Incorporation had prevailed. The Court had looked again at the experience of
the states and this time seen a glass half full rather than a glass half empty.1 41 It
had pounded intervening precedents into line behind a new principle, and in the
final moment had rewritten Wolf itself as a partially incorporationist decision in
order to break the way for a holding that henceforth both state and federal cases
would be controlled by the same search and seizure doctrine. 42 In cases decided
through the 1960s, fourth and fourteenth amendment precedents were used interchangeably as the Warren Court simply assumed that the same standards governed
both, and that when those standards were breached, the exclusionary rule came into
"because other remedies [had] completely failed to secure compliance with the constitutional provisions."
People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 282 P.2d 905, 911 (1955) (in bank). See Paulsen, Criminal Law
Administration: The Zero Hour Was Coming, 53 CAL. L. REV. 103 (1965) (suggesting that the court
changed its position on the exclusionary rule in light of the deliberate violations of the Constitution by
California police---even at the supervisory levels).
"s Since Weeks, relying solely upon the fourth amendment, had said that the exclusionary rule would
not apply to evidence seized by state officers, the Court at first held that so long as no federal officers had
engaged in illegal conduct and the evidence used in a federal prosecution was merely delivered on a
"silver platter" by state officers, the evidence was admissible. See, e.g., Byars v. United States, 273 U.S.
28 (1926). However, in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), the Court disapproved the doctrine
on the ground that it caused friction between the federal and state systems when federal courts in exclusionary rule states received evidence seized unlawfully by state officers-evidence the state's own courts
would not receive. See Broeder, The Decline and Fall of Wolf v. Colorado, 41 NEB. L. REV. 185 (1962).
"Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (recognizing standing in a suspect charged with a
possessory offense or lawfully present at the time of the search). See notes 301-12 and accompanying
text infra.
"SRea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956) (enjoining a federal officer from delivering illegally
seized evidence to state authorities for use in a state which did not recognize the exclusionary rule). See
Berman & Oberst, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by an Unconstitutional Search and Seizure-Federal
Problems, 55 Nw. L. REV. 525 (1960). But see Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392 (1963) (declining to
enjoin a state officer in similar circumstances).
" 367 U.S. at 655.
4
' °Id. at 655-56.
' In dissent, Justice Harlan insisted that however many states did embrace the rule, what was important was that half of them did not. Id. at 680.
" Compare text at note 139 supra with note 120 and accompanying text supra. My statements in
the text cover two notions that for purposes of analysis must at times be kept separate. On the one hand,
there is the question whether the same rules govern searches and seizures carried out by federal and
state officers. Notwithstanding Justice Frankfurter's objections, the Court held in Ker that the standards
were indeed the same. See note 120 supra. Again, I have my doubts about whether the Burger Court
sees the matter as settled, and I will return to the question later. See note 668 and accompanying text
infra. On the other hand, there is the question whether the same consequences flow from a finding of
unlawful conduct by federal and state officers. This is the precise issue decided in Mapp-in favor of
the exclusionary rule as the only response to illegal search and seizure. But see notes 610-13, 617-19,
625-26 and accompanying text infra.
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play as a matter of course.' 48 The Burger Court inherited that frame of mind, and
with few exceptions has continued to view search and seizure considerations as
fungible goods to be pulled from fourth and fourteenth amendment decisions without distinction.' 44 Yet, in taking precedents to identify considerations more than
to state principles, the Burger Court has made important changes. While the effect
of the Warren Court's imposition of uniformity upon the state and federal systems
was to make over state criminal procedure to mirror the more structured federal
process, the Burger Court has moved both systems back toward the standard applied
to state cases when Twining was in flower. 4 ' Thus, while the Court contemplates
that both state and federal cases will be judged by the same standard, more often
than not, that standard is indistinguishable from the "fundamental fairness" minimum always required of the states under the fourteenth amendment.
II.

THE PROBLEMS

Search and seizure cases present three major issues. First, there is the question
of the scope of constitutional protection. The Court must define a "search" and a
"seizure." It must determine the circumstances in which the fourth amendment
comes into play and when that provision rather than some other is the appropriate
benchmark against which to judge events. Second, there is the question of standards.
Once it is decided that the fourth amendment applies, the Court must determine
when it is violated. The Court must elaborate on what makes a search and seizure
"unreasonable" and fill out other vague and ambiguous phrases. It must define
"probable cause" and fix standards for "particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized." Finally, there is the question of consequences.
Having found that a search or seizure was unreasonable, the Court must determine
146
what follows upon that conclusion.
After Boyd and Weeks, the exclusionary rule provided a vehicle, and the Prohibition cases an opportunity, for the Court's attempts, however feeble and unsatisfactory in hindsight, to deal with these three overriding issues. There was a
good faith attempt to draw Professor Amsterdam's horse. The going was hard.
Every decision seemed to raise more search and seizure questions than it answered,
and it was exceedingly difficult to formulate workable doctrine to guide the police
and the lower courts. With the arrival of the imaginative Warren Court Justices,
great strides were taken, but even the constitutional implications of the most common contacts between citizen and police evaded principled analysis in which the
Court and the rest of us could place confidence. 4 Nevertheless, the attempt was
3E.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)
(finding it necessary to expressly overrule federal
decisions in order to reach an inconsistent result in a state case).
'E.g., Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973) (upholding a search in a state case solely on the
basis of a federal case decided on the same day).
" See notes 116-30 and accompanying text supra.
. Although I am not satisfied that the term "consequences" is a significant improvement, I do want
to avoid calling this question one of "remedy." Our number is dwindling by the day and our views are
hardly acceptable to the present Court, but there are some of us left who do not believe the exclusionary
rule is merely one of several "remedies" for unconstitutional search and seizure. I for one do not embrace
Justice Frankfurter's dichotomy between "right" and "remedy." Rather, I see the exclusionary rule as
"part and parcel" of the underlying right. I will defend that thesis in a separate Section below.
. E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (treating brief street encounters). See Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 490 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (complaining that "the present state of
uncertainty" as to the constitutional implications of "everyday" questions was "intolerable").
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made, and in this Part some of the most important cases are surveyed. While I find
these decisions dissatisfying in many respects, I set them out here not for criticism
but to provide a contrast with the more recent work of the Nixon appointees. The
Burger Court cases are, of course, my chief concern. I will come to them after laying
the necessary foundation.
A. The Question of Scope
Scope, the threshold question, has troubled the Court more than any other. It has
been treated in three related, but for purposes of organization separable, lines of
cases. In the Katz case, 148 the Court grappled with the fundamental theoretical
issues tied up in the fourth amendment's protection of privacy. That case, together
with its precursors and successors, must be examined first. Next, we must examine
the cases on the effect of the governmental purpose in conducting what appear to be
"searches." Finally, we must complete the picture by treating the neglected question
of the protection for property in the fourth amendment. 49
1. The Fourth Amendment and Privacy
The best thinking on the scope of the fourth amendment has come from outside
the Court, and the best of that from Anthony Amsterdam. 5 ' He identifies two
models. On the one hand, the Court might choose a means-oriented approach that
" Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
...
Two other "scope" questions come to mind. One is the effect of private actions that, if conducted
by government officers, would violate the fourth amendment. The Court held in Burdeau v. McDowell,
256 U.S. 465 (1921), that for want of the requisite governmental responsibility, searches conducted by
private persons are not controlled by the fourth amendment. That proposition is not so impregnable as
it first may seem. For even if one takes the position that there is insufficient "governmental" or "state"
action in the intrusion itself to invoke the Constitution, but see Note, Seizures by Private Parties: Exclusion in Criminal Cases, 19 STAN. L. REV. 608 (1967), the later acquisition of the intrusion's fruits by
the police, see Note, Private Searches and Seizures, 90 HARV. L. REV. 463 (1976), or their ratification of
the intrusion, see Black, Burdeau v. McDowell-A judicial Milepost on the Road to Absolutism, 12 B.U.
L. REv. 32 (1932), or even the use of the fruits at trial, see White, The Fourth Amendment as a Way of
Talking About People: A Study of Robinson and Matlock, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 165, 221 n.107, may
arguably implicate the authorities in the otherwise private search and seizure. While a relatively unobjectionable private search might not cause a great deal of difficulty, one that "shocks the conscience" and
would violate even the due process clause if carried out by state officers is troubling indeed. See Burdeau
v. McDowell, 256 U.S. at 477 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting that the suspect's business had been
burglarized and his safe blasted open to get at evidence handed over to the government). Both because
a discussion of Burdeau would require a fair dip into the general "state action" literature and because
I do not see that the effort would substantially further the defense of my thesis, I have decided not to
treat the case or its issue in this Article.
The second "scope" question I will omit is the question of "consent" to what would otherwise
constitute an unlawful search and seizure. While some authorities view consent as merely another exception to the warrant requirement, see, e.g., United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 1973),
I consider Lloyd Weinreb's view that consent avoids the fourth amendment altogether more accurate.
Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. Cm. L. REV. 47 (1974). Here again, though,
I do not see that a discussion of the decisions would serve my purpose. I hasten to say that I believe cases
like United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (resting the power of a third party to consent to a
search on the suspect's assumption of that risk), only apply the "expectation of privacy" formula from
Katz in another context-indeed, one not far removed from the "secret agent" cases. See notes 168,
176-87 and accompanying text infra. To be sure, the "totality of the circumstances" test established in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), for ordinary consent cases tracks the "reasonableness"
or, I think more accurately, the "fundamental fairness" standard of review that is now applied by the
Burger Court in most fourth amendment cases. Witness the third-degree methods disapproved by Judge
Celebrezze in United States v. Mayes, 552 F.2d 729 (6th Cir. 1977). I do not, then, find the cases on
consent, or for that matter private search and seizure, to undercut my thesis. I have only concluded
that a discussion of them would unduly lengthen an already overlong paper without introducing more
useful illustrations than those I have chosen to set forth.
ISO
Amsterdam, supra note 1.
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invokes the fourth amendment in any case in which the police conduct under review
resembles the general searches carried out by the Halifax messengers."' This alternative has the flavor of the historical approach I have said the Court, and everybody else, has rejected.' 52 But the means-oriented model is not so crabbed as all that.
It uses the historical evidence only to identify the paradigm government action with
which the fourth amendment is concerned. Faced with a case in the mid-twentieth
century, it does not ask if the framers "intended" to cover this case, but rather whether
55
what the police did looks like what the customs officials did in Boston Harbor.'
The root idea is that however the fourth amendment is read, it surely must be read
to control the paradigm case.154 From there, the Court can only inch forward in
the fashion of the common law, expanding the reach of the fourth amendment by
strained analogy and loose adherence to precedent. The individual rarely wins in
such a regime. Witness Hester,5 ' in which the Court declined to hold federal agents
accountable under the fourth amendment when they seized moonshine that had
been "abandoned" in the "open fields" just outside the suspect's window, and
Olmstead, 5" in which the Court saw no fourth amendment problem in wiretapping
that involved no physical trespass into a building and no seizure of "material
things."' 57 On the other hand, the Court might adopt a value-oriented model that
finds in the historical materials only a description of the values the fourth amendment
protects. The Jackson' and Boyd' cases come to mind. The "searches" and
"seizures" in those cases hardly approached the storming of John Entick's house,
but the Court applied the fourth amendment because the same "substantial purpose"
had been achieved.' ° Said another way, irrespective of the character of the official
actions in Jackson and Boyd, values protected by the fourth amendment were at
stake in both of those cases, and that amendment was necessarily brought into service
to perform its assigned function.
On another level, the Court must choose between what Amsterdam calls the
atomistic and regulatory models.'
Does the fourth amendment establish a sphere
surrounding the individual-one that resembles an atom-and forbid government
entry except by a specified process ? 162 Or does the fourth amendment regulate government in its dealings with all of us, holding every contact the police have with
the public to a previously prescribed standard? The regulatory model cuts against
the grain, of course. The constitutional protections for personal liberty with which
we are most familiar generally perceive confrontations with government from the
"I am borrowing here not only from Professor Amsterdam but from a useful elaboration on his work
in Stone, The Scope of the Fourth Amendment: Privacy and the Police Use of Spies, Secret Agents, and
Informers, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 1193.
"' See notes 5-10 and accompanying text supra.
' See notes 49-51 supra.
15 Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 363; Stone, supra note 151, at 1199.
" See notes 100-01 and accompanying text supra.
'See
notes 102-03 and accompanying text supra.
' 277 U.S. at 464. See also Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
" See notes 65-66 and accompanying text supra.
" See notes 67-82 and accompanying text supra.
"0 116 U.S. at 635.
" Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 367. While Professor Amsterdam understands these second-order
models as having to do with the question whether the fourth amendment is violated rather than whether
it applies at all, it seems to me that the Court's choice between them is so fundamental that it must
affect the full range of fourth amendment issues. The choice goes to the very conception of the amendment. I have to consider it a matter of scope.
"0Of course, neither Professor Amsterdam nor I conceive of this atom of liberty to be spatial.
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standpoint of the individual and fix the limits of governmental interference with
the individual'sliberty. The notion that the fourth amendment is somehow different,
that it views the individual's contacts with authority from the standpoint of government and lays down generally applicable standards of police conduct in relation to
everyone, rings off key on first hearing. Nevertheless, the fourth amendment clearly
states that it is the right of the people that is to be secure,'3 and aside from a built-in
hesitancy to embrace innovative theoretical inventions, there is no good reason why
it must be read to limit only intrusions into atoms of liberty rather than to regulate
the conduct of government generally.
If they were understood in private, these theoretical difficulties were hardly
acknowledged in the Court's early opinions. That accounts, I suppose, for the evident
inconsistency between cases like Boyd and Olmstead.'64 At first, the Warren Court,
too, worried over the supposed requirement that a fourth amendment claim arise
from a physical trespass,"' and in the "secret agent" cases' 66 the Court was frankly
at sea in its attempts to explain its judgments.11 7 Then, in the Katz case,16 s the
Court rejected the physical trespass prerequisite, overruled Olmstead on that issue
and on its holding that conversations were not "effects," and finally made the necessary theoretical choices. By applying the fourth amendment to a bug fixed to the
outside of a public phone booth, and by holding that it protected "the privacy upon
which [the individual] justifiably relied,"'6 9 the Court plainly adopted the valueAmsterdam, supra note 1, at 367.
'"In Olmstead, the Court made feeble attempts to distinguish Boyd and circumscribe Jackson, but it
is clear that Chief Justice Taft had an altogether different view of the fourth amendment from that
employed in the earlier cases. See Stone, supra note 151, at 1200. But see Note, Formalism, Legal
Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARv. L.
RaV. 945, 961-63 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Formalism] (contending that the reasoning if not the result
in Olmstead was similar to the formalism that had influenced Boyd).
"E.g., Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (per curiam); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505 (1961).
"Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S, 323 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis
v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); On Lee v. United
States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). The cases had to do with the applicability of the fourth amendment to
informers who had or gained the confidence of suspects and heard incriminating statements, some of
which were simultaneously heard by agents using electronic devices or recorded for later use at trial.
The Court held in all the cases that the fourth amendment did not apply. See Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking, 53 Tax. L. REV. 203 (1975).
"5The Court was sharply split in all the cases. In On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), the
vote was 5-4. Justice Frankfurter and Justice Douglas would have overruled Olmstead and reversed on
a fourth amendment ground, Justice Burton would have reconciled Olmstead and reversed, and Justice
Black would have used the supervisory power to upset the conviction. Lopez was decided by a vote of
6-3, but the sixth vote came from Chief Justice Warren, who managed to distinguish On Lee. In Lopez,
Justice Brennan's dissent, joined by Justices Douglas and Goldberg, would have applied the fourth amendment to any case involving electronic surveillance. In the 1966 trilogy of cases, the Court was again
split, with the majority emphasizing the facts of each case and playing down On Lee and Lopez, precedents
one would have expected to control the new cases. Individual Justices weaved in and out of the majority,
apparently on the basis of how outrageous the government's conduct had been in each. E.g., Hoffa v.
United States, 385 U.S. 293, 314-15 (1966) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (explaining his votes to affirm in
Lewis and Osborn but to reverse in Hoffa). Only in Osborn were the Justices in substantial agreement.
In that case, Justice Stewart focused on the warrants the officers had obtained, albeit belatedly, and insisted that the conviction could be confirmed consistent with Justice Brennan's Lopez dissent. Even then,
Justice Douglas dissented on the theory that all electronic surveillance is unconstitutional as a general search.
385 U.S. at 340. Accord, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARv. L. REv. 40, 187 (1961).
"Katz
8
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
'"Id.at 353. In hindsight, it may be said that Katz confirmed more propositions than it introduced.
Four years earlier, in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), the Court had excluded a verbal
statement from a trial because it had been obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. Earlier in the
1966 Term, the Court had loosed the fourth amendment's ties to property law concepts in Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), and commented in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1967), that the
"'
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oriented and atomistic models. 7 ° Henceforth, or so it seemed, the police would have
the fourth amendment to contend with in any case in which they presumed to intrude upon an individual's enclave of privacy-the fundamental value protected
171
against unreasonable search and seizure.
Katz was a fair start. It might have been a more limited decision 72 but purposefully reached for higher theoretical ground while using language sufficiently nebulous
to leave "room for retreat. 1 73 The difficulty is that the Burger Court was left to
build the structure for which Katz was only the groundwork. The new appointees
seem not to have recognized the work to be done. Instead of elaborating on the
values protected by the fourth amendment and building doctrine to see that those
values are indeed protected, the Burger Court has confused the situation by vainly
attempting to accommodate means-oriented precedents in a post-Katz world. Two
examples will suffice.
In the White case,' 74 federal officers had once again wired an informant for sound,
recorded his conversations with a suspect, and introduced the recording at trial. 7 5
fruits of unlawful electronic surveillance would be excluded. Indeed, Justice Douglas' concurring opinion
in Berger proclaimed the death of Olmstead. 388 U.S. at 64. See generally United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745, 768 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
170 Professor Amsterdam does not need Katz to conclude that the atomistic model has been adopted.
The "standing" cases, which permit a litigant to complain only of an interference with his or her own
privacy or property, reflect an unwillingness to view the fourth amendment as a general regulation of
the police. Amsterdam, however, contends that "a regulatory view of the fourth amendment need not
imply universal standing to invoke the exclusionary rule; it may well permit distinctions between persons
who are and persons who are not permitted to suppress unconstitutionally obtained evidence." Amsterdam,
supra note 1, at 369. Amsterdam does not explain his position, but I take him to mean that the Court
might validly distinguish, as did Justice Frankfurter in Wolf, between right and remedy-and while finding
a violation of the fourth amendment in some intrusions nevertheless decline to apply the exclusionary
rule as a "remedy" for the violation. In this view, the application or not of the exclusionary rule depends
upon its utility as a deterrent to further unlawful police action, and it may be unnecessary to apply the
rule to every case in order to enjoy its maximum deterrent effect. See Amsterdam, Search, Seizure and
Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Section 2255]. With
all due respect to the man whose ideas I rely heavily upon in these pages, I think this understanding of
the issues is in error. If the Court were to adopt the regulatory view of the fourth amendment, I should
have thought the standing cases would no longer be tenable. The Court would not be concerned that any
particular person's enclave of liberty is infringed but presumably would permit anyone to bring to light
police misconduct at large-the evil the regulatory model identifies. It will not do to embrace a strained
distinction between right and remedy in search and seizure cases, to insist that the only ground for the
exclusionary rule as a remedy is deterrence, and thus to contend that it need not be brought to bear in
every case to have that effect. I will treat the difficulties with the right-remedy dichotomy and the deterrence rationale below. See notes 572-645 and accompanying text infra. Suffice it to say here that if
deterrence is, indeed, the purpose of the rule, then it would still seem that the Court would not care who
it is who brings police excesses to its attention.
' I shall not attempt here to develop a definition of privacy that goes beyond already existing works
that focus upon the individual's control over personal information. See generally C. FRnD, AN ANATOMY
oF VALaEs (1970); Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REv. 275 (1974).
...
Justice Harlan attempted in his concurring opinion to restrict it to a holding that a person in a
public phone booth has standing to object to a search of the booth, which in turn can be accomplished
without intruding into the booth's air space. 389 U.S. at 360-61.
...
Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1968 Sup. CT. REv. 133,
138. I would include among those vague and ambiguous phrases Justice Stewart's comment that the
fourth amendment "protects people, not places." 389 U.S. at 351.
x'United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
" The conversations were also overheard, without the aid of a radio receiver, by an agent hiding in
the informant's kitchen. Since no evidence from that agent was introduced at trial, the Court did not
consider whether mere eavesdropping, as opposed to electronic surveillance, makes a constitutional difference after Katz. In view of the Court's holding on the recordings, however, it seems clear that the Court
would approve eavesdropping with the consent of the informant and unaided by an electronic device.
If anything, that intrusion is less objectionable. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 452 (1963)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (distinguishing the risk that a person takes in talking to an "unbugged" and a
"bugged" informant). See KAmssAR, LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 103, at 466.
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The case was on all fours with On Lee,'7 6 the first of the "secret agent" cases and
78
1 77
Katz itself had apparently left On Lee intact,'
the most vulnerable of the line.
but since On Lee had relied upon the trespass rationale and had found no fourth
amendment issue whatever in the use of a "bugged" agent in the privacy of the
suspect's office, it was ripe for reconsideration. 1'7 9 On Lee had been a means-oriented
decision; it should have been doomed,' but it was not. Justice White, writing for
a plurality that included the new Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun,'' began well
enough. He rejected the proposal that the application of the fourth amendment
should turn upon the subjective expectations of the suspect. "Our problem," he
said, "is what expectations of privacy are constitutionally 'justifiable'-what expectations the Fourth Amendment will protect .... ,"182 But then he withdrew it all.
In place of analysis, in place of a forthright attempt to resolve the problem as stated,
he offered ipse dixit. Simply put, he said, "the law gives no protection to the wrongdoer whose trusted accomplice is or becomes a police agent.' 8 If "one contemplating
illegal activities" risks a damning conversation with a friend, "the risk is his.' 8s 4 In
a real sense, the Court came to the brink of deciding what the fourth amendment
protects and then backed off again, saying, in effect, that whatever it protects, it
doesn't protect this.' 5
'"On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 750
(1971) (opinion of the Court) (commenting that On Lee "involved facts very similar to the case before
us"); id. at 773 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (declaring that the two cases were "virtually identical").
"See note 167 supra. On Lee had been cited in Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court in Lopez, but
even then it was apparent that none of the Justices felt comfortable in relying heavily upon it. The 1966
cases studiously avoided that, and in Osborn, the only one of the three involving electronic surveillance,
the Court emphasized that the officers had obtained a warrant. Dissenting in White, Justice Harlan dwelt
at length on the Court's delicate treatment of On Lee and concluded that Lopez had declined to reaffirm
that case and that no case since then had given a "breath of life" to its reasoning. 401 U.S. at 777.
...
389 U.S. at 363 (White, J., concurring).
"aIndeed, the circuit court had explicitly held that On Lee was no longer good law. United States v.
White, 405 F.2d 838, 847-48 (7th Cir. 1969). See note 177 supra.
" In the very language from On Lee seized upon by Justice White, that Court's approach came through:
"'It would be a dubious service to the genuine liberties protected by the Fourth Amendment to make them
bedfellows with spurious liberties improvised by farfetched analogies which would liken eavesdropping
on a conversation, with the connivance of one of the parties, to an unreasonable seizure.' " United States
v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 750 (1971), quoting On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 753-54 (1952).
i Justice White's opinion for the Court had only four votes-his own and those of the Chief Justice,
Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stewart, who had written the Court's opinion in Katz. Justice Black concurred in the judgment on the basis of his continuing view that eavesdropping, with or without the aid
of an electronic device, does not constitute a search and seizure. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
364 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also concurred, but only on the alternative ground,
also cited by the Court, that Katz was not retroactive. He emphasized, however, that he could no longer
support On Lee. 401 U.S. at 756. Justices Douglas and Harlan dissented.
' 3 401 U.S. at 752.
18 Id.

1" Id.
'Aside

from the obvious governmental action issue that would be presented, the Court would face
serious practical difficulties if it were to hold that by using evidence brought to them voluntarily by a
previously unknown informant, the police somehow ratify whatever the informant did to obtain the information and therefore become responsible for that conduct. Justice White is quite correct that criminal
investigation would take on a decidedly different character if the police were unable to take advantage
of information about crime supplied by the citizenry. But his conclusion that undercover agents the
police send to obtain information from suspects must be treated in the same way is an extraordinary non
sequitur. Friends who become agents are one thing, but agents who become friends are quite another.
I cannot improve upon Geoffrey Stone's thorough treatment of the "secret agent" cases, including White.
Stone, supra note 151. In my judgment, none of the Court's decisions, not even Osborn where warrants
were obtained on the basis of information supplied by an undercover agent, can stand after Katz. See
Cioffi v. United States, 419 U.S. 917 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Shortly after On Lee, John Frank
wrote: "If carrying a secret broadcasting device into a man's place of business or home is not the trespass
Lord Coke had in mind, then the concept of trespass needs to catch up with twentieth century scientific

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

White, of course, was an early case, and I should pick my second example from
the Burger Court's more recent work. In the Santana case,' 8 6 an undercover agent
had arranged to purchase heroin from McCafferty and for that purpose the two
drove at McCafferty's direction to Mom Santana's house. McCafferty took the officer's
money, went into the house, and returned with the heroin. When she offered it to
the officer two blocks from the house, he stopped the car and arrested her. As other
officers gathered around, McCafferty said that Mom Santana had the money used
in the purchase. The officers returned to the house immediately and found Mom
Santana standing in the doorway with a brown paper bag in her hand. They jumped
out of the car, shouting "police" and displaying their badges. Mom Santana retreated
into the house, but the officers followed and arrested her in the vestibule. After
stating the facts in little more detail than I have here, Justice Rehnquist disposed of
the constitutional issues in four paragraphs. As though to dispel the thought that he
would decide the case on the basis of property law notions, he first conceded that 8at7
common law the threshold of Santana's house would have been considered private.
Then he said this:
[I]t is nonetheless clear that under the cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment

Santana was in a "public" place. She was not in an area where she had any expectation of privacy. "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
house or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." Katz v. United

States .... She was not merely visible to the public but as exposed to public view,
speech, hearing and touch as if she had been standing completely outside her house.
Hester v. United States ....

188

ingenuity." Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1951-52, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 37 (1952). For
my part, he might have omitted reference to broadcasting devices and found the fourth amendment applicable to secret agents, "bugged" or "unbugged."
...
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
" Id. at 42.
"Id. (citations omitted). Reliance on Hester was doubly troubling. Not only was Justice Holmes'
opinion in that case based on common law, but it was based on common law misconceived. Recall that
federal agents seized broken moonshine bottles thrown from a window of a house. Justice Holmes' first
thought was that they had been abandoned, and the truth is that alone would have been enough to distinguish Hester in Santana. Cf. Rogers, The Fourth Amendment and Evidence Obtained by a Government
Agent's Trespass, 42 NEB. L. REv. 166, 170 (1962) (also observing that the house and surrounding land
in Hester had been owned by the suspect's father). Laying the abandonment theory aside, however,
Justice Holmes turned to the argument that the bottles had been taken by trespassing on private land and
responded in two brief sentences: "[T]he special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment . . . is
not extended to the open fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the common
law." 265 U.S. at 59. His only citation was to Blackstone's treatment of common law burglary, defined
in part as unlawful entry of a dwelling house or other building within the curtilage. Id., citing 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 223-25. Justice Holmes' reasoning is obscure, but it appears he meant either
that no trespass had occurred unless the agents intruded not only into the curtilage but the house itself,
or that the petitioner had managed to throw the bottles over the curtilage surrounding the house and into
the open fields beyond. The first possibility is bad property law, and the second bad guesswork. Those
recent cases attempting to accommodate Hester as a viable precedent have uniformly held that the protected curtilage extends well away from the dwelling. E.g., Saihen v. Bensinger, 546 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir.
1976) (adopting 75 yards as a benchmark).
I confess the opinion in Hester puzzles me, but however that may be and whatever Holmes was
actually trying to say, the Burger Court has chosen to read Hester with Katz as authority for the view
that a physical trespass upon private property is simply irrelevant to the fourth amendment inquiry-at
least so long as the police do not pass the threshold uninvited. But see United States v. Shima, 545 F.2d
1026 (5th Cir. 1977) (upholding an entry to collect contraband seen through a window). That is an
extraordinary fate for an opinion that on its face relied only upon the common law. See United States v.
Freie, 545 F.2d 1217, 1223 (9th Cit. 1976) (reading Hester no longer to have "independent meaning"
but only to indicate that one has no expectation of privacy in open fields); Moylan, The Fourth Amendment Inapplicable vs. The Fourth Amendment Satisfied: The Neglected Threshold of "So What?", 1977
S. ILL. U. L.J. 75, 82-92 (seeing more value in the continued life of Hester than my less-experienced eye
can find).
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Hester, of course, was clearly a means-oriented case, its "open fields" rationale intended to rebut, in that case, the petitioner's argument that the agents who picked
up the broken bottles of whiskey just outside the house had committed the sort of
trespass of which the Halifax messengers had been guilty. I daresay that the Court's
use of that case in 1976 to propose that a citizen has no expectation of privacy in the
threshold of his or her home is nothing short of startling." 9
In recent cases, the Court has looked not for the individual's "justifiable" but for
his or her "reasonable" or "legitimate" expectation of privacy.'90 The difference is
more than semantical. The latter phrases invite reference not to the Constitution
itself, to "what expectations the Fourth Amendment will protect,"'' but rather to
what expectations contemporary Americans in fact have. 192
' It is as though the fourth
amendment only mirrors existing understandings, protecting privacy more or less as
expectations that privacy be protected rise and fall. The Court seems not to recognize that our expectations depend in the first instance not only upon history and
tradition but upon a knowledge that the fourth amendment is in place. There is a
certain chicken-and-egg quality in the opinions that is at war with the notion of a
written Constitution, which guarantees some identifiable measure of privacy to us
all and does not lose its potency with the ebb and flow of community opinion. If the
fourth amendment is only to reflect our expectations, the result can only be that
s Justice Marshall argued in dissent that Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Santana held at
most that the police can enter private property to make a seizure if the object of that seizure is out of
doors and in plain view from outside the property line. 427 U.S. at 46-47. Cf. Cady v. Dombrowski,
413 U.S. 433, 449-50 (1973) (expressly leaving open the question whether the search of an automobile
in an "open field" requires a warrant). Santana itself involved a suspect who was almost, but not quite,
safely within her home. The Court did not hold, however, that something or someone inside a house but
still open to view from outside, say through an open door or window, is therefore subject to seizure.
That was clear, at least to Justice Marshall, since the Court relied on the "hot pursuit" exception to the
fourth amendment warrant requirement in approving the police entry into the house to arrest Santana
in the vestibule. If Marshall is correct, we have not yet reached the point where we must close our blinds
lest the police take our immodesty as an invitation to pay a house call. But see United States v. Shima,
545 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1977) (approving a warrantless entry to seize illicit drugs seen through a
window). On the other hand, it seems there is nothing to prevent the police from keeping watch and
hoping to see something useful.
"ME.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (using the term "reasonable"); Couch v.
United States, 409 U.S. 322, 336 (1973) (referring to a "legitimate" expectation). Professor Amsterdam
identifies Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), as the first case to use the different language. That, of
course, was an opinion by Chief Justice Warren and can hardly be ascribed to the Nixon appointees.
Nevertheless, Terry marked a departure from prior arrest doctrine that has been pursued with vigor by
the Burger Court. In retrospect, it may be said that the Terry Court's rephrasing of Katz may have
contributed to a relaxation of fourth amendment protection that has been exacerbated in more recent
decisions.
" See text at note 182 supra.
..
2 Concurring in Katz, Justice Harlan first took the view that the fourth amendment protects only an
individual's actual, subjective expectation of privacy-and then only in circumstances in which that expectation is recognized by society as reasonable. 389 U.S. at 361. The difficulty with any emphasis upon
subjective expectations is readily apparent. If the individual's subjective expectation is thought to control,
then an extraordinarily naive person would seem to have greater fourth amendment protection than his
or her more realistic fellows. The cynic would perhaps have very little protection at all. Justice Harlan's
suggestion that the fourth amendment comes into play only when the expectation is both real and reasonable resolved the problem at both ends of the personality scale, but in doing so it eliminated the
necessity of taking subjective expectations into account. In any case, the fourth amendment could not
on his reasoning be invoked unless the individual's expectation conformed to community standards of
reasonableness. In due time, Harlan saw his error and repented in his dissent in White. Indeed, he went
on to acknowledge the even more troublesome problem with tying the application of the fourth amendment to objective, community expectations rather than finding an answer to the question of the amendment's scope in an interpretation of the Constitution itself. See note 193 infra.
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constitutional protection for privacy will deteriorate proportionately as we read
opinions like White and Santana and our expectations of privacy fade... and fade. 9 '
No matter. We have been told in rapid succession that we have no expectation
of privacy when we turn our private papers over to an accountant,' 94 when we
record our financial transactions on personal checks,' 95 or when we appear before a
grand jury to give testimony 9 " and voice 7 or handwriting' exemplars. How it
is that the Court has arrived at these conclusions the opinions do not say. That is
to be expected, however, for there is no more amorphous standard in our law than
"reasonableness."' 199 The Court does no more than examine each case on its facts
and judge as best it can. The inquiry is unprincipled. It is not unlike the very
similar groping for "fundamental fairness" in the due process cases of the Twining
era.2 ° ° The Court pulls the facts and considerations together, weighs and balances
them in some fashion, and then decides. It decides; it does not analyze. When in
criminal cases one of its considerations is inevitably the demands of the society for
order, the balance is usually struck in favor of government and against the accused.
In retrospect, the Katz Court's freeing of the fourth amendment from the meansoriented model has actually disserved individual liberty. The truth is that the

... Professor Amsterdam has made the point. Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 384. Justice Harlan drew
the obvious conclusion:
The analysis must, in my view, transcend the search for subjective expectations or legal attribution of assumptions of risk. Our expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections
of laws that translate into rules the customs and values of the past and present.
Since it is the task of the law to form and project, as well as mirror and reflect, we should not,
as judges, merely recite the expectations and risks without examining the desirability of saddling
them upon society.
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Burger Court's apparent rejection
of the argument opens the door to untold difficulties. Still to be resolved, for example, is the extent to
which government can restrict expectations of privacy legislatively-in much the same way it limits the
application of the due process clause by failing to create threshold liberty or property interests. E.g.,
United States v. Riley, 554 F.2d 1282 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding that there is no expectation of privacy in
fourth-class mail because an obscure Postal Service regulation provides that the sender "consents" to
warrantless inspection). See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). Similarly, it is unclear whether the
individual's manifestation of subjective expectations can somehow extend fourth amendment protections.
Compare Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (Marshall, J.,dissenting) (proposing that a
manifestation be considered) with United States v. Chadwick, 97 S. Ct. 2476 (1977) (taking such
evidence into account).
" Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973). Specifically, Justice Powell held for the Court that
"there can be little expectation of privacy where records are handed to an accountant, knowing that
mandatory disclosure of much of the information therein is required in an income tax return." Id. at
335. In United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), the facts were somewhat different. There, the
petitioner claimed an expectation of privacy in checks and bank statements produced by his bank in
response to a subpoena duces tecum. Justice Brennan insisted that Couch was distinguishable, because
the petitioner in Miller had not delivered the statements to the bank knowing that it would disclose them
to the government. The duty to disclose arose only later in response to process. Id. at 447 n.1 (Brennan,
J.,
dissenting). Since the majority did not seize upon that distinction, it seems safe to conclude that the
critical fact in both Couch and Miller was that the petitioner had parted with possession of papers and
thus assumed the risk that they would come into the hands of the authorities. Indeed, Justice Powell's
opinion for the Court in Miller heavily relied upon White and the other "secret agent" cases. See notes
174-85 supra.
'" United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
'United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
107Id.
'United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973).
'"As Justice Marshall put it in a different context: "Of course, the Fourth Amendment test is reasonableness, but in determining whether a search is reasonable, this Court is not free merely to balance,
in a totally ad hoc fashion, any number of subjective factors." Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 341 (1971)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The
Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.J. 329 (1973).
' See notes 116-30 and accompanying text supra.
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Burger Court has used the Katz approach, reduced to a formula that ill-suits its
theoretical innovations, to restrict rather than to expand the scope of constitutional
protection against unreasonable search and seizure. So far as I know, the Court's
use of the reasonable or legitimate expectation formula has not once resulted in the
application of the fourth amendment to circumstances in which there was any doubt
on that threshold question. The Court's record is, to put it mildly, remarkable. At
a time when technological advances have made over our relatively simple lives,
thrusting each of us into a mysterious maze of machinery that tracks our every
move on a computer tape and poses in the process new and ever greater threats to
individual privacy, the Burger Court approaches the fourth amendment in the most
niggardly fashion. The words of caution set forth in the Boyd case have been
relegated to dissent.2 01
2. The Fourth Amendment and Governmental Purpose
In another series of cases touching upon the scope of the fourth amendment, the
Court has asked whether the identification of governmental action as a "search" or
"seizure" may depend upon the purpose for which the action
is taken. It has been
argued on occasion that the fourth amendment is concerned only with circumscribing
law enforcement authorities in their investigation of criminal actvity and that an
intrusion upon an individual's privacy or property does not implicate the amendment unless it is undertaken for the purpose of gathering evidence of crime. There
was one early case on the point, 20 2 but the first significant treatment came in Justice
Frankfurter's opinion for the Court in the Frank case.2 °3 A Baltimore city ordinance
provided that a health inspector who had "cause to suspect" that a nuisance existed
in any building could demand entry for purposes of inspection, and anyone refusing
such entry could be punished with a fine of twenty dollars. Justice Frankfurter allowed that the petitioner's attack on the ordinance raised an issue under the due
' Compare text at note 70 supra with California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 94 (1974)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). At the risk of reading into the Burger Court's post-Katz decisions more
than is really there, I must say that they seem to reflect a growing insensitivity to the effect governmental
snooping can have on human behavior. A parade of horribles comes to mind: police officers peering
through windows and doors, at times with the aid of flashlights, binoculars, or more sophisticated devices;
perching on fire escapes, patroling community hallways, and listening through thin apartment walls; and
inspecting the hoods of cars, the soles of shoes, and the serial numbers of anything from rifles to radioes.
See KAMISAR, LAFAVF & IsRAEL, supra note 103, at 210-13. Is there no "reasonable" or "legitimate"
expectation of privacy in these cases? To answer in the negative is to propose that they involve no
"search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Yet, if the police are not searching, what, pray
tell, are they doing? Recently, the Court dismissed for want of a substantial federal question when a
petitioner complained that the police had spied on him in a public toilet. Piatak v. Ohio, 42 U.S.L.W.
3685, appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 810 (1974). I daresay that most people will soon change their habits
drastically if they find that they can expect no privacy in places apparently designed to ensure just that.
Going on, what of surveillance in buildings and on the public streets? I will acknowledge that some
forms of unlawful conduct would be discouraged if a camera were to be trained on Harvard Square and
the fact were advertised. Yet, at the same time, entirely lawful, though perhaps embarrassing or unpopular,
activity would also be affected. Passers-by would hesitate to stop at the "dirty book" counter, to
acknowledge an unpopular friend, or to pause to hitch up their pants. Public cameras encourage private
ones, and before long we will have even more of them staring at us in banks, department stores, and
restaurants. Make no mistake. I recognize that to some extent the effect upon the individual can be kept
to a minimum. Cameras can be used only to monitor behavior and not to record it for future reference,
and on occasion due notice can be afforded--giving at least the appearance of permitting those who object
to avoid the intrusion. Finally, I acknowledge that in time we may become accustomed to surveillance
and less troubled by it. On the other hand, perhaps that is precisely the point. We may get used to it
when there are very good and ancient reasons for resisting.
'See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
"3 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
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process clause of the fourteenth amendment and that a consideration of the fourth
amendment, particularly its history, was relevant to the question. 0 4 He appraised
the events in England and the colonies leading to Entick there and Otis' speeches
here and settled upon the language in Entick, repeated and relied upon in Boyd,
connecting the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure with
the privilege against self-incrimination.20'5 He maintained that the fourth amendment's general protection for personal privacy was "intimately related" to "selfprotection: the right to resist unauthorized entry which has as its design the securing
of information ...which may be used to eflect a further deprivation of life or liberty
or property."2 6 The "great battle," he said, had been waged not merely to gain
protection from intrusions, but to gain protection from intrusions in search of evidence of crime. 0 7 Returning to his due process analysis, he concluded that the
Baltimore health inspections fell at the "periphery" of interests safeguarded by the
due process clause, and in light of the apparent reasonableness of the intrusion in
the case2 " and the long history of such practices in Maryland, 209 he found no constitutional violation in the petitioner's conviction.
Writing in the period between Wolf and Mapp,Justice Frankfurter tried desperately in Frank to hold his ground against the incorporationists in dissent.210 His
opinion was ambiguous, and purposefully so. 211 The result was extraordinary-a
fourteenth amendment decision approving a warrantless intrusion built upon a
tenuous reading of historical materials merging the fourth and fifth amendments.
His purpose was clear. He saw no real unfairness in the Baltimore inspections and
wanted to avoid federal intervention upsetting what had been going on for two
hundred years. But for the incorporationists he might simply have balanced the
considerations under the due process rubric and approved the Baltimore scheme,
but in response to them he found it necessary to delve into fourth amendment
precedents. The confusion of the fourth and fifth amendments was no more than
a convenient vehicle for preventing the fourth amendment from disturbing the re'The precise bearing of the fourth amendment was, of course, left obscure. Justice Frankfurter relied upon his own language from the Wolf case. See note 120 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 44, 74-77 and accompanying text supra.
359 U.S. at 365 (emphasis added).
2f

Id.

On the facts, the punishment of the petitioner for refusing a warrantless inspection hardly pulled
at the heartstrings. The statute did not authorize a forcible entry but only provided for a fine for wrongful
refusal-and then only if the inspector had "cause to suspect" that a nuisance existed. In the Frank case,
an inspector had found a large pile of straw, trash, and rodent feces behind the petitioner's house and
requested entry to examine the premises for rats. -le obtained a warrant for the petitioner's arrest only
after giving him two opportunities to comply with the demand. Id. at 361.
" Frankfurter was careful to acknowledge that the fourth and fourteenth amendments were not
necessarily limited in their protection of privacy to the circumstances that gave rise to the fourth amendment in 1791. Id. at 365-66. On the other hand, he noted that the search and seizure provision of the
Maryland constitution had stood next to administrative inspection schemes in Maryland for 200 years, and
no one had thought that the two were in conflict. Id. at 366-72.
"0Justice Douglas wrote the dissent for himself, Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Black and Brennan.
As might be expected, Justice Douglas cited Wolf for the exaggerated proposition that the "Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment enjoins upon the States the guarantee of privacy embodied in the
Fourth Amendment." Id. at 374. While he conceded that there was still some question about the exclusionary rule, he admitted no doubt that the substantive protection for privacy offered by the two amendments was the same.
' Justice Whittaker, who later dissented with Frankfurter in Mapp, felt compelled to attach a separate
opinion insisting that Frankfurter's opinion here held only that the "core of the Fourth Amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches applies to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 373 (emphasis added).
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suit he had reached under the due process clause. His history was manufactured,
of course. To be sure, he identified a link between the fourth and fifth amendments
in Boyd's heavy use of Entick language,212 but his suggestion that the connection
somehow narrowed the scope of the fourth amendment to that of the fifth simply
could not be sustained.113 Boyd itself had been a civil forfeiture case, and it was
easy enough for Justice Douglas in dissent to point out instances in the historical
materials in which the practices associated with the fourth amendment had led only
to civil sanctions. 14 It came as no surprise, then, when a few years later the Court
expressly overruled Frank in the Camara and See cases. 215 Writing for the Court
in Camara, Justice White rejected out of hand Frank's "remarkable premise" that
"the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior. "210
At least for the time being, the Camara decision scotched the idea that the fourth
amendment is limited to criminal cases. Yet, what it granted the individual with
one hand it took back in large measure with the other. In a second part of his opinion
for the Court, Justice White declared that the ordinary concomitant of the application of the fourth amendment-the requirement of a warrant issued upon probable
cause to believe that evidence of crime will be found-has no meaningful place in
administrative inspection cases.217 Accordingly, he held that warrants for inspections
would be required but that they could be supported by a "flexible" notion of probable
cause-described in the opinion as a finding that "reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a
particular dwelling. ' 218 Thus the Court ultimately held that while the fourth amendment applies, it does not impose the same standards upon administrative inspections
as upon searches for evidence of crime.2 1" Going on, the Court allowed in Camara
maIn Entick, Lord Camden was of course speaking only of the English common law protections against
unreasonable search and seizure and self-incrimination, but in Boyd the Court relied on the same language
in interpreting provisions of the United States Bill of Rights. See notes 75-76 and accompanying text supra.
•" By its express terms, the fifth amendment protects the individual from being compelled to be a
witness against himself "in any criminal case." See ORIoINS, supra note 43, at 432-37 (reviewing the
drafting process that resulted in the limitation).
m*359 U.S. at 377-79. See Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights and the Fourth Amendment,
1960 Sup. CT. REv. 46; Comment, State Health Inspections and "Unreasonable Search": The Frank Exclusion of Civil Searches, 44 MINN. L. REV. 513, 520-27 [hereinafter cited as Health Inspections].
'Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). The
question had been further examined in two intervening cases, but neither had overruled Frank. See Eaton
v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960) (affirming a lower court's reliance upon Frank but only by an equally
divided court); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (failing to reach the question for want of
proper objection below).
387 U.S. at 530. The Court acknowledged that Frank might have been distinguished on its facts.
The Baltimore ordinance allowed inspections only upon "cause to suspect," a standard the inspector in
Frank surely met, while the San Francisco provision involved in Camara established no such standard.
Yet the Court found it appropriate to re-examine Frank's basic holding in order to lay to rest the doubts
that had arisen about it. See District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 16-17 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (opinion of
Prettyman, J.) (labeling the proposition that only criminal suspects are entitled to fourth amendment protection a "fantastic absurdity"). See also Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
In this connection, it is only fair to mention that the Court's membership had changed since Frank.
Justice Frankfurter had been succeeded by Justice Goldberg, who in turn had been succeeded by Justice
Fortas. Justice White had succeeded Justice Whittaker. When those two votes joined the votes of the
Frank dissenters, the Frankfurter view was left supported by only a minority, composed of Justices Clark,
Harlan, and Stewart, who had voted with Frankfurter in Frank and then dissented in Camara and See.
Justice White's majority opinions in the new cases relied heavily upon the analysis of the Frank dissenters.
27387 U.S. at 534-35.
2
s1d. at 538.
'gIn
dissent, Justice Clark commented with some amusement that in finding the ordinary probable
cause standard inapplicable, Justice White relied on the same arguments that had led Justice Frankfurter
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that even this different sort of warrant would not be necessary in emergency situations or when the house-holder consents to an inspection. 220 The Court imposed a
similar warrant requirement in See, the companion case involving a commercial
business, but then commented in closing that its opinion should not be read to imply
that business premises may not be inspected in more circumstances than private
homes or to question "such accepted regulatory techniques as licensing programs
which require inspections prior to operating a business or marketing a product.2 2 1
Entering upon this state of affairs, the Burger Court has largely ignored the
basic holdings in Camara and See and proceeded to expand upon the exceptions to
the warrant requirement those cases allowed. Biswel1222 comes to mind. In that
case, a Treasury agent made a surprise visit to a pawnbroker, federally licensed to
deal in sporting weapons, and demanded to see his storeroom. The agent had no
warrant, but he displayed a copy of a federal statute authorizing warrantless inspections during business hours. The pawnbroker acquiesced, the agent inspected, and
two unlicensed rifles were seized. Writing for the Court, Justice White distinguished
his own opinion in See, where he said there had been no occasion to deal with longstanding federal licensing schemes for the regulation of commerce in which the government is vitally concerned. 2 3 In any event, he said, the inspections necessary to
meaningfully regulate the firearms industry could not be circumscribed by a warrant
requirement. Unlike the building code inspections in See, the inspections carried
out here must be "unannounced, even frequent," and a warrant requirement "could
22 4
easily frustrate" the enforcement scheme.
If the Court's use of the "licensing" exception ends in Biswell with the approval
of warrantless inspections in the firearms industry, perhaps the demonstrable slippage
in fourth amendment protection will be slight. In an increasingly complex society,
we must expect that businesses that pose extraordinary dangers to the public will
be subjected to stringent controls, and inspections of business premises may be no
great price to pay.225 But it seems the Court is preparing in the Barlow's case 2 to
extend the "licensing" exception to inspections pursuant to the Occupational Safety
and Health Act. Inspections by OSHA agents are not limited to industries traditionally subjected to heavy regulation because of their special danger or importance
to conclude that a warrant was unnecessary. In a real sense, the White opinion in Camara departed in
no great way from Frank; in each case the standard was reasonableness though White preferred to call
his reasonableness a flexible sort of probable cause. See Note, Area Search Warrants in Border Zones:
Almeida-Sanchez and Camara, 84 YALE L.J. 355, 370 (1974). Justice Clark in See insisted that, of the
two, the Frank approach was far superior, retaining as it had the integrity of the probable cause standard
in criminal investigations. 387 U.S. at 547. Speaking to the supposed unfairness of punishing an individual for refusing entry to an inspector whose authority to search was in doubt, Justice Clark offered that
administrative warrants issued by the agency involved would serve the same purpose. Id. at 548. In that
belief, he was evidently satisfied that he could distinguish the very peril that gave rise to the fourth
amendment in the colonies-the issuance of general warrants by administrative officers. See note 49 and
accompanying text supra.
2w 387 U.S. at 539-40.
2n 387 U.S. at 546.
' United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
...
Id. at 316-17.
'ftid.

'I am aware that some whose sensitivity in search and seizure cases is unassailable find no significant
threat to fourth amendment values in the OSHA case. E.g., Letter from Kenneth Culp Davis to Joel M.
Gora, American Civil Liberties Union (April 22, 1977).
" Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho 1976), prob. juris. noted sub nora. Marshall
v. Barlow's Inc., 429 U.S. 1347 (1977).
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but extend to any commercial employer subject to the Act-an estimated 4,100,000
business establishments 2 7 If the Supreme Court upholds OSHA inspections, it
will expand the exceptions to Camara and See to such an extent that it will be difficult to contend that the holdings in those cases retain any lasting significance. 2
Narrowly stated, the cases do not hold that the fourth amendment does not apply at all in "licensing" cases but only that it imposes a diluted standard to them"reasonableness. '229 Yet, neither the standard of review they employ nor the evil
they seek to prevent bespeaks search and seizure analysis. The statutes or regulations
upon which administrative inspections are based are to set forth information that
informs the individual affected of the inspector's authority to search and the limits

of the inspection he or she is to undertake. The evil, it appears, lies in failing to
provide sufficient information to the individual in advance of the inspection, thus
forcing him or her to choose between acquiescing in an entry of doubtful justification
and risking prosecution for wrongful refusal.2 30 If the state's scheme is to operate

reasonably, if it is to be fair, then the inspection must be justified to the individual
before the fact. Only then is it fair to punish the "one rebel a year" 23 ' who refuses
to cooperate.232 Again, it seems to me that the ultimate standard against which
government's actions are judged is the "fundamental fairness" minimum associated
with due process adjudication. The Court is not so concerned that the individual's
privacy is invaded, so long as the government has a reasonable basis for its action
and explains it to the individual before the fact.
I come away thinking that whatever the Court's statements on the issue, it resists the application of fourth amendment analysis to administrative inspections.
Another familiar case illustrates the substitution of due process for search and
seizure standards-in this case with more candor than the Court ordinarily exhibits.
In James,2 3 the welfare visit case, Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court put the
Rothstein & Rothstein, Administrative Searches and Seizures: What Happened to Camara and See?,
L. REV. 341, 366 (1975).
'Id. Of course, to the extent the Camara and See decisions themselves contemplated these very exceptions and to the extent their warrant requirements were intended only to serve adequate notice on the
individual to be inspected in any event, it may be that those cases were overread from the outset.
Promising a before-the-fact magisterial determination of the appropriateness of an intrusion into privacy,
they may have delivered only one "reasonable" administrative scheme in place of another. Accord, LaFave,
Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Camara and See Cases, 1967 SuP. CT. REV. 1.
See note 219 supra; note 230 and accompanying text infra.
'But see United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972) (commenting that "inspections for
compliance with the Gun Control Act pose only limited threats to the dealer's justifiable expectations of
privacy").
'Indeed, this is the very evil Justice White dwelt upon in Camara. 387 U.S. at 532. See United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 17 n.1 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (commenting that a
search warrant for a home or office assures the occupants "that the officers have legal authority to conduct
the search and defines the area to be searched and the objects to be seized"); South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364, 384 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (same).
' The reference comes from Justice Douglas' dissent in Frank. 359 U.S. at 384.
"mNone of the regulatory schemes in the cases authorized a forcible inspection over the individual's
objection but rather some punishment for wrongful refusal. In a surprising opinion by Justice Douglas in
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), the Court disapproved a warrantless inspection of a federally licensed liquor dealer because it had been made forcibly without authorization in
the statute. However, the Court supplied ample dicta to the effect that a warrantless search without force
would have been valid. Recalling the common law seizures of stolen or smuggled goods hidden to avoid
paying import duties, Justice Douglas plainly embraced the long-standing regulatory scheme involving
liquor dealers, complete with its provision on warrantless inspections. In Biswell, Douglas dissented on
the ground that the gun dealer's acquiescence had been the product of coercion not authorized by statute.
2
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
'

50

WASH.
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issue as "whether a beneficiary of the [AFDC program] may refuse a home visit by
the caseworker without risking the termination of benefits. '23 4 That question, he
said, could be answered without reference to Camara's "protective attitude" toward
privacy and the fourth amendment "for the seemingly obvious and simple reason
that we are not concerned here with any search ... in the Fourth Amendment meaning of that term. ' In four short years, the Court had come full circle back to
Justice Frankfurter's position in Frank. Even when Justice Blackmun assumed for
purposes of decision that the welfare visit at issue possessed "some of the character'
istics of a search in the traditional sense,"236
he insisted that the only standard of
2 37
review was "reasonableness.
The balance of the opinion then sifted through the
competing individual and state interests, weighing them in the balance, and concluded that the home visits carried out in New York were reasonable and hence
constitutional. If Barbara James thought otherwise, she was free to find some other
way to support her infant son. 23 1 To my mind, the Court's fact-oriented approach
to the case, which in the end held no more than that these particular visits under
this particular statutory scheme were reasonable, is indistinguishable from Justice
Frankfurter's approach in Frank. Ultimately, the Court simply concluded that the
New York law sufficiently circumscribed the inspection to be carried out and justified it in advance to Ms. James. Accordingly, it was not fundamentally unfair to
put her to the choice of acquiescing in the inspection or forfeiting benefits. The
fourth amendment, it seems, was entirely irrelevant. ' 9
2 Id. at 310. This statement of the question presented makes clear what otherwise might not be from
the opinions in the case. The petitioner's argument was actually the one that had lost in Camara-that
the state could not intrude into the privacy of her home without a warrant issued upon probable cause to
believe that evidence of crime would be found. She would not have been satisfied with the special sort of
warrant devised in Camara to permit a reasonable administrative inspection when standards established
under a regulatory statute are met. Of course, the Court's disposition of the case denied her even that.
Id. at 317. It is noteworthy that Justice White, who concurred in the judgment, did decline to
embrace this language. Id. at 326.
"Id. at 318.
27 Id., citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), discussed in notes 420-34 and accompanying text infra.
"'Unlike
the other cases just discussed, no criminal prosecution followed upon James' refusal to allow
the home visit. But see Burt, Forcing Protection on Children and Their Parents: The Impact of Wyman
v. James, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1259 (1971) (viewing James as essentially a child neglect case); Dershowitz
& Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon
Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1223-25 n.100 (1971) (insisting that criminal evidence was being sought).
On the other hand, removal from the welfare roll was equally devastating to her, and in dissent Justice
Marshall contended that the scope of the fourth amendment could hardly depend upon the "size of the
club that the State wields against a resisting citizen." 400 U.S. at 340-41. But see Greenberg, The
Balance of Interests Theory and the Fourth Amendment: A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action
Since Camara and See, 61 CAL. L. REV. 1011, 1033 (1973) (concluding that under certain circumstances
such visits are reasonable); Handler & Hollingsworth, Stigma, Privacy, and Other Attitudes of Welfare
Recipients, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9-12 (1969) (indicating that most welfare recipients may not object to
home visits). The choice put to James understandably raised the specter of the "right-privilege distinction"
the Court had long since disapproved. 400 U.S. at 328-29 (Douglas, J., dissenting), citing Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1595 (1960). But the Court gave the matter no heed. Indeed, judging from more recent cases it appears
that the reports of the distinction's death may have been premature. E.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341,
342-47 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). See Monaghan, supra note 118; Van Alstyne,
Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 445 (1977).
'The Court has not elaborated upon James so as to decide frankly whether it means to read the
fourth amendment out of administrative inspections altogether-despite Camara and See. The automobile
inspection cases might have provided an opportunity to do so, but the Court chose to leave the matter as
it stood after James. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (commenting that the
Camara and See warrant requirement has never been extended to automobile inspections but employing
a fourth amendment "reasonableness" standard of review); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973)
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3. The Fourth Amendment and Property
a. Real Property
The trespass action at common law lay for interference with real or personal
property in the plaintiff's possession, and it is plain enough that English courts developing the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure were concerned primarily with property interests.240 In Entick, Lord Camden focused first
upon the messengers' breach of the close for the purpose of conducting a "search"
and then upon their "seizure" of "goods and chattels." 24' Indeed, he treated any
supposed intrusion upon privacy as merely an aggravating circumstance justifying
the substantial judgment in the case. 42 In this country, at least until recently, the
Supreme Court's treatment of fourth amendment questions reflected the same concern for property rights. Early on, the Court wrestled with trespass ab initio and
similar common law niceties in determining whether an intrusion upon an individual's premises was constitutional. 24 ' Even after Hester eliminated all but the
curtilage from constitutional protection the Court insisted for years that the fourth
amendment could not be violated without a physical trespass into a "constitutionally
protected area. '244 When, however, the Court departed from the means-oriented
approach to the fourth amendment, it began to lose interest in trespass as the key to
search and seizure issues. To be sure, even in Katz the Court acknowledged that
the fourth amendment does not translate into a "general constitutional 'right to
privacy'" and that "its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with
privacy at all."'245 Nevertheless, the Court's adoption of the value-oriented model
in an egalitarian age augered a steady movement away from property notions and
toward an emphasis upon privacy.
On the face of it, the Court's posture is unremarkable. I have already acknowledged Katz' considerable advance over the means-oriented model, and it goes without saying that in the age of electronic surveillance it would make little sense to
insist that the law of search and seizure is still to turn on unsophisticated common
law notions about what constitutes a trespass. At least since the 1937 realignment
of the Court, we have tended to expect protection for personal liberty from the Bill
(failing to reach the question whether an inspection for the protection of the public as opposed to a
search for evidence of crime is to be measured against the fourth amendment). Last Term, in Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.32 (1977), and again in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 n.42 (1977),
the Court insisted that the "principal concern" of the fourth amendment "is with intrusions on privacy
in the course of criminal investigations." Some light may be thrown on the issue shortly, when the Court
decides in Michigan v. Tyler, 399 Mich. 564, 250 N.W.2d 467, cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 50 (1977), whether
a warrantless examination of the scene of a fire to determine its cause is valid. Further down the road,
the Court will have to face the related questions raised when the police rush onto private property under
the so-called "emergency doctrine," see Bacigal, The Emergency Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 9
U. RICH. L. REV. 249 (1975), or conduct technical inspections of the scene of a crime. E.g., United States
v. Young, 553 F.2d 1132 (8th Cir. 1977).
, Barrett, supra note 214.
" 19 Howell's State Trials at 1063-66. See notes 28-47 and accompanying text supra.
"See notes 37-39 and accompanying text supra.
"E.g., McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95 (1927) (rejecting the ab initio doctrine).
5
"E.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57 (1967); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510
(1961).
" Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967). Justice Stewart, who wrote for the Court in
Katz but had dissented with Justice Black in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), cited as his
principal authority for the passage in the text Black's separate dissent in Griswold: "The average man
would very likely not have his feelings soothed any more by having his property seized openly than by
having it seized privately and by stealth." 381 U.S. at 509 (Black, J., dissenting).
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of Rights rather than safeguards for the "property" and "economic liberty" that
were the favorites of the old Court.2 46 Accordingly, it is altogether proper that the
Court should find personal privacy to be the chief value protected by the fourth
amendment. I hold no brief against all that. Yet, I do believe that if the fourth
amendment has in the past protected more than privacy, there is certainly no reason
to eliminate that dimension of it from modern case law. While I, too, place a high
value on personal privacy and my ire is aroused most in search and seizure cases
when government trenches upon that privacy, I would not discard fourth amendment protection for property simply because in the middle of the twentieth century
property rights seem relatively less valuable than personal liberty. For one thing,
the distinction between liberty and property has never been clear; 247 for another,
I will concede my own preference for expanded rather than contracted safeguards
for individual interests of all kinds in the modern industrial state.
For my part, it makes perfectly good sense for the Court to discard the trappings
of common law trespass only to the extent they diminish the individual's protection
from governmental intrusions. I would read Katz to hold only, that a physical
trespass is no longer necessary to implicate the fourth amendment. I would not
read that case to mean that trespass is not sufficient to bring it into play. It is one
thing to say that in an electronic age the values protected by the fourth amendment
can be threatened without a physical trespass, but it is quite another to say, for that
reason, that trespass is irrelevant to the fourth amendment inquiry. I will concede
that my view is a sort of ratchet theory-the individual's protection from governmental power is permitted to move in only one direction. But in light of the seemingly inexorable march toward greater regimentation in the American society, I
have no apology to make to reason and sound judgment.
I would go a step further. If the Court is uncomfortable with fourth amendment precedents that emphasize property rights, or if it is hesitant to build upon
those precedents now that Katz has focused attention elsewhere, I would invite the
Court to re-examine the "property rights" cases and identify in them a sub rosa
attempt to protect privacy-the very personal liberty in which the Court is now
most interested. It is not too much to suggest that the evil the trespass action sought
to remedy was an interference with the tenant's quiet enjoyment of land and, in
turn, that quiet enjoyment is not far removed from our modern notion of privacy.
By defending the tenant's close and making the trespasser liable for so much as
bending the grass on the tenant's side, the trespass action operated as a prophylactic.
It halted the interloper at the fringes of the tenant's preserve and avoided the intrusion
248
upon privacy that would accompany a closer approach.
Unfortunately, in my view, the Burger Court has failed to take the path plainly
open to it. Instead, its most recent decisions seem to assume that Katz decided
"See GUNTHER, supra note 118, at 592-96.
'See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
' I suggest this possible reading of the trespass cases but I do not propose to defend it here. It may
be that on examination the thesis that trespass at common law had much to do with what we now call
privacy cannot be successfully defended. Perhaps the action only protected the individual's critical stake
in land, the life-giver in the Middle Ages, and had nothing at all to do with protecting quiet enjoyment.
Nevertheless, Entic4's familiar insistence that merely treading upon one's soil was an offense suggests
more was at work in the cases than the protection of property from one's ambitious neighbor. In any
event, the Supreme Court is certainly free to find what values it will lurking beneath the surface of
precedents. I daresay that reading the English trespass cases to speak to privacy would not be the most
imaginative use of historical materials the Court has undertaken.
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precisely what I would deny-that physical trespass is entirely irrelevant to the
fourth amendment. I have already mentioned Santana,249 in which police officers
parked their car in front of the suspect's home and, seeing her standing in the
threshold, rushed immediately upon her property and, indeed, into the house itself.
Since the Court found that the threshold was a "public place" and that standing in
it the suspect had no Katz expectation of privacy, it evidently found it unnecessary
even to comment on the breach of the close.2 50 Similarly, Justice Douglas' surprising
opinion for the Court in Western Alfalfa2 ' relied on Hester to approve a health
inspector's observation of smoke coming from a corporation's chimneys while standing in the yard near the plant. It was apparently unimportant whether a trespass
to real estate had occurred so long as the Court was satisfied that "the invasion of
privacy" was "abstract or theoretical. ' 25 2 Katz' severance of the historical tie between physical trespass and the fourth amendment has evidently called into question
all that went before.26 8 Whatever protection one's real property may have claimed
before 1967 now appears to be open for re-examination.254
'United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976). See notes 186-89 and accompanying text supra.
' See also Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) (emphasizing the suspect's expectation of privacy
when the only question was standing and his presence at the time of the search should have sufficed without
further comment). The Court has not yet firmly decided whether the police can validly enter a private
dwelling without a warrant for the purpose of making an arrest upon probable cause. See note 406 and
accompanying text infra. If the Court should give an affirmative answer, I suspect there will be a place
for citation to Katz and Hester in the opinion.
'Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
'Id.
at 865. I should say, however, that I do not read Western Alfalfa to be of a piece with Santana.
While I am far from pleased that Hester was relied upon, it does seem to me that the "open fields" rationale put forward in that case fits Western Alfalfa much better than the facts with which Justice
Holmes worked. For one thing, the inspector viewed smoke plumes that "anyone in the city who was
near the plant could see in the sky." Id. at 865. The happenstance that he was standing in the corporation's yard rather than across the street seems a less than satisfactory basis for condemning his action.
Then, too, the case involved a corporation, whose fourth amendment rights are more closely circumscribed than those of individuals. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651-52 (1950); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946). Finally, the Court came to no firm conclusion in Western Alfalfa. It was altogether unclear why the lower court had set aside the Board's cease
and desist order based upon the inspector's report. On the record, it seemed that the court had relied on
a procedural due process theory, finding the hearing the company was afforded inadequate because the
company was not given notice that the inspector's report would be used and there was no opportunity to
put on rebuttal evidence. Even if the inspection had been found to violate the fourth amendment, it was
unclear what effect such a holding would have had on the proceeding. Cf. United States v. Janis, 428
U.S. 433 (1976) (holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable in a civil tax assessment case). At bottom,
the Supreme Court's discussion of the fourth amendment issue appears to have been largely advisory and
the result attributable perhaps to Justice Douglas' well known concern for the environment. See, e.g.,
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
'Dissenting in the most analytical of the standing cases, Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165,
191 (1969), justice Harlan contended that the owner of the premises from which the conversations of
others are seized by electronic surveillance does not have standing to contest the lawfulness of the surveillance:
[T]he entire theoretical basis of standing law must be reconsidered in the area of conversational
privacy. For we have not buried Olmstead, so far as it dealt with the substance of Fourth Amendment rights, only to give it new life in the law of standing. Instead, we should reject traditional
property concepts entirely, and reinterpret standing law in the light of the substantive principles
developed in Katz.
On first blush, Justice Harlan's position seems unremarkable. It is hardly my purpose to resurrect Olmstead
and the requirement of a physical trespass before the fourth amendment is implicated. On the other hand,
Justice Harlan's position understands trespass to be irrelevant. That, it seems to me, is a different matter.
Federal agents apparently had physically entered the premises to install the listening devices used to
record third-party conversations. I am at a loss to understand how that entry was consistent with the
fourth amendment, irrespective of what the officers did after they crossed the threshold. It may be that
Justice Harlan meant in his opinion to say only that the home owner should not be permitted to suppress
conversations in which he did not participate-that he should be denied the benefit of the exclusionary
rule because none of his own property was taken from the house when it was unlawfully entered. If that
was his argument, it may have been only another attempt to pare down the exclusionary rule as the consequence of a violation of the fourth amendment. See note 611 and accompanying text infra. On the other
hand, if he meant to say frankly that after Katz a physical trespass is irrelevant to the fourth amendment,
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b. PersonalProperty
The fourth amendment speaks not only to "searches" of "houses" but to "seizures"
of "papers" and "effects." And one would expect it to regulate governmental confiscation of personal property whether or not the seizure is accompanied by an intrusion
upon real estate or personal privacy. 5 That, in any event, was the assumption of
the early decisions. Indeed, Weeks fashioned the exclusionary rule from the action
in replevin-permitting the individual to regain possession of a chattel after a
wrongful taking.2 56 I view the fourth amendment's protection for personal property
in much the same way that I view its protection for real property. On the one hand,
I hardly want to dismiss safeguards for chattels merely because they seem on balance
to be less important than privacy. On the other hand, if privacy is to be the focus,
I can find ample evidence that in its protection for personal property the fourth
amendment ultimately protects privacy. Again, safeguards for property operate as
a prophylactic. Judge Hand said it a half century ago: "[L]imitations upon the
fruit to be gathered tend to limit the quest itself ... ."""I To the extent the fourth
amendment denies government the power to seize some items, it surely must have
the effect of restricting its power to search, that is, to invade individual privacy.
The early cases seemed to embrace this thesis, however inartfully. In more recent
decisions, however, beginning to be sure before the Nixon appointees took their
places but gaining new strength in the Terms since, the Court has departed markedly
from it. Four illustrations will suffice-the cases on the mere evidence rule, the
seizure of writings, the plain view doctrine, and finally those on the individual's
standing to raise a fourth amendment claim based on a possessory interest in the
thing seized.
In Entick, Lord Camden asserted that "the law obligeth no man to accuse himself" because the burden would fall "upon the innocent as well as the guilty" and
that "search for evidence is disallowed on the same principle. '258 Interpreting that
his argument not only loosed the Constitution from the common law concern for private property but
ignored the serious intrusion upon privacy occasioned by a physical entry. For whether or not the home
owner had standing to challenge the "seizure" of third-party conversations, denying him standing to
challenge the physical entry of his home would have left him powerless to attack what I can only characterize as a search. To be sure, the agents in Alderman took no property from the house, but they most
certainly intruded upon the owner's preserve. From the style and arrangement of his furniture, the
quality of clothing in his closet, and the quantity of food in his refrigerator they obtained information
about him that he had preferred to keep private. The point need not be belabored. 'The Harlan position
in Alderman, albeit a dissenting view and not repeated so far as I know in later decisions, illustrates how
the Court can restrict the reach of the fourth amendment even as it protects privacy by insisting that all
remaining trappings of property law be lopped off and forgotten. Compare United States v. Ford, 553
F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (disapproving entry upon private premises to plant bugs without sufficient
judicial supervision) with United States v. Johnson, 561 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc) (refusing
to consider a "technical trespass" in deciding whether the police enfringed upon suspects' reasonable
expectation of privacy by approaching a house at night and peering through a basement window). See
also United States v. Anderson, 552 F.2d 1296 (8th Cir. 1977) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the area around a house but approving an intrusion into it for the "legitimate" purpose of finding the
occupant to question him about a theft).
' See Dutile, Some Observations on the Supreme Court's Use of Property Concepts in Resolving
Fourth Amendment Problems, 21 CATH. L. REV. 1, 4-13 (1971) (proposing that the primacy of property
law notions in fourth amendment analysis be retained and that the use of electronic devices as an aid to
hearing or seeing be considered a trespass).
'See, e.g., Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 632 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Davis v.
United States, 328 U.S. 582, 612 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
25 Grant, supra note 115, at 365-66. See notes 86-97 and accompanying text supra.
' United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1930).
' 19 Howell's State Trials at 1073.
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language in Boyd, the American Supreme Court read into the fourth amendment
the common law of replevin-that government can seize chattels and resist their
return only if it has a superior property interest in the things seized.2"' The "mere
evidence rule" was born. While stolen or smuggled goods and contraband could be
seized-because government or the true owner could assert a superior right to
them-an individual's private property was his or her own and could not be seized
even as evidence of crime.260 Later cases, notably Gouled,26 reworked the rule into
its familiar form-that only fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband could be seized
with or without a warranty.62 Commentators criticized the rule,26 3 trial judges did
their best to circumvent it,26 4 and in the end the Court discarded it-announcing in
Hayden"' that "[t]he premise that property interests control the right of the
Government to search and seize has been discredited."26 So long, said Justice
Brennan for the Court, as there is "a nexus-automatically provided in the case of
fruits, instrumentalities or contraband-between the item to be seized and criminal
behavior," it may be lawfully taken for use as evidence.2 6' Speaking directly to the
'See notes 40-42 and accompanying text supra. See Health Inspections, supra note 214, at 526 n.51.
Of course, the Entick language might have been read as an attempt to distinguish roughly between
searches of criminals and innocent people-validating the one, though with some hesitation in Entick,
and condemning the other. Searches for stolen goods, on the one hand, are by definition carried out only
against thieves; searches for mere evidence of crime, on the other, may affect innocent people wrongly
suspected. See TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 52-53. In the relative simplicity of the times in which Lord
Camden wrote it may not have seemed so obvious that guilt could be determined only after a trial, and
we must recall his observation that anyone whose search for stolen goods was unsuccessful was liable for
damages. Still, in our own day the literal interpretation is entirely unsatisfactory. For whether or not
the guilty could be so easily distinguished from the innocent in 1765, it is safe to say that modern search
and seizure doctrine, such as it is, contemplates that the success of a search bears no necessary relation
to its validity.
' Boyd included in its list of seizable items those writings government requires business people to
keep for inspection under reasonable regulatory statutes and goods subject to forfeiture under the tax laws
or to execution under a writ of attachment. 116 U.S. at 623-24. See Davis v. United States, 328 U.S.
582, 595-96 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (elaborating on the difference between "private" papers
which can never be seized and "public" papers which can be seized in a properly safeguarded search-because "the public has an interest other than that which they may serve as evidence"). But see G.M. Leasing
Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 356 (1977) (rejecting any dicta in Boyd purporting to exclude all
invasions of privacy "in furtherance of tax collection" from the reach of the fourth amendment). See also
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 285-86 (1855), discussed
in note 64 supra.
'Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). See also United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56,
64 n.6 (1950); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S.
452, 464-66 (1932).
'See Comment, Types of Property Seizable Under the Fourth Amendment, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 963
(1976). It was not always clear why the government's interest in these items was superior to that of
the defendant. As to stolen goods, the government could assert a superior right through the true owner,
but when that person was unknown or unavailable the vicarious property interest argument seemed to
break down. As to the instrumentalities of crime, there were two theories. First, it was contended that
instrumentalities could be seized on the common law theory that things used in the perpetration of crime
were forfeited to the state. See Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man's Land in the Criminal Law, 49
CAL. L. REv. 474, 475 (1961). Second, Gouled suggested that they could be seized in order to prevent
their use in further crimes. 255 U.S. at 309. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 471 (1971)
(referring to objects "dangerous to themselves"). Contraband, of course, was the most defensible of the
categories. For by legislating away the individual's right to hold a thing in his or her possession, the
government easily enough obtained authority to assert a superior interest in it. But see Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 306 n.11 (1967) (labeling the superior property interest analysis a "fiction").
' E.g., Chafee, supra note 79; Comment, Limitations on Seizure of "Evidentiary" Objects-A Rule
in Search of a Reason, 20 U. CH. L. REV. 319 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Limitations]; Search, supra
note 96, at 522.
2" Limitations, supra note 263.
'nWarden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
"id. at 304.
'Id.
at 307. For my part, I have never been clear on how fruits, instrumentalities, or even contraband are so easily identifiable. The problem is a real one. I will take it up again shortly. See notes 313-19,
325-32 and accompanying text infra.
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argument that government's power of search would be limited by denying it authority to seize mere evidence, Justice Brennan responded, following John Kaplan,
that "privacy 'would be just as well served by a restriction on search to the evennumbered days of the month.... And it would have the extra advantage of avoiding
hair-splitting questions .... 11,,18
The demise of the mere evidence rule drew immediate attention to Boyd's alternative reading of the key passage from Entick-that the fourth amendment right
against unreasonable search and seizure and the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination were somehow linked in a "mystical bond 28 9 and together
vouchsafed objects of evidentiary value, particularly private papers, from governmental inspection. 7 ° In the early cases, the law of search and seizure had been
viewed as the "product of the interplay of" 271 two constitutional provisions rather
than the mandate of one. As recently as Mapp, the Court had relied on both amendments to fasten the exclusionary rule upon the states.272 Yet, when Schmerber27
distinguished testimonial from other kinds of evidence and limited the reach of
the fifth amendment privilege to the former, 274 the link between the two amendments began to crumble. Schmerber itself explicitly acknowledged that writings were
testimonial and thus protected, 27" but even that concession to the fifth amendment
was troubling. For while Entick had condemned the "paper-search,"2 7 the language
of the fourth amendment clearly contemplated that "papers" might be seized, and
277
dicta in several cases made it plain that there is "no special sanctity" in documents.

'387 U.S. at 309, quoting Kaplan, supra note 262, at 479. With deference both to the Court and
Professor Kaplan, I must say that answer was less than satisfying. For one thing, it assumed what had not
really been decided until Hayden-that the fourth amendment offers no significant protection for property
rights. For another, I should have thought that the Court would see an analogy to its decisions on standing, the fruit of the poisonous tree, and the use of illegally seized evidence to impeach trial testimony.
See notes 611-13 and accompanying text infra. In all those cases the Court finds convenient justifications
for suspending the exclusionary rule. If we assume, as I later will not, that the only basis for applying
the rule is the deterrence of illegal police action, then it is arguable that the Court need not apply it at
every opportunity but only in enough cases to ensure the survival of its deterrent effect. Professor Amsterdam pointed out some time ago that, if that is indeed what the Court is about, the various exceptions to
the rule's application are no more rational than a system in which the rule is applied only half the time-to cases chosen at random. He offered that the Court might as well flip a coin in every case and apply
the exclusionary rule only when it comes up "heads." Section 2255, supra note 170. The Court, of course,
has rejected Amsterdam's tongue-in-cheek suggestion and retained the established exceptions to the application of the rule. I daresay that in Hayden Justice Brennan had just as much reason to embrace Judge
Hand's suggestion for retaining the mere evidence rule-even if it was no more rational than Kaplan's
proposal. Indeed, inasmuch as the mere evidence rule operated to enhance rather than diminish the
individual's constitutional protection, there was even more reason to retain it.
MLANDYNSKI, supra note 9, at 58.
' See notes 75-77 and accompanying text supra.
'Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587 (1946). See, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S.
452 (1932); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). The rule that the mere use of illegally seized
evidence at trial violated the fifth amendment was, however, criticized rather early. See, e.g., Chafee,
supra note 79; Kohn, supra note 120.
'See note 134 supra.
'Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
' The distinction drawn-between communications on the one hand and "real or physical evidence"
on the other-was taken in principal part from WIGMoRE, supra note 79, at S 2263. While the Court
insisted that its opinion was "not to be understood as adopting the Wigmore formulation," 384 U.S. at
763 n.7, there was little to choose between the two. Id. at 774 (Black, J., dissenting).
384 U.S. at 763-64.
See text at note 46 supra.
'Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921). Accord, Nelson, supra note 78, at 775. See
Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (commenting that papers in the mail can be opened and
inspected under a warrant "as is required when papers are subjected to search in one's own household").
See also Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
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In two recent cases, the Burger Court has come to grips with the problem-and
discarded the prohibition against forcing the production of private papers. 27" The
essence of the holding in Fisher7 9 was that the fifth amendment is violated only if
"testimony" and "compulsion" are conjoined. While an individual's private papers
are clearly testimonial, so long as they are prepared voluntarily and not compelled
by government process until later there is no fifth amendment application."' Similarly, while a production order is clearly "compulsion," so long as the order does
not compel oral testimony or require the individual to "repeat, or affirm the truth
of the contents of the documents sought,"'" no present "testimony" is involved,
and again the fifth amendment offers no relief. As a result, the Court is now prepared to recognize a fifth amendment claim only if the defendant can show some
further testimony tied up in his or her response to a production order-as when the
existence or authenticity of the documents sought can be proven only by the defendant's compliance with the order. In such a case, production under the compulsion of the order involves implicit testimony confirming the existence or authenticity of the document produced.2 2 The holding in Fisher all but decided the issue
in Andresen,"" in which agents searched the defendant's law offices for documentary
evidence. Finding no present compulsion to invoke the fifth amendment and a
sufficient warrant to satisfy the fourth, the Court approved the agents' action and
the use of the documents at trial.28 4
To be sure, the Court's dissolution of the questionable tie between the fourth
and fifth amendments bears the mark of analytical clarity-something all too often
missing from recent decisions. As yet it is too early to say whether the apparent
separation of the fifth amendment from privacy concerns will substantially diminish
the individual's protection from subpoenas duces tecum for private papers.28 5 To my
'Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
"'Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
oThe facts in Fisher itself were slightly different. The documents involved were tax records prepared not by the defendant but by his accountant, and they were subpoenaed not from the defendant
but from his attorney to whom the defendant had delivered them for purposes of receiving legal advice.
The Court first decided that, based on Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), the defendant
could not assert the fifth amendment privilege as to documents not in his possession. The Court acknowledged, however, that the attorney-client privilege would entitle the lawyer to assert any privilege the
defendant might have claimed if the papers had remained in his custody. That posed the question
whether the defendant might have resisted the subpoena for his accountant's documents. In deciding that
question, the Court made it plain that its decision would not change in a case in which the papers involved were prepared by the defendant himself. 425 U.S. at 410 n.1 1.
425 U.S. at 409. In prior cases, the Court had recognized that the fifth amendment might be
invoked by responses to subpoenas. E.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64 (1966).
' 425 U.S. at 410. See also Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (1957) (commenting that a
"custodian's act of producing books or records in response to a subpoena duces tecum is itself a representation that the documents produced are those demanded by the subpoena"); United States v. Beattie,
522 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1975). The Court took as its essential thesis Justice Holmes' comment that "[a]
party is privileged from producing the evidence but not from its production." Johnson v. United States,
228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913).
'Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
'A
review of the cases just prior to Andresen reveals that most. lower courts had already concluded
that, notwithstanding Boyd, documents could be the subject of a search. Compare Shaffer v. Wilson, 523
F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); United States v. Murray, 492 F.2d 178
(9th Cir. 1973); Taylor v. Minnesota, 466 F.2d 1119 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 956 (1973)
with Hill v. Philpott, 445 F.2d 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971). See Comment, A
Paper Chase: The Search and Seizure of Personal Business Records, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv. 489 (1977);
Comment, The Protection of Privacy by the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Doctrine Laid to
Rest?, 59 IOWA L. REv. 1336 (1974).
'Concurring in the judgment in Fisher, Justice Marshall wondered aloud whether the Court's new
approach might not protect genuinely private writings as well as the Boyd analysis:
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mind, however, the critical questions are only just presented. Now that the Court
has disposed of the troubling fifth amendment dimension of the problem, it must
deal with the even more perplexing fourth amendment issue. Until now, doctrinal

confusion has managed to protect the individual's private writings and with them
the value we Americans place upon reducing our innermost thoughts to paper."s
If, after discarding the fifth amendment confusion in the cases, the Court is unwilling to reinforce fourth amendment safeguards for journals, diaries, and em-

barrassing love letters, we are on the verge of official intrusions upon privacy heretofore unknown to the American scheme.28 ' Even if the leather-bound Bible on
the mantel can somehow be considered evidence, its warrantless seizure under
Hayden and the recent cases would pose the gravest constitutional issue. We will

live in a world different from the one we know if we become afraid to record our
hopes and memories on paper, but must hold them in our heads as best we can-lest
they be opened to the public view by a police officer who bundles them off to the
2 88
station to be used as evidence in a criminal prosecution.
The effect of the demise of the mere evidence rule and the severance of self-

incrimination concerns from seizures of writings is nowhere clearer than in the

289
"plain view" cases. At least since Harris,
the Court has held that "objects falling
in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.""29 There are limits, of
course. The Court said in Coolidge29' that the officer must have some prior justification for being in position to see the evidence in plain view and, at least as to objects
"not contraband nor stolen nor dangerous in themselves," he or she must come

upon it inadvertently. 2

Two understandings of the plain view doctrine have

Indeed, there would appear to be a precise inverse relationship between the private nature of the
document and the permissibility of assuming its existence. Therefore, under the Court's theory,
the admission through production that one's diary, letters, prior tax returns, personally maintained
financial records, or cancelled checks exist would ordinarily provide substantial testimony. The
incriminating nature of such an admission is clear, for while it may not be criminal to keep a
diary, or write letters or checks, the admission that one does and that those documents are still
available may quickly--or simultaneously-lead to incriminating evidence . . . . Thus, in practice,
the Court's approach should still focus upon the private nature of the papers subpoenaed and protect
those about which Boyd and its progeny were most concerned.
425 U.S. at 433. See also Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 350 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(setting forth his own approach to the problem).
'See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 420 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) (suggesting that
"[t]he ability to think private thoughts" would be "curtailed through fear that those thoughts ... would
become the subjects of criminal sanctions however invalidly imposed").
' I daresay that, despite the Boyd doctrine, while the Court has approved a good many governmental
inspections of private documents over the years, it has never approved official intrusions upon these most
private writings. See TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 64-71; ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE
§ 210.3(2) (1975) (prohibiting the seizure of personal diaries, letters, or other writings of similar confidential nature). Compare United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1969) (approving the seizure
of a letter) with United States v. Boyette, 299 F.2d 92 (4th Cir. 1962) (disapproving the seizure of a
diary). In Fisher, the Court declined to treat the "[s]pecial problems of privacy which might be presented
by subpoena of a personal diary." 425 U.S. at 401 n.7.
' Of course, it matters little whether the writings are incriminating or not. So long as the police go
through them in search of evidence, the intrusion upon privacy is the same. See TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 67.
" Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (permitting the seizure of a registration card found
inside the door of a car the officer was securing for impoundment).
'Id. at 236. Harris purported only to apply a "settled" rule, but the cases cited hardly supported it. Judge Moylan has identified clearer precursors, but he concludes that Harris was the first to
use the plain view rationale in "explicit terms." Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child
of the Great "Search Incident" Geography Battle, 26 MERCER L. REv. 1047, 1068 (1975).
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality opinion for the Court).
'ld. at 471.
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emerged. On the one hand, the doctrine may have to do with the threshold question
of scope. The Court may be saying that if evidence is plainly visible it follows that
its owner or possessor can have no reasonable expectation of privacy in it and, accordingly, it may be seized without a "search" within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. 9 3 This is to read the Katz concentration upon "searches" and privacy
to have swallowed up any remaining concern for property, leaving chattels of evidentiary value subject to "seizure" without interference from the fourth amendment.2 94 On the other hand, the doctrine may come into play only after the fourth
amendment is invoked. It may speak to the further question whether, given that
the fourth amendment applies, it is violated-usually because the evidence is seized
without a warrant. The weight of authority accepts the second position. 95 Judge
Moylan, 296 for example, insists that Katz has not done completely away with the
concept of a "constitutionally protected area. '297 To him, the plain view cases hold
only that once the police have justifiably intruded into such an area and inadvertently come upon identifiable evidence, they will be excused from risking loss
of the evidence by delaying a seizure until a warrant is obtained. If, however, there
is no initial intrusion into a protected area the plain view doctrine is inapplicable. 298
On either reading of the cases, it is clear that the fourth amendment provides
precious little protection for personal property. If we take the first approach, it may
not even be significant whether the evidence to be seized is in a public or private
place or whether the officer who observes it is standing on public or private ground.
In any case, it would be open to the Court to find no Katz expectation of privacy
and to permit seizure of evidence without invoking the fourth amendment. 29 Judge
Moylan would not go so far. He would first distinguish between objects found
within and without a protected area. Things found in public do not implicate the
"'See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976) (apparently viewing a visual inspection of the interior of an automobile as something other than a "search"); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413
U.S. 433, 449-50 (1973) (expressly leaving open the question whether the search of an automobile in an
"open field" required a warrant); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 509 (1971) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (insisting that when police officers took a car from a private drive "there was no search at
all"); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) (holding that officers who used a searchlight to
observe contraband liquor on the deck of a boat had not conducted a "search on the high seas").
'This understanding of the direction the plain view analysis may be taking raises fundamental questions of definition. Prior to Katz, it was understood that trespass upon private property had something to
do with a "search" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. After that case, perhaps we are no
longer entitled to assume that a physical entry implicates the fourth amendment. Perhaps a "search" has
been redefined as an intrusion into a reasonable expectation of privacy-something the individual may
lack even in his or her own home. See text at note 188 supra. So long as the police do not need to
disturb the premises or things upon it in order to see evidence in plain view, there simply is no "search,"
and the only fourth amendment standard in the case is that applicable to "seizures." Compare notes
240-54 and accompanying text supra with notes 255-88 and accompanying text supra. See also Landynski,
The Supreme Court's Search for Fourth Amendment Standards: The Extraordinary Case of Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 45 CoNN. B.J. 330, 336 n.2 2a (1971) (distinguishing "plain view" from "abandonment"
and in the process confusing the fourth amendment standards for "searches" and "seizures").
In Coolidge, for example, the Court referred to the plain view doctrine as one of several "exceptions
to the warrant requirement." 403 U.S. at 464. Accord, United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 76 (2d Cir.
1973) (including "plain view" in a list of "exceptions"), cited in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364, 382 n.10 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
Moylan, supra note 290.
Compare id. at 1077 with Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (characterizing as
"misleading" the parties' statement of the question as whether the phone booth in which the suspect was
standing was a "constitutionally protected area").
'See Brown v. State, 15 Md. App. 584, 292 A.2d 762 (Ct. Spec. App. 1972). See also Mascolo, The
Emergency Doctrine Exception to the Warrant Requirement Under the Fourth Amendment, 22 BuFFALO
L. REV. 419, 423-24 (1973).
'See cases discussed in notes 249-54 and accompanying text supra.
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plain view doctrine; things found in private do. As to the latter, if officers observe

the object from outside they must have a warrant to cross the threshold and effect
a seizure. If, however, they can justify entry on some other ground and they come
upon identifiable evidence inadvertently, they can seize it without a warrant. This

last situation, to Judge Moylan, is the paradigm plain view case." °' The analysis is
clean. It makes some sense, and it has the advantage of retaining some respect for

private property even after Katz. Yet, set atop Hayden's rejection of the mere evidence rule and the Burger Court decisions treating writings to some extent like
other chattels, it only widens again the authority of government to interfere with
personal property. Again, in failing to limit the fruits of the quest, the plain view
doctrine fails to restrict its scope.
Coming finally to the standing cases, the Court has often said, at least in dictum,
that a person who claims a possessory interest in a thing seized is entitled to contest
the validity of the government's action under the fourth amendment.3 ' The leading
case is Jeflers3 ° in which the Court permitted the petitioner to suppress narcotics
belonging to him but seized in an unlawful search of his aunts' hotel room. While

that case has never been overruled, to the extent it rests on fourth amendment protection for personal property divorced from an invasion of the challenger's privacy,
it may have difficulty surviving Katz and Hayden30 3 The Court suggested as much
in Brown3 0 4 when it denied standing to petitioners who were not on the premises
at the time of the search, claimed no property interest in the premises, and were
not charged with a possessory offense.3 0 5 To be sure, the Court noted in passing
that the petitioners had not alleged any "legitimate interest" in the things seized,30 6
suggesting perhaps that if they had, their standing would have been acknowledged.
In an accompanying footnote, however, the Court summarily rejected tardy claims
of "constructive possession" and a property interest shared by a "partnership in
307
crime."
W Moylan, supra note 290, at 1069. To be sure, Coolidge itself can be cited for this proposition.
The automobile seized from the driveway in that case had been visible to the officers from a position away
from the suspect's property. Still, the Court's plurality would not permit the seizure. 403 U.S. at 472.
Judge Moylan adds McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948), and Taylor v. United States, 286
U.S. 1 (1932). Cf. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925) (approving a seizure only after a warrant
had been obtained). I sincerely hope that he is right-that the fragile plurality opinion in Coolidge states
present law that Katz has not undermined the cases finding significance in a physical entry. Accord.
Corwin, supra note 80, at 22. On the other hand, the increasing strength of justice White, the principal
dissenter in Coolidge, and the basic tenor of more recent Burger Court decisions give me pause. I notice,
for example, that the District of Columbia Circuit has just held that a conceded "technical trespass" upon
private property to glimpse unlawful activity through a basement window does not violate the fourth
amendment. United States v. Johnson, 561 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc).
'E.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261, 263 (1960).
'United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
'See notes 265-68 and accompanying text supra.
Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973).
Id. at 229. Any of the three allegations would have entitled the petitioners to raise the validity of
the search under Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (recognizing standing in a person who
possesses real property, is legitimately on the premises when the search is conducted, or is charged with
a possessory offense involving the thing seized and would have to implicate himself or herself in crime
in order to claim some interest in it). Compare United States v. Hunter, 550 F.2d 1066, 1073 (6th Cir.
1977) (reading Brown to dispose of any broad reading of the "automatic standing" rule of Jones and
leaving "prosecutorial self-contradiction" as the only remaining ground) and Combs v. United States,
408 U.S. 224, 227 n.4 (1972) (recognizing the issue but failing to resolve it) with United States v.
Edwards, 554 F.2d 1331, 1333-34 n.2 (5th Cir. 1977) (relying on "automatic standing" without extended
discussion).
""411 U.S. at 229.
' Id. at 230 n.4. While the Court acknowledged that these arguments had not been raised below
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Given the ambiguity in Brown, it is unclear whether the Burger Court continues
to recognize standing based solely on a property interest in the thing seized. On the
other hand, if the Lisk case. 8 from the Seventh Circuit is any guide, the answer
may make little difference. Lisk had placed a bomb in the trunk of a co-defendant's
car. It was stipulated that although he had no interest in the car he retained a
proprietary interest in the bomb-including a right to its return. When federal
agents unlawfully searched the car and seized the bomb, he insisted that he had
standing to challenge its admission at trial. Writing for the circuit court, then-Judge
Stevens reasoned that by virtue of his property interest in the bomb Lisk had standing
to contest the seizure, but since he had no interest in the car he lacked standing to
challenge the search that turned it up. 309 It was, as Stevens put it, as though the
bomb had been found in plain view in a public place.31 ° Reduced to contending that
the bomb was neither fruits, instrumentalities or contraband, nor evidence of crime,
Lisk was on sinking ground. 31 ' He had standing to contest the seizure, but on the
and thus were not properly before the Court, it took time to disparage both of them, rejecting the partnership theory because the petitioners' possession of stolen property had been "illegitimate" and the constructive possession theory because the "conspiracy" upon which it was based was a "doubtful" ground
and because, in any event, the conspiracy as charged in the indictment had ended before the date of the
seizure. I hesitate to infer the worst, but it may be that if the Burger Court continues to recognize a
possessory interest in the thing seized as sufficient for standing, it may require more than an allegation
of such an interest but perhaps the fact of legitimate possession as determined after adjudication. Compare
United States v. Sacco, 436 F.2d 780, 784 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 834 (1971) (holding that the
possessory interest must be legitimate) and United States v. Lester, 21 F.R.D. 376, 382 (W.D. Pa. 1957)
(holding that the possessory interest must be proved) with Cotton v. United States, 371 F.2d 385, 391
(9th Cir. 1967) (holding that a claim of illegitimate interest is sufficient).
'United States v. Lisk, 522 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 230. See Knox, Some Thoughts on the Scope of the Fourth Amendment and Standing to
Challenge Searches and Seizures, 40 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1975) (elaborating upon but not departing significantly from the analysis in Lisk). On petition for rehearing, Stevens distinguished United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951), as involving a "regular invitee" with sufficient interest in the premises or
a suspect who was himself the "target" of the search. 522 F.2d at 232-33. See Mancusi v. DeForte,
392 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1968) (appearing to cite feflers as involving a sufficient interest in the place
searched); Grove, Suppression of Illegally Obtained Evidence: The Standing Requirement On Its Last Leg,
18 CATH. L. REV. 150, 171-72 (1968). The target theory was suggested by language in the Jones case:
In order to qualify as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" one must have
been a victim of a search or seizure, one against whom the search was directed, as distinguished
from one who claims prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a
search or seizure directed at someone else.
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (emphasis added). The question is whether the italicized
language establishes an independent basis for standing or merely restates in different words what it is
to be the "victim of a search." See United States v. Potter, 419 F. Supp. 1151, 1157 (N.D. III. 1976).
Thus far, the target theory has not fared well in the lower courts. Compare Mabra v. Gray, 518 F.2d 512,
514 (7th Cir. 1975) (another Stevens opinion reading the key language in Jones as merely an appositive)
with United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165, 1167-68 (7th Cir. 1976) (finding the target theory an
independent basis for standing but only in cases in which the suspect also has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the security of the thing seized in the place where he or she left it) and United States v. Hunt,
505 F.2d 931, 941 (5th Cir. 1974) (ignoring the doctrine altogether), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 975 (1975).
" It was also, perhaps, as though the codefendant had consented to the search of his car. 522 F.2d at
230 n.5. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (the duffel bag case).
' See text at note 267 supra. One would have thought that Lisk's argument was somewhat stronger
than the court allowed, however. For one thing, the bomb was described in the indictment as "a metal
pipe approximately 18" in length and 1 A" in diameter, crimped at each end with 2 electrical wires protruding from the center thereof, and containing an explosive material." 522 F.2d at 229 n.1 (emphasis
added). It seems plain that unless the officers conducted a dangerous inspection with a match at the scene,
they could not have known at the time of seizure that the material in the pipe was explosive. Of course
it was the explosive character of the material that transformed a worthless length of pipe into a "firearm"
within the meaning of the applicable federal statute. Perhaps even more importantly, it is plain that in
order to identify the object as a bomb, the police had to open it for examination-probably chemical testing
at a laboratory. Yet there was no talk in the court's opinion of an arguably unlawful "search" of the
pipe conducted after its lawful, as to Lisk, "seizure" from the car. 64 GEo. L.J. 1187, 1190 n.15 (1976).
Cf. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (holding that opening a locked container may invade the privacy of its owner).
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merits there was little argument to be made. All the evidence is not in, but if Justice
3 12
Stevens succeeds in persuading his new brethren that Lisk was correctly decided,
then the only conclusion to be drawn is that the fourth amendment's protection for
personal property has been almost entirely collapsed into its protection for privacy.
My purpose in this Section is merely to demonstrate that the trend in search and
seizure decisions is toward diminished protection for the individual. I should point
out, however, that a different path is open to the Court, a path I would have the
Court find anew even at the expense of overruling some of its recent decisions. At the
outset, I will acknowledge that the mere evidence rule has been properly laid to rest.
While I agree with the Hayden dissenters that the Court should not go out of its
way to render broad rulings that restrict individual liberty, 313 the Gouled rule drew
distinctions that can no longer be defended. 14 It was unworkable, and on that
ground alone it was properly buried. 5 On the other hand, I would not in the name
of practicality dismiss one unmanageable rule only to embrace another. That, in my
judgment, is precisely what Hayden did when it held that any object of evidentiary
value could be seized-so long as it was sufficiently related to criminal behavior-and
then exempted fruits, instrumentalities, and contraband from the test.3 16 If prior
to Hayden it was so difficult to distinguish items in those three murky categories
from mere evidence, I see no reason to think that the police will be any better able
to do so now-as they set about their task of seizing fruits, instrumentalities, and
contraband, which somehow "automatically 3 ' 17 identify themselves, while leaving
undisturbed objects unrelated to crime.3 18 To state the Hayden doctrine is to refute
it. I would reject the untenable distinction between fruits, instrumentalities, and
contraband on the one hand, and mere evidence on the other, but I would reject it
in both its forms and require in every case that the police have probable cause to
believe an object is evidence before it is seized.31 The addition of writings to the
chattels that can be seized makes this result all the more essential.
Of course, the Burger Court decisions on the seizure of writings must not be
overread. At most, they deny that the testimonial character of documents protects
them under the fifth amendment and hold that they may be obtained against the
owner's will, in some cases through a subpoena and in others through a search on
a warrant. The decisions most certainly do not say that writings are to be treated
in precisely the same way as ordinary chattels, and in particular they do not say
'In the past, he has been remarkably successful in gaining acceptance in the Supreme Court for his
work as a circuit judge. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 679 n.47 (1970) (relying upon
Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975), modified en bane, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976));
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 350, 357 (1976) (relying upon Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis,
473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972)).
8 387 U.S. at 310 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
",Kaplan, supra note 262. The best illustration of the Court's inability to cope with the mere evidence rule is Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) (approving the seizure of business records on
the theory that they were "part of the outfit or equipment actually used to commit the offense" of operating
an illegal liquor business).
m Accord, TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 63-64.
m See text at note 267 supra.
M7 Id.

sSee LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court: Further Ventures into the Quagmire, 8
CRiM. L. BULL. 9 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Quagmire]. To my mind, the problems raised in the
"mass seizure" cases remain. Compare Von Cleef v. New Jersey, 395 U.S. 814 (1969) with Stanford v.
Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965) and Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957).
' See, e.g., Shipman v. State, 291 Ala. 484, 282 So. 2d 700 (1973) (disapproving the seizure of an
object in plain view on the ground that the officer had no reasonable cause tobelieve it was contraband).
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that the plain view doctrine is to be applied to them.32 ° The idea in the plain view
exception is that the police can "seize" an object readily identifiable as evidence
without obtaining a warrant for it. Nothing in the doctrine authorizes any sort of
'
"search."321
While the police may be able to identify ordinary chattels as evidence,
I should have thought that any relationship between writings and criminal behavior
could only be ascertained by inspection. If officers pause to read documents, I find
the conclusion that they have conducted a "search" inescapable. 22 Accordingly, I
hope the Court will limit the seizure of writings to circumstances in which a magistrate issues a subpoena or search warrant that particularly describes the documents
to be delivered up or searched for and seized. In view of the extraordinary invasion
of privacy occasioned by an inspection of documents, "23 any warrant issued for writ' I will concede that Andresen came close. In that case, the petitioner contended that the warrant that
authorized the search of his law office was too broad and that in executing it the officers had seized
documents tangential to the real estate fraud matter under investigation. The Court rejected both arguments. As to the warrant itself, the Court found that the "specific list" of documents was necessary to
piece together the "jigsaw puzzle" of transactions relevant to the offense and that the addition of the
words "together with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown" did
not convert the list into a general warrant for rummaging through the petitioner's papers without direction. To save the warrant, the Court read the quoted language to refer only to the "crime" to which
the specific list of documents related. Coming to the seizure of other papers, the Court found that the
particular documents taken-relating to real estate lots other than the one involved in the alleged fraudwere nevertheless sufficiently tied to the offense under investigation to justify seizure. "In this case,"
said Justice Blackmun for the Court, "we conclude that the trained special investigators reasonably could
have believed that the evidence specifically dealing with another lot . . could be used to show petitioner's
intent with respect to the Lot 13T transaction." 427 U.S. at 483. While Andresen's summary treatment
of the very real difficulties opened up by Hayden is troubling, it seems to me that the Court has not yet
committed itself to treating paper searches like searches for other kinds of evidence. But see United States
v. Griffin, 555 F.2d 1323 (5th Cir. 1977) (approving seizure of pharmaceutical records identified as
evidence in the field); United States v. Prewitt, 553 F.2d 1082 (7th Cir. 1977) (permitting seizure of
correspondence without "minute" identification in a warrant).
'See Moylan, supra note 290, at 1066 (tracing the origin of the doctrine to Justice Frankfurter's
distinction in the "search incident" cases between the authority of the police to seize visible items at the
scene of an arrest and a broader authority to search the premises). Cf. United States v. Woods, 560 F.2d
660, 667 (5th Cir. 1977) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (insisting that the plain view doctrine could not justify
opening a cabinet in order to expose evidence); United States v. Bertucci, 532 F.2d 1144, 1149 (7th Cir.
1976) (Swygert, J., dissenting) (contending that a flashlight inspection of cartons in the back seat of a
car was itself a search unjustified by the plain view doctrine).
' See TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 67-68. The Justices who reached the fourth amendment question in
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), concluded that when officers set up the petitioner's camera and
viewed his reels of film on the spot before seizing them they conducted an unlawful search. The reels of
film were found in plain view, of course, but as Justice Stewart put it "the contents of the films could not
be determined by mere inspection." Id. at 571. Said another way, without searching through the reels
of film the officers could not identify them as evidence. The same analysis, I should have thought, applies in spades to writings. While some innocent documents will undoubtedly be read even in a closely
supervised search for evidence named in a warrant, the reading of papers in any other circumstance
would constitute an independent search-unjustified by anything in the plain view doctrine. Cf. South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 380 n.7 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (commenting that the
Court's approval of an automobile inspection contemplated only the removal and storage of documents-without an examination of their contents). But see United States v. Pugh, 566 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1977)
(approving a warrantless seizure of a book after an officer was able to read its one-word title in plain
view).
In Andresen, the Court acknowledged that there are "grave dangers inherent" in warrants authorizing searches for documents that are not presented when only physical objects "whose relevance is more
easily ascertainable" are sought. In particular, the Court conceded that "some innocuous documents will
be examined at least cursorily, in order to determine whether they are, in fact, among those papers authorized to be seized." 427 U.S. at 482 n.11. In light of these dangers the Court offered that officials
responsible for paper searches "must take care to assure that they are conducted in a manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon privacy." Id. From my point of view, the Court's diplomacy is
admirable but probably ineffectual. Police officers "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime," Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948), do not pause long to consider the privacy
interests of suspects they sincerely believe to be society's enemies. The proposal in the text relies not
upon the good faith and objectivity of the police but upon firm judicial supervision both before and after
the intrusion. Cf. United States v. Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding a documentary warrant invalid for want of sufficient particularity-but holding the admission of evidence seized under it
to have been harmless error).
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ings should closely circumscribe the authority of the police-on the order of warrants
authorizing electronic surveillance. 24
Coming to the plain view doctrine, I am concerned again about the ability of
the police to identify even fruits, instrumentalities, and contraband as sufficiently
related to criminal behavior to justify warrantless seizure. To meet the problem
reasonably, without simply demanding a warrant in all cases, I would enlist the rule
of inadvertence to new duty. While it is plain from Coolidge that the requirement
that evidence be discovered inadvertently was designed to frustrate the "planned
arrest," 25 it seems to me that it can be made to serve another function as well.
'Again in Andresen, see 427 U.S. at 482 n.11, and in Fisher as well, see 425 U.S. at 400, the Court
acknowledged the similarity of the concerns in subpoenas and searches for writings and electronic surveillance. Cf. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (analogizing the legislation involving Mr. Nixon's presidential papers to that regulating electronic surveillance). In both cases, government officers must read or listen to much that is innocent in order to identify anything that can be useful
in the investigation and prosecution of crime. We recognize that in our stringent statutory controls of
electronic snooping, and I would certainly take the same view of paper searches. Compare 18 U.S.C. §§

2510-2520 (1970) (governing electronic surveillance) with ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
(mandating additional judicial supervision when documents are
PROCEDURE §§ 220.5, 230.1(3) (1975)

subject to search). For a different proposal see Formalism, supra note 164, at 988 (suggesting that the
fourth and fifth amendments be read to "protect absolutely a core of personal communications"); Fisher
v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 414 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring) (adopting a similar position).
'Justice Stewart expressly stated that the case involved a "planned warrantless seizure." 403 U.S. at
471 n.27 (emphasis in original). See Moylan, supra note 290, at 1083-84; The Supreme Court, 1970
Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 244-46 (1971) [hereinafter cited as The Supreme Court] (judging that the
use of the power of arrest "for the ulterior purpose of gaining access to a person's house" to encounter
evidence "seems at the heart of Justice Stewart's concern"). On the other hand, if the deterrence of
"planned arrests" was in the Court's collective mind, it is difficult to understand why the rule of inadvertence was expressly made inapplicable to fruits, instrumentalities, and contraband-the very things the
police might anticipate finding in the arrested person's home at the time of arrest. See text at note 292
supra. CI. LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson
Dilemma, 1974 Sup. Cr. REv. 127, 132 [hereinafter cited as Dilemma]. Those categories have more to
do with the identification of objects as evidence than with initial police intrusions without probable cause
to search. See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 507-09 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting)
(reading the rule of inadvertence as a "check on the requirement of particular description in search warrants"); id. at 513 (White, J., dissenting) (asking rhetorically whether the Court meant to hold that before
a person "is deprived of his possession or right to possession of his effects" a magistrate must "confirm
that what the officer has legally seen . . . is actually contraband or criminal evidence"). To my mind, the
lower courts have virtually gutted the rule of inadvertence by failing to recognize its application to the
problem of identification and assuming simplistically that it is no more than a tool for getting at planned
arrests. For example, in United States v. Cushnie, 488 F.2d 81 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 968
(1974), the Fifth Circuit upheld the plain view seizure of marijuana the police spotted in an open suitcase as they entered the suspect's hotel room to make an arrest for possession of marijuana. Of course,
by reading Coolidge not to apply the rule of inadvertence to "contraband" the court might have avoided
the issue altogether. Instead, the court assumed that the rule of inadvertence applied but held that a mere
anticipation of finding drugs in the possession of a suspect arrested on drug charges was not enough to
invalidate the seizure. Plainly, the court discounted the inadvertence issue as soon as it was assured that
the police had not timed their entry in an effort to find contraband. Although Cushnie itself is hardly
troubling, two later Fifth Circuit cases relying upon it are. In United States v. Worthington, 544 F.2d
1275 (5th Cir. 1977), the court summarily dismissed the inadvertence problem when Drug Enforcement
Administration agents seized marijuana not from an open suitcase in a lighted hotel room, but from
gunnysacks in the darkened rear compartment of a small airplane. While the agents testified, and the
trial court found, that in their experience was the way marijuana was imported, I tend to doubt that it
was all so clear that anything was amiss-before the sacks were pulled out and opened. Next, in United
States v. Bolts, 558 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1977), the court relied on Cushnie and Worthington to approve
the seizure of a passport-found in plain view on an open shelf in a suspect's den. At the time, the suspect had just been arrested and everyone was waiting for family members to arrive to take charge of
his children after he was taken away. By no stretch of the imagination was the passport contraband,
though perhaps it was an instrumentality of the suspect's alleged drug trafficking scheme. In any case,
the arresting officers had known about it for months and might have obtained a magistrate's determination
that, if found, it would be evidence. Disregarding the identification issue in large measure, the Fifth
Circuit pronounced itself satisfied that the arresting officer could "grasp the significance" of the passport.
There being no suggestion of a timed arrest, the seizure was approved.
There is some evidence that Justice Stewart in Coolidge was concerned about the identification issue.
He mentioned in passing that in order to prevent the police from conducting an independent search of
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I would have the requirement apply to any object seized by the police in the field,
including fruits, instrumentalities, and contraband, and not named in a warrant
nor previously identified as evidence by a magistrate. In the typical case in which
the police suspect that an object related to crime will be found in a dwelling, several
scenarios can be constructed. First, the police may have probable cause to believe
both that the object will be found in the house and that it is evidence. In that situation, they will obtain a search warrant naming the object, and the plain view issue
will not arise. Second, the police may have probable cause to believe the object will
be found in the house but lack probable cause to believe it is evidence. In that case,
they will seek a warrant from a magistrate but will be rudely surprised when he
or she refuses to authorize a search-reasoning that even if a search is successful, its
fruits will be worthless. If the police enter the house on some other justifiable basis
and see the object in plain view, it cannot be seized. The magistrate has already
determined that it is not sufficiently related to criminal behavior. Finally, the police
may have probable cause to believe the object is evidence but lack probable cause
to believe it will be found in the place they propose to search. The magistrate will
refuse to issue a warrant, of course, but if he or she determines that, if found, the
object would be evidence, we have a different case. Now if the police gain entry to
the house by some other justifiable means and find the object there in plain view,
I have no difficulty permitting them to seize it--even though they have not come
upon it inadvertently but in fact anticipated finding it. After all, they have done all
they can. They have sought a warrant for the search and failed to obtain it because
their suspicion fell short of probable cause. Most importantly for my purposes here,
they have not attempted to make the critical judgment whether the object is evidence themselves but have afforded a magistrate an opportunity to make that decision before the fact.
By applying the rule of inadvertence to any object seized, but suspending it
when the police have in good faith obtained a magistrate's determination that, if
found, the object would be evidence, the Court could reduce substantially the dangers
the plain view doctrine otherwise presents. It would protect personal property that
the police might mistake for evidence without the guidance of a magistrate, and it
would provide added insurance that the police will not extend their search beyond
what is permissible under the justification by which they gain entry-in anticipation of discovering further evidence in plain view.a26 My modest proposal partakes
objects to determine whether they are related to crime, extending "a general exploratory search from one
object to another until something incriminating at last emerges," the plain view doctrine allows seizure
only of things whose connection with crime is "immediately apparent." 403 U.S. at 466-67. Some lower
courts have made that limitation part of a three-prong test, said to be derived from Coolidge. E.g., United
States v. Wilson, 524 F.2d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 945 (1976): "In order to
qualify for inclusion within the plain view exception it must be shown (1) that the initial intrusion which
afforded the authorities the 'plain view' was lawful; (2) that the discovery of the evidence was inadvertent; and (3) that the incriminating nature of the evidence was 'immediately apparent.' " Inasmuch
as I, too, find the identification problem in Coolidge of some importance, I hesitate to be critical. However,
it does seem to me that cases such as Wilson take language out of context. Again, when Justice Stewart
said that the incriminating character of objects must be "immediately apparent," he was addressing the
question whether the police can be permitted to examine them closely in order to determine their value as
evidence, or, what is worse, to move from object to object through a dwelling in the hope of ultimately
turning up something that is incriminating. That issue is related to but different from the broader question
whether the police can ever be trusted to identify evidence in the field and whether, if they cannot, a
magistrate's assistance should be sought whenever possible. This is the problem I treat in the text.
=Again, I would have the fourth amendment's protection for personal property serve a prophylactic
function. See text at note 257 supra.
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of the familiar presumption in favor of magisterial supervision in search and seizure
cases.3 2 7 If, despite recent suggestions to the contrary,1 21 the Court remains committed to the principle that the police should obtain a warrant for a search if there
is time to get one before action is necessary, I see no reason to adopt a different rule
for seizure. I propose no more than that if the police anticipate finding an object in
plain view and there is time to obtain a magistrate's determination that it is evidence,
then the police should seek that magisterial guidance before acting. It is only when
there is no occasion for presenting the matter to a magistrate, that is, when the police
come upon evidence inadvertently in the field, that a warrantless seizure is appropriate.3 2 9
Turning to the matter of standing, I would hold that a defendant in a criminal
case always has sufficient stake in the outcome to challenge the method by which
evidence against him or her was obtained.3" Short of that, even if the Stevens position in Lisk is accepted for the moment and we assume that a person whose personal
property is seized in an unlawful search of another's premises has standing only to
contest the seizure, it seems to me that it should be open to argument not only that
the object seized is not evidence of crime but that the police did not come upon it
inadvertently.33 ' Once again, I would not limit application of the rule of inadvertence to cases in which the defendant's privacy is breached. I consider it a rule
that directly protects personal property from wrongful seizure and indirectly limits
unjustified searches in anticipation of finding evidence in plain view. Of course, if
'See notes 347-49, 354-56 and accompanying text infra.
'See notes 403-10, 491, 494-522, 565-91 and accompanying text infra.
'I have in mind a future paper that will reject Judge Moylan's view that the rule of inadvertence is
limited to cases in which the police cross some threshold of constitutional protection and propose its application at large even when the police gather evidence from public places. At bottom, my notion is
that even when the police do not seize tangible objects they nevertheless seize "observations" of objects
as they pass down the street. If they use those observations in some way-to get a warrant for further action from a magistrate or merely as the basis for testimony in court-the fourth amendment ought to
play a role. Cf. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 177 (1969) (noting that the police may not
testify later about something "seen" but not taken in an unlawful search). Of course, I would hardly
insist that the police make their rounds with their eyes closed in order to avoid the unlawful seizure of
observations, and if they spy evidence in a window sill I would permit them to use their observation in
court. But if the observation is not come upon inadvertently, as for example when the police center upon
a particular house in anticipation of observing evidence, then I would bring the rule of inadvertence to
bear and prohibit them from making use of what they see until they have obtained a magistrate's determination that what they anticipate seeing is evidence. At a minimum, the proposal would tend to avoid
stakeouts around the homes of the innocent and redirect them to the homes of the guilty-that is, to
homes where the police anticipate finding evidence as determined by a magistrate. A thorough discussion
of the implications of such a position must await a more appropriate forum. I will neither expand upon
it nor defend it here.
'See note 640 infra.
' This use of the rule of inadvertence, which focuses upon the identification of objects seized as
evidence, has something in common with the "target" theory of standing, which focuses upon the police
purpose in conducting the search. See note 313 supra. In Hayden, when the mere evidence rule was
abolished and the difficulty of identifying objects as evidence was first raised, the Court acknowledged
that "in the case of 'mere evidence,' probable cause must be examined in terms of cause to believe that
the evidence sought will aid" in the investigation. Accordingly, "consideration of police purposes will be
required." 387 U.S. at 307. Cf. Matthews v. Correa, 135 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1943) (commenting that the
"line between fruits of the crime itself and mere evidence thereof may be narrow; perhaps this turns
more on the good faith of the search than the actual distinction between the matters turned up"). While,
again, I would go further and permit any criminal defendant against whom evidence is introduced at
trial to challenge the method by which it was obtained, I have no quarrel with the "target" theory as a
less desirable alternative to what appears to be present law.
The Lisk case has recently come up for review again, this time on the very theory suggested in the
text-that the seizure was not inadvertent. Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit, like so many other courts,
persists in confusing plain view with theories of search. Lisk has again been denied relief for want of a
sufficient expectation of privacy in his friend's car. United States v. Lisk, 559 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir. 1977).
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the police obtain a magistrate's determination that what they anticipate finding is
evidence, then I would suspend the rule. In that case there is simply no argument
against the seizure, divorced from the invasion of privacy that made it possible."' 2
It will be said that the lines I propose are just as unmanageable as those the Court
has recently rejected. Even if that is true, I am not deterred. For I will freely admit
a preference for complexity that enhances individual liberty over simplicity that
despoils it. It will certainly be said that my emphasis upon property rights and the
identification of things seized as evidence is overdone. Again I have a response.
It seems to me that by requiring in most instances that things to be seized be particularly described in a warrant, the fourth amendment itself recognizes that the
identification issue is critical. If officers in the field are left to exercise their own
judgment their actions will tend toward the very general exploratory searches
the framers abhored. 33 3 Furthermore, as Judge Hand observed,33 4 even if the
Court is now concerned only with the protection of reasonable expectations of
privacy, search and seizure doctrine that limits the objects to be seized ultimately
restricts the scope of the search and accordingly limits the governmental intrusion upon privacy. At bottom the point is the same. The Court simply must
draw lines, however flawed. It must develop doctrine that fills out some recognizable
fourth amendment structure. If it does not-if it relies entirely upon the Katz
formula and reduces every question of the fourth amendment's scope to an unprincipled balancing test the outcome of which can never be predicted-then we
have lost the ground we won in the incorporation battles twenty years ago. And
we have lost it in search and seizure cases whether tried in state or federal court.3 35
B. The Question of Standards
The overriding issue regarding compliance with the fourth amendment is the
relationship between its two clauses. The first, the reasonableness clause, states the
ultimate standard-the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches
and seizures. The second, the warrant clause, lays down guidelines for the issuance
and form of warrants. Two principal views have emerged. One holds that the two
clauses must be read separately. The first clause controls warrantless police action;
the second comes into play only when the police obtain a warrant before acting.36
On this view, the reasonableness clause is no more than a codification of the common
The only possible argument in this situation is one built somehow from the due process or eminent
domain clauses. I assume that the Court would find any seizure that does not violate the fourth amendment to be valid measured against other, less familiar standards. Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125
n.27 (1975) (commenting that the fourth amendment has "always been thought to define the 'process
that is due' for seizures of person or property" to the exclusion of other constitutional provisions).
mSee, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 470-71 (1971) (plurality opinion); Von Cleef
v. New Jersey, 395 U.S. 814 (1969).
'See text at note 257 supra.
'See notes 199-201 and accompanying text supra.
'TAYLOR,
supra note 8, at 39. Another, similar view holds that the first clause controls cases in
which the intrusion is for a purpose other than a search for evidence of crime-as in health inspections,
inventories, and perhaps even searches incident to arrest. See White, supra note 149, at 178, 209. The
warrant clause, then, governs criminal investigations. Id. at 178. Cf. notes 202-16 and accompanying
text supra (examining the argument that the fourth amendment does not apply at all in cases in which
the police are not pursuing evidence of crime). The obvious difficulty with lifting the warrant clause from
"civil" search cases is the resulting incentive to conduct pretext inspections for the real purpose of discovering evidence. Professor White recognizes the problem and suggests that the practice might be
discouraged by excluding from trial any evidence turned up in a warrantless inspection justified as "civil."
Id. at 179.
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law-taken for granted by the colonists who were concerned only with general warrants in fashioning the fourth amendment.3 3 ' The argument is fueled by the original
language of the amendment-which provided that "the right of the people shall not
be violated by warrants issuing." 3 ' The implication, so the argument runs, is that
the framers assumed that searches and seizures must be reasonable; they only proposed in the fourth amendment to prohibit executive officers from authorizing unreasonable actions in the teeth of the common law.3" 9 This view of the two clauses
is illustrated by the Court's early attempts to fix the limits of searches incident to
arrest. The key case is Rabinowitz, 340 in which the Court approved a contemporaneous search of the suspect's one-room office, his deck, his safe, and his file cabinets.3 4'
Said Justice Minton for the Court, "The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable
to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable. That criterion in
'342
turn depends upon the facts and circumstances-the total atmosphere of the case.
The other, competing view of the fourth amendment's two clauses holds that
they must be read together. While the ultimate standard is indeed reasonableness,
that term is to be defined in reference to the warrant clause. Thus, a search is per se
unreasonable unless it is authorized by a warrant, except in certain exceptional situations in which the police have a good excuse for not obtaining a warrant before
taking action.343 This view rests upon the language of the fourth amendment as it
was finally submitted to the states and ratified.144 It reasons that the framers could
hardly have intended to closely circumscribe warranted police action, but to leave
warrantless action largely unimpeded. Accordingly, the guidelines established for
warrants must apply to all intrusions upon privacy and property; adherence to
them is what makes a search and seizure reasonable3 4 In addition, this view recognizes the colonists' distrust of warrants issued by executive officers and, accordingly,
reads the fourth amendment to contemplate that warrants will be issued only by
magistrates. 46 Thus, the argument embraces the principle of judicial supervision
'TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 38-39.
' See LASSON, supra note 11, at 101. See also text at note 57 supra.
' TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 41. An extreme variation of this view has it that the fourth amendment

presents the police officer with a choice. The officer can choose to act without a warrant, but if a court
later determines that his or her action was unreasonable, the officer can be liable for damages. On the
other hand, the officer can choose to obtain a warrant before acting, in which event the requirements of
the warrant clause govern. If a court later determines that the action was nevertheless unreasonable, the
officer can raise the warrant as a defense. Of course, the messengers in Entick, see text at notes 40-47
supra, attempted to do just that and were unsuccessful. See notes 32-33 and accompanying text supra.
Yet that warrant did not comply with accepted common law standards. It is argued that if it had, and
if Lord Camden had only disagreed with Lord Halifax about whether it was supported by probable
cause, then the messengers would have had a defense in claiming that they acted in good faith in reliance
upon official authorization.
'"United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). See also Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699
(1948); cases cited in text at notes 109-12 supra.
" 339 U.S. at 58-59.
Id. at 66.
'Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-58 (1967); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14
(1948).
'See notes 58-60 and accompanying text supra. See also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 316-17
(1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"'Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1963) (holding that "the requirements of
reliability and particularity of the information on which an officer may act" cannot be "less stringent"
when an officer acts alone than when he or she acts on a warrant). Cf. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S.
38 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the standards for warrantless action may be more
stringyent).
E.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-53 (1971) (disapproving warrants issued by
the district attorney). See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 371 (1968) (same).
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of criminal investigations.14 7 The best illustration of this second view is Justice
Frankfurter's dissent in Rabinowitz. He would have restricted a search incident
to arrest to the suspect's person and the area within his or her "immediate physical
control." 4 ' Insisting that "[o]ne cannot wrench 'unreasonable searches' from the
text and context and historic content of the Fourth Amendment," he said that "a
search is 'unreasonable' unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only exceptions
justified by absolute necessity. ' 49
To be sure, the Frankfurter position is open to criticism. The Rabinowitz majority accused him of reducing the fourth amendment to a "fixed formula," something of a "rule of thumb" that had the appeal of "easy administration" but little
else to recommend it.'5 0 Telford Taylor has offered that Justice Frankfurter stood
the fourth amendment on its head by insisting that most searches be covered by
warrants when, at least according to Taylor, the very idea of the fourth amendment
was to discourage the issuance of warrants."6 ' Nevertheless, the incoming Warren
Court Justices embraced the Frankfurter view with enthusiasm. In retrospect, it
appears they had two solid reasons for doing so. First, the preference for warrants
offers manageable standards that a case-by-case test of reasonableness cannot. As
Justice Frankfurter put it, "To say that the search must be reasonable is to require
some criterion of reason. It is no guide at all . . . to say that an 'unreasonable search'
is forbidden-that the search must be reasonable." 6 2 Notwithstanding the doubts
expressed by the Rabinowitz majority, 53 the Warren Court found it far easier to
determine whether the police might reasonably have obtained a warrant than whether,
having failed to procure one, they acted reasonably on their own. Second, the principle of judicial supervision before the fact ensures that the decision whether to intrude upon the individual will be made not, in Justice Jackson's famous phrase, "by
' 4
the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime, 111
but by a "neutral and detached" 3 5 magistrate who objectively weighs the evidence
supporting the investigation. Moreover, by encouraging that the magisterial determination take place before intrusive police action is taken, the Frankfurter view
limits the chance that a search will inappropriately "be made legal by what it turns
up."35 It is one thing for a court to appraise evidence before the fact and to determine that the police have insufficient grounds for a search, and quite another to review
the evidence in hindsight and to disapprove what the police have already done-ignoring the success they have already had.
So it was that in Chimel... the Warren Court squarely overruled Rabinowitz
' See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) (expressing a preference for search warrants);
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) (expressing a preference for arrest warrants). See generally Player,
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 5 GA. L. REv. 269 (1971).
339 U.S. at 72.
'Id. at 70. See also Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948); Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145, 161-62, 168 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
35 339 U.S. at 63, 65.
TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 46-47.
m' 339 U.S. at 83.
' Justice Minton dealt with the matter explicidy, allowing that the judgment in every case would be
difficult-but none the less so for shifting the issue presented from the reasonableness of the police action
to the "fallacious" question whether there was time to procure a warrant. See id. at 65.
' Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
..Id.
'aUnited States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
' Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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and adopted not only the dissent's result but its answer to the fundamental question
of the relationship between the fourth amendment's two clauses. Assuming that the
police had lawfully arrested the suspect in Chimel,5 8 Justice Stewart held for the
Court that the incident search could go no further than his person and the area into
which he might reach for a weapon or evidence. 5" The rationale, drawn from Justice
Frankfurter's Rabinowitz dissent, was that a search of the "grabbing area" was necessary to prevent the suspect from using a weapon to resist arrest or effect escape and
from concealing or destroying evidence that might then be lost to the investigation 8 °
Those justifications would not support a broader search, however, even if the police
had probable cause to believe that a more extensive search of the premises would
turn up further evidence."' "Such searches in the absence of well-recognized exceptions, may be made only under the authority of a search warrant.""36 In Vale a 3
following soon after, the Court decided what had been implicit in Chimel-that a
broader search must be delayed until a warrant can be obtained even if in the interim the police must rope off the premises to prevent the removal of evidence
by others."6 4
Chimel and Vale were hardly unanimous decisions. Justice Harlan concurred
in Chimel-lamenting that in fashioning protective fourth amendment doctrine inconsistent with long-standing practices of local authorities and then forcing that
doctrine upon the states through incorporation and the exclusionary rule, the Court
was constructing a dilemma. Sooner or later, he warned, the Court must decide
whether it will disregard competing law enforcement concerns at the state level or
respect those concerns, alter its protective doctrine, and thereby dilute the federal
standard.86 5 Justice White dissented in Chimel. Justice Black concurred in that
dissent and wrote his own in Vale. While the two Justices purported to embrace
the essence of the Frankfurter position,' the tenor of their opinions clearly looked
back to the majority opinion in Rabinowitz. In Chimel, Justice White said simply
Although all parties agreed that an arrest warrant upon which the arresting officers relied was invalid, the state courts had approved the arrest without a warrant but upon probable cause. In order to
reach the "search incident" question without straying into a review of that determination, Justice Stewart
assumed without deciding that "the California courts were correct in holding that the arrest of the
petitioner was valid under the Constitution." Id. at 755.
Id. at 762-63.
"oId. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 72 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
395 U.S. at 766 n.12.
Id. at 763.
'Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
''The suspect in Vale had been arrested on the steps in front of his house, and the narrow question
was whether the "search incident" theory would admit the arresting officers into the house for a search.
By holding that Chimel would not permit such a search without a warrant, id. at 33, the Court implicitly
held that the police can "maintain the status quo" while they send one of their number to a magistrate.
Griswold, Criminal Procedure, 1969-Is It a Means or An End?, 29 Mn. L. REv. 307, 317 (1969). But see
United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1977) (distinguishing Vale in a case in which the
police knew that someone was in the house already and might destroy evidence before a warrant could
be obtained). To the extent difficulties with the necessary oath and general decorum can be ironed out,
the issuance of search warrants over the telephone may provide a fair answer. United States v. Johnson,
561 F.2d 832, 843 n.12 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2953 (1977); United States v.
Turner, 558 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1977). See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c).
' 395 U.S. at 769. See also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 117 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
. In a footnote in his Chimel dissent, joined by Justice Black, Justice White said he did not question
the holding of prior cases that "where it is practicable to obtain a search warrant and the search is not
contemporaneous with an arrest, a warrant must be obtained to validate the search." 395 US. at 776 n.8.
The concession, of course, was backhanded at best. Not only did Justice White relegate the comment to
an obscure footnote, but he specifically excepted searches incident to arrest from the Frankfurter analysis.
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that "[f]or the police to search the house while the evidence they had probable
36 7
cause to search out and seize was still there cannot be considered unreasonable."
Similarly, in Vale, Justice Black insisted that "[i]t is only necessary to find that,
given Vale's arrest in a spot readily visible to anyone in the house and the probable
existence of narcotics inside, it was reasonable for the police to conduct an immediate

search of the premises. '"308
The staged entrance of the Nixon appointees magnified the debate. Chief Justice

Burger arrived in time for Vale and dissented with Justice Black. Justice Blackmun
joined the dissenters soon after,3 6" and when the Frankfurter position prevailed in
Coolidge3'7 it was only in a plurality opinion. 37 ' The opinions in that perplexing

case depicted the Court in analytic transition. Justice Stewart pulled and bent the
precedents into line behind his opinion for the plurality in a desperate attempt to
consolidate his position, ' 2 while Justice White fly-specked Justice Stewart's logicinsisting that the Court must abandon esoteric line-drawing in favor of clear, workable rules to guide the police. 37 3 But laying the great mass of detail in their argu'0 Id. at 775.
' 399 U.S. at 39. Indeed, Justice Black cited Rabinowitz as authority for his view that "whether a
search incident to a lawful arrest is reasonable should still be determined by the facts and circumstances
of each case." Id. at 38. I should say that while I read the White and Black dissents in these cases to
partake of the Rabinowitz view of the fourth amendment's two clauses, there is in both some attention
to exigent circumstances-the sort of situation in which Justice Frankfurter would have permitted warrantless action. In Chimel, Justice White contended that the warrantless arrest of the suspect created
exigent circumstances justifying an immediate search, and in Vale Justice Black maintained that immediate
action was necessary to prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence by others. See note 366 and
accompanying text supra. In response, of course, Justice Stewart insisted that the police had simply
neglected to obtain search warrants in both cases. Indeed, in Chime! they may have timed the arrest of
the suspect in order to have an opportunity for a warrantless search of his home. 395 U.S. at 767.
Blackmun had joined the Court by the time Vale was decided, but he did not participate in the
decision.
' Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), discussed in notes 289-300, 325-32 and accomEanying text supra.
Justice Stewart again wrote for the Court, and Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall concurred.
On the other hand, since Justice Harlan concurred in the portion of the plurality opinion that expressly
responded to Justice White's dissent, saying that anything other than Justice Stewart's view would "go
far toward relegating the warrant requirement . . . to a position of little consequence in federal search
and seizure law," I think it fair to count his vote with Justice Stewart on the critical issue in the
case. Accord, Moylan, supra note 290, at 1049. But see North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 2d 301, 502 P.2d
1305, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1972) (in bank) (declining to follow Stewart's plain view analysis on the
theory that since Harlan did not join that part of the plurality opinion the Court was equally divided on
the issue).
'"He
had difficulty even with his own recent opinion in Chimel, though he allowed that the ruling
in that case was not directly controlling for want of retrospective application. 403 U.S. at 455-56. See
Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971). In Chime!, he had held for the Court that the police
can search an arrested person and the "area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." 395 U.S. at 763. Nothing was said in that case about a requirement that the seizure
of evidence found within that area must be inadvertent, and in Coolidge Justice Stewart expressly declined
Justice White's invitation to rewrite Chimel to that effect. Compare Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 465 n.24 (1971) with id. at 519. On the contrary, Justice Stewart seemed clearly to leave Chimel
in place and to apply the rule of inadvertence only to evidence found outside the suspect's physical control.
Id. at 484 (stating the principle in Coolidge as the requirement "that the police must obtain a warrant
when they intend to seize an object outside the scope of a valid search incident to arrest") (emphasis
added). In the end, Justice Stewart conceded the obvious-that "it would be nonsense to pretend that
our decision today reduces Fourth Amendment law to complete order and harmony." Id. at 483.
'At
bottom, Justice White proposed that in the interest of clarity the Court should "treat searches
of automobiles as we do the arrest of a person," see notes 403-10, 494-505 and accompanying text infra,
and thus should permit warrantless searches on probable cause without requiring a showing of exigent
circumstances on the facts of the particular case. 403 U.S. at 527. Coming to Justice Stewart's plain view
analysis, Justice White contended that the rule of inadvertence was not only inconsistent with the precedents,
Chimel among others, but protected no fourth amendment values. He said that by the time the police
are in a position to seize evidence in plain view, whether inadvertently or not, the invasion of privacy to
which the fourth amendment is addressed has already occurred-and been justified on some independent
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ments to one side, the familiar debate that had divided the Court twenty years
earlier in Rabinowitz was easily recognizable just below the surface. It is clear
that Stewart and White were in fundamental disagreement from the outset over
whether the police can validly enter a suspect's premises to effect a warrantless arrest. Justice Stewart first assumed, as he had in Chimel, that the arrest of the suspect
was valid.374 His opinion then launched into the further question of the proper
scope of any search and seizure undertaken thereafter. Justice White, on the other
hand, began his separate opinion with the proposition that the police can make a
warrantless arrest, with or without exigent circumstances, on the suspect's premises
or elsewhere375 It is hardly surprising, then, that the two Justices should come to
different results in Coolidge. The critical question, it will be recalled, was whether
the automobile taken from the drive had been properly seized without a warrant
naming it.371 Justice Stewart thought not. Since the police had anticipated finding
it and intended to seize it, they should have obtained a warrant.377 In contrast,
Justice White found no difficulty with the seizure. If the police could enter the
premises to arrest the suspect without a warrant, as he assumed they could, then it
made little sense to contend that they needed a warrant to enter and seize real evidence, whether they anticipated finding it or not.3"
basis. Accordingly, it makes little fourth amendment sense, as White put it, to prohibit the seizure of
one photograph on the theory that the police anticipated finding it but to permit the seizure of an
identical photo standing next to it because the police had not expected to find it. Such a rule, according
to Justice White, would not cut short a further intrusion into privacy but would merely protect the
suspect's possessory interest in the object seized-an interest, for White, unrelated to "any Fourth Amendment ends." Id. at 517. Justice White also objected that the rule of inadvertence does nothing to discourage
"planned arrests," offering that if the police have probable cause for a search they will obtain a warrant.
"Only oversight or careless mistake would explain the omission .... " Of course, Justice White allowed
that the police might misjudge their evidence and not realize they have probable cause or a magistrate
might fail to issue a warrant when appropriate. In either event, according to White, the rule of inadvertence would prohibit the seizure of things the police have probable cause to search for and seize, but
permit the seizure of things they lack cause to pursue. A student comment fashioned the scenario:
Since the burden is traditionally on those seeking exemption from the warrant requirement
to show the need for it, the plurality's rule will foster an anomalous situation in which police contend they did not have probable cause to seize the object before they made their entry, while the
defendant contends probable cause existed and the police could have obtained a warrant.
The Supreme Court, supra note 325, at 245. That is true, of course, only if the anticipation to which
Stewart referred in his rule of inadvertence is to be equated with probable cause. If, on the other hand,
he referred only to some quantum of evidence short of probable cause, still sufficient to raise an expectation of finding something, we have a different case. If the real problem to which the rule speaks is the
identification of objects not named in a warrant as evidence, and Justice Stewart would permit the seizure
of an object that was anticipated so long as a magistrate has identified it as evidence, then I at least see
no logical flaw in the plurality opinion. See notes 325-32 and accompanying text supra. Then, if the
police find themselves defending a plain view seizure without the benefit of a prior magisterial identification
of the thing seized as evidence, they will not argue that they lacked probable cause for a warrant but
that they had not the slightest thought they would find it and thus had no reason to ask a magistrate
whether, if found, the thing would be useful in a criminal prosecution.
' See note 358 supra. The officers in Coolidge had gone to the suspect's home on the authority of
warrants for the arrest of the suspect and the seizure of the Pontiac car, issued by the state Attorney
General-"who had personally taken charge of all police activities relating to the murder." 403 U.S.
at 446-47. The Court agreed that the warrants were invalid for want of issuance by a "neutral and
detached" magistrate but assumed for purposes of decision that the warrantless arrest was valid. The
warrantless seizure of the car was, then, the remaining critical issue and the one Stewart examined in
depth in his opinion for the Court. Id. at 455.
That, he said, was the common law rule and the one supported by the weight of authority. 403 U.S. at
510-11 n.l. In his concurring opinion, however, Justice Harlan said that the Court had never expressly
taken that position and, while it appeared to be the crux of the disagreement between Stewart and White
in this case, the Court still had not decided who was right. Id. at 492. See note 406 infra.
See note 300 supra.
403 U.S. at 484. See note 325 supra.
sChimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 776 (1969) (White, J., dissenting).
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After Coolidge, the deluge. While Rabinowitz has not been explicitly resurrected,
the Burger Court appears to accept the view that warrantless police action is per se
unreasonable except in exigent circumstances only in cases in which the police pry
into large, immobile containers, preferably double-locked170 and even more preferably resembling a house or office building."' In all other cases, the Court seems
unconcerned that the police act without a warrant, even when there is ample time
to obtain one. To my mind, the Court applies a standard of case-by-case reasonableness that is indistinguishable from that employed by the majority in Rabinowitz,8 '
which in turn is indistinguishable from the flexible, "fundamental fairness" standard
that Justice Frankfurter would have limited to state cases examined under the due
process clause.. 8 2 In so doing, the Court loses both the additional guidance for decision provided by the preference for warrants and the advantages of prior judicial
supervision of criminal investigations. In the end, the Court finds itself asking just
how badly the police acted and then judging whether they acted badly enough. 388
I will set forth only three illustrations-the decisions on the detention of the person,
those on searches incident to arrest following Chitnel, and those on automobile
3 84

searches.

1. Detention of the Person
The term "arrest" is not mentioned in the Constitution. Yet the fourth amendment plainly speaks to detention of the person by protecting the right of the people
to be secure in their persons and by requiring that warrants particularly describe
=E.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (invalidating the warrantless search of a
double-locked trunk).
E.g., G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977) (invalidating a warrantless search
of business premises used in part as a dwelling place).
'See text at note 342 supra.
'See notes 116-30 and accompanying text supra.
'See
text at note 130 supra.
'One illustration I will not present is the line of decisions on the requirements for probable cause in
the rare cases in which the police seek a warrant. See LaFave, Probable Cause From Informants: The
Effects of Murphy's Law on Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 1. There, too, however,
I believe the Burger Court is fast retreating from the more structured precedents set down during the
Warren Court years. Beginning with Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933) (see text at note
104 supra) the Court recognized that the affidavit supporting a warrant must be more than a bald assertion of suspicion but must contain facts that allow the reviewing magistrate to make an independent
determination of probable cause. While the early Warren Court decisions gave questionable warrants the
benefit of the doubt, see, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) (observing that affidavits
and warrants are often drafted by nonlawyers and must be judged in a "common sense and realistic
fashion"); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (concluding that if there is a "substantial basis"
for crediting hearsay in an affidavit it may justify issuance of a warrant), the decisions in later years
were more demanding. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (holding that informers' tips
used in affidavits must be both reliable and credible); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969)
(rejecting a totality of the circumstances standard and finding that the two-prong Aguilar test was not
satisfied even though the police had attempted to verify the informer's tip on which they relied). The
Burger Court has altered course. In United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971), the Court used Jones
as a "suitable benchmark" and expressly overruled Spinelli in one respect on the way to a judgment
clearly inconsistent with the earlier cases. See 43 CoLo. L. REv. 357 (1972). 1 judge more recent decisions summarily treating these issues to reflect this Court's lack of interest in thorough re-examination
of what the police and magistrates do in the "haste of a criminal investigation." United States v. Ventresca,
380 U.S. at 108. See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (treating the petitioner's attack
on the sufficiency of the warrant in a footnote). To the extent the recent cases spend less energy in
detailed logical analysis but rather examine in seratim various indicia of reliability regarding evidence
submitted to the magistrate, see, e.g., United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971) (relying on various
circumstances in the case to justify a finding that an informer's tip was sufficiently credible), I find them
consistent with the Court's overarching approach to search and seizure issues. This Court prefers a
flexible, case by case methodology which allows leeway to do rough justice in the particular case but
does not hamper the Court's disposal of arguments that do not go to "fundamental fairness."
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the persons or things to be seized. When a police officer "accosts an individual and
restrains his freedom to walk away," 3 5 the fourth amendment comes into play.
That much is clear. Indeed, there has never been serious doubt of it. The questions that have troubled the Court are of a different order. First, the Court has
had to decide whether the amendment's preference for warrants means that the
police are bound to obtain a warrant before acting whenever there is a reasonable
opportunity to do so. Second, assuming that there will be cases in which the police
detain individuals without a warrant, the Court has had to decide whether the same
standards applicable to a magisterial determination of probable cause apply as well to
police judgments in the field.
The early decisions frankly avoided the first question. The familiar casesDi Re," 6 Johnson,38 7 and Brinegar3 8S-at most only assumed that a warrantless
arrest on probable cause would pass muster and went on to the further question
whether, on the facts, the police had probable cause at the time they took action.'" 9
The Warren Court, too, preferred to duck the issue. In both Draper3 " and Henry, 9'
the only question before the Court was again whether the police had acted on
probable cause and, in any event, a strong case for exigent circumstances excusing
failure to obtain a warrant might have been made out in either.3 92 In Beck, 93 the
Court stressed the advantages of "an objective predetermination of probable cause"
and worried that a warrantless arrest "bypasses" those safeguards and substitutes
the "far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification. 3 94 Still, the Court
did not squarely require the police to explain their failure to get a warrant in every
case. When the Court passed up yet another opportunity to do just that in Wong
Sun,"9 5 Justice Douglas was obliged to state his view in a concurring opinion.396
Toward the end of the Warren era, in both Chimel... and Coolidge,'8" the Court
declined still more opportunities to flatly adopt Frankfurter's position. 9 9
The incoming Burger Court began with a promising but ambiguous comment
in the Pugh case. 400 The question at bar was not whether the police must have a
' Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
'United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
SJohnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
'E.g., United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 592 (1948) ("[a]ssuming, without deciding, that an
arrest without a warrant . . . may later be justified if the arresting officer's knowledge gave probable
grounds to believe any felony found in the statute books had been committed").
'Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
' Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
'In Draper, the officers did not have probable cause until they were able to verify their information
as the suspect was leaving a train with suitcase in hand, and in Henry the suspects were in an automobile.
Of course, the arrest in Henry was disapproved, in any case. Nor does the opinion in Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958), offer guidance. In that case, the police obtained a warrant.
'Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
Id. at 96.
'Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). See Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A
Study in Faith and Hope, 42 Naa. L. REv. 483, 496-97 (1962).
..371 U.S. at 497 (insisting that "there having been time to get a warrant, probable cause alone could
not have justified the arrest ... without a warrant").
'Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755-56 (1969). See note 358 and accompanying text supra.
...
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). See note 374 and accompanying text supra.
' I refer here only to the general view that warrantless police action is per se unreasonable except in
exigent circumstances excusing failure to obtain a warrant. See notes 343-49 and accompanying text supra.
Justice Frankfurter formulated the proposition in cases involving search incident to arrest. I do not know
whether lse would have adhered to it in examining the lawfulness of the arrest itself.
,0 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
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warrant before making an arrest, but rather whether they must seek judicial approval of a warrantless arrest promptly after the suspect is taken into custody. In
holding that they must do precisely that, Justice Powell observed that "the Court
has required that the existence of probable cause be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate whenever possible." '' Then, in an accompanying footnote, he said:
We reiterated this principle in United States v. United States District Court [the
domestic wire-tapping case] . . . . In terms that apply equally to arrests, we
described the "very heart of the Fourth Amendment directive" as a requirement
that "where practical, a governmental search and seizure should represent both
the efforts of the officer to gather evidence of wrongful acts and the judgment of
the magistrate that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a
'40 2
citizen's private premises or conversation.
It must be kept in mind, of course, that this language was written to justify a requirement of speedy judicial review after the police have made a warrantless arrest.
It might have been intended only to underscore the value of judicial participation-at
some point. Yet the language, read literally, seems to say that a magisterial determination should precede the intrusion "whenever possible."
If Justice Powell had in mind the second possibility, his comment in Pugh must
be the shortest-lived constitutional decision of this century. For in the very next
Term, Justice White finally had his way. Writing for the Court in Watson, 403 he
allowed that the police "may find it wise to seek arrest warrants where practical to
do so" and even that the Court might more readily accept their determinations of
probable cause if warrants are obtained.40 4 But he refused to "transform this judicial
preference into a constitutional rule."40 5 Instead he held that the police may arrest
a suspect in a public place on a determination of probable cause40 6 even when there
'5 1 id. at 112.

ld. at 113 n.12 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Io

States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
ld. at 423.
° Id.
The opinion was explicitly limited to detentions in a public place and thus once again left open
the question whether the police can enter private premises to make a warrantless arrest on probable cause
but in the absence of exigent circumstances. Id. at 418 n.6. While it appears that Justice White himself
would have no difficulty approving such an entry, provided the police have probable cause to believe the
suspect is at home, accord, ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 120.6 (1975), other
Justices are by no means convinced. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477-78 (1971)
(plurality opinion). In United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), discussed in notes 186-89 and
accompanying text supra, the suspect was standing in the threshold of her home when she was first accosted by the police, and they chased her into the vestibule in "hot pursuit." Accordingly, the Court again
declined to pass on the validity of a warrantless entry in the absence of exigent circumstances. Again,
individual Justices stated their personal views. Compare 427 U.S. at 43-44 (White, J., concurring) (approving warrantless entries) with id. at 45-58 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (disapproving them). For my own part,
the entire controversy is distressing. I find warrantless arrests in public dangerous enough without permitting
them in private as well. Indeed, I would not approve entry upon private premises to effect an arrest on
a warrant. This sort of police action has about it the character of a search. Justice White agrees and
would require that the police have probable cause to believe the suspect will be found inside, but that is
hardly the familiar rule for searches of dwellings. I should have thought a search warrant would be required. That, after all, is the standard for searches of buildings for real evidence. See Dorman v. United
States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Rotenberg & Tanzer, Searching for the Person to be Seized, 35
OHIO ST. L.J. 56 (1974); Note, The Neglected Fourth Amendment Problem in Arrest Entries, 23 STAN.
L. REV. 995 (1971). At the very least, a search warrant would serve the function of informing occupants
of the legal authority for the intrusion and the scope of the search to be undertaken. See United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 17 n.1 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364, 383-84 (1976) (Powell, J.,concurring); Camera v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967), discussed in notes 216-39 and accompanying text supra. It appears, however, that the lower courts anticipate
'United
5
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is time and opportunity to obtain a warrant before taking action.40 7 Justice White
cited Pugh, but not on the key issue;4 °s Justice Powell's concurring opinion failed
even to mention his own language of only the year before.4"' Indeed, reflecting on
Watson in the school paddling case last Term, Justice Powell read that case to have
found "judicial scrutiny after the fact" sufficient "despite the distinct possibility that
a police officer may improperly assess the facts and thus unconstitutionally deprive
'
an individual of liberty."41
The change occasioned by the Watson decision, then,
is nothing short of dramatic. The case flatly denies the Frankfurter position-that
warrantless police action is per se unreasonable except in exigent circumstances-and
with it rejects the principle of judicial supervision of criminal investigations.
The first question, then, appears to have been decided, however unhappily. The
second, the question whether the police will be held to the standards that govern
a magistrate, is still in flux. At first, the Warren Court was firm on the matter.
In Wong Sun,"1' the Court said that the police must be held at least to the standard
applicable to magistrates in order to avoid encouraging them to act without judicial
supervision. In Beck,4" the Court blurred the standards for arrest and search warrants, bringing to bear upon each some relatively stringent precedents.4 13 By the
time Henry414 was decided in 1959, litigants assumed that before the police could
interfere in any significant way with the liberty of a citizen they would have to have
the sort of evidence that would persuade a magistrate to issue a warrant for the
that Justice White will win out. See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 560 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Easter, 552 F.2d 230 (8th Cir. 1977). But see People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 545 P.2d 1333,
127 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1976) (requiring exigent circumstances). The issue is presented for decision in
Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, 534 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1976) (chart of decisions without
published opinions), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1072 (1977). Entry upon property in the possession of third
parties raises even more serious questions. See KAMIsAR, LAFAvF & ISRAEL, supra note 103, at 312-13.
In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972), afl'd, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir.), cert.
granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3182 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1977), the Court will be asked to hold that if the things for
which the police wish to search are in the hands of a third party, they must first attempt to obtain them
by subpoena, resorting to a search warrant only after failure through the less intrusive means.
423 U.S. at 423-24.
Indeed, he drew out of Pugh the comment, gratuitous in that case, that the Court "has never invalidated an arrest supported by probable cause solely because the officers failed to secure a warrant."
420 U.S. at 113, quoted in 423 U.S. at 417-18.
'To
be sure, Justice Powell did point out the obvious-that none of the Court's prior cases had held
that the police might ignore an opportunity to obtain a warrant before making an arrest in a public place
and that the Court's decision in Watson was inconsistent with the general rule that warrantless police
action is per se unreasonable except in exigent circumstances. In the end, however, he decided to live with
the holding on the theory that "logic sometimes must defer to history and experience." 423 U.S. at 429.
Like Justice White, Justice Powell found that the common law had permitted such arrests. See Williams,
Arrest for Felony at Common Law, 1954 CRIM. L. REV. 408. It hardly need be said, however, that it is
one thing to find in legal history a reason to protect the individual from some form of governmental power
and quite another to rely on history to deny that protection. In other contexts Justice Powell has not
taken the view that Americans are entitled only to the precise quantum of liberty that British subjects enjoyed in 1791. E.g., United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (requiring a warrant in
electronic surveillance cases involving domestic security).
5
"0Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 679-80 (1977).
m
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 480-81 (1963). Accord, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96
(1964).
'The Court relied on Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958), for the proposition that
"[tlhe language of the Fourth Amendment, that '. . . no Warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause . ..
of course applies to arrest as well as search warrants." 379 U.S. at 96 n. 6 , quoting 357 U.S. at 485-86. But
Beck took the point further-applying all the precedents on what constitutes probable cause in search cases
to the arrest situation.
...
See note 384 supra.
414Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
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suspect's arrest.415 A few years later, however, events began to weaken the Court's
resolve. The crime rate rose, "aggressive patrol" in the inner cities became an accepted practice,416 and the Court's critics demanded a more flexible approach to
street encounters.4 17 Specifically, there was building pressure to approve the "stop
and frisk" laws that were fast being adopted across the country.418 Those statutes
authorized the police to briefly detain suspects on the basis of reasonable suspicion
that they were involved in criminal activity.41
The Court stepped ever so lightly. It declined to review the validity of any particular state's law but chose as its principal case one from a state that had no stop
and frisk statute. Even in Terry,420 the Court vaguely attempted to bypass the
troubling "stop" issue and approve only a limited "frisk" of the outer clothing after
detention of the suspect.42 The facts were typical. An experienced officer had observed three suspects apparently casing a store for a daylight robbery in downtown

"'Indeed, in Henry the Government conceded that at the very moment the officers in that case had
stopped the suspect's car an "arrest" had occurred, necessitating the justification of probable cause, Id. at
103. But see Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 262 (1960) (suggesting that the subjective intention of
the officers is controlling). Cf. Belcher v. Stengel, 97 S. Ct. 514, 515 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
(indicating that an officer's intent to make an arrest may influence a decision on whether his or her action
is to be ascribed to the state).
"See
Skolnick, The Police and the Urban Ghetto, 1968 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. No. 3.
" E.g., Vorenberg, Police Detention and Interrogation of Uncounselled Suspects: The Supreme Court
and the States, 44 B.U. L. REV. 423 (1964).
'SThe most important examples were New York's statute, then N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 180-a
(McKinney Supp. 1967) (Law of Mar. 2, 1964, ch. 86, § 2, 1964 N.Y. Laws 111, as amended by Law of
April 27, 1967, ch. 681, § 39, 1967 N.Y. Laws 1602), and now N.Y. Cat. PRoc. LAW § 140.50 (McKinney
1971), and the provision in the Model Code. ALI MODEL CODE Or PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.2
(1975). See Ronayne, The Right to Investigate and New York's "Stop and Frisk" Law, 33 FORDHAM L.
REV. 211 (1964); Siegel, The New York "Frisk" and "Knock-Not" Statutes: Are They Constitutional?,
30 BROOKLYN L. REV. 274 (1964); Comment, Selective Detention and the Exclusionary Rule, 34 U. CHI.
L. REv. 158, 158 n.2 (1966) (collecting the authorities).
"See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.50 (McKinney 1971); ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PaoCEDURE § 110.2 (1975).
Wayne LaFave speculated on the various verbal formulations that might be
employed in "stop and frisk" situations and concluded that in order to meet the reasonable suspicion
standard the police must have evidence raising a "substantial possibility" of criminal activity. LaFave,
"Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 40 (1968).
'sTerry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
'The Court's language was painfully ambiguous. In the text, the Court acknowledged that when the
officer "took hold of" the petitioner and "patted down the outer surfaces of his clothing," he had "seized"
and "searched" him, and stated the task as deciding "whether at that point it was reasonable for Officer
McFadden to have interfered with petitioner's personal security as he did." Id. at 19. Yet in an accompanying footnote, the Court added:
We thus decide nothing today concerning the constitutional propriety of an investigative "seizure"
upon less than probable cause for purposes of "detention" and/or interrogation. Obviously, not all
personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves "seizures" of persons. Only when
the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty
of a citizen may we conclude that a "seizure" has occurred. We cannot tell with any certainty
upon this record whether any such "seizure" took place here prior to Officer McFadden's initiation
of physical contact for purposes of searching Terry for weapons, and we thus may assume that up
to that point no intrusion upon constitutionally protected rights had occurred.
Id. at n.1 6 . Cf. id. at 34 (White, J., concurring) (suggesting that in appropriate circumstances an officer
may briefly detain a suspect for questioning but that the suspect may refuse to answer without, in the
process, furnishing grounds for arrest). The notorious footnote 16 in the Terry case is open to at least
two readings. On the one hand it can be read as an attempt to avoid the "stop" issue altogether and to
deal in the opinion only with the "frisk." See Meyer, Arrest Under the New Kansas Criminal Code, 20
KAN. L. REV. 685, 724-25 (1972). On the other, it can be read to have merely carved out of the case
the question of detention for interrogation. But see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968), set forth in note
422 infra, expressly mentioning "reasonable inquiries." Of course, it is difficult to understand what other
reason the police might have for accosting a suspect on the street. Hence White's concurring opinion
treating the issue. In a concurring opinion of his own, Justice Harlan said that he "would make it perfectly clear that the right to frisk in this case depends upon the reasonableness of a forcible stop to
investigate a suspected crime." Id. at 33.
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Cleveland. He briefly detained them for questioning, and when he received no
reasonable explanation for their behavior and began to fear for his own safety, he
conducted a pat-down search of their outer clothing. Feeling pistols under the
clothing, he reached in and seized them. Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the
Court was laced with qualifications and ambiguities that might provide room to
retreat should the Court's position become untenable. The holding itself was so
carefully groomed to the facts of the Ohio case that it was altogether unclear how
far the Court had gone.422 Specifically, it appeared that the decision might depend
upon personal observation by an experienced officer,42 a reasonable apprehension of
impending violent crime,42 4 and exigent circumstances demanding swift and sure
police action.425 In the end, however, a definite shift in fourth amendment doctrine
was apparent. For the first time, the Court had approved a significant interference
426
with liberty on something less than probable cause.
If the Warren Court's first step into "stop and frisk" was fearful and hesitant,
the Burger Court's follow-through decisions have been bold and decisive. Adams427
is the principal case. Acting on a tip from an unnamed informant that a man
seated in a nearby automobile was carrying drugs and a gun at his waist, the officer
in Adams walked over, tapped on the window, and asked the suspect to open the
door. When instead the suspect rolled down the window, the officer immediately
reached inside and pulled a pistol from his waist. The officer then placed the suspect
under arrest for unlawful possession of the gun, and when other officers arrived on
the scene he conducted a search incident to the arrest that turned up narcotics in
the suspect's wallet and coat pocket and a machete under the front seat.42 8 While
'reReading more like an National Labor Relations Board decision that merely recites the findings of
fact at length and then attaches the Board's conclusion, the narrow holding in Terry was expressly set
forth near the end of the opinion:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and
where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own
or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him.
392 U.S. at 30. See Schaefer, The Fourteenth Amendment and Sanctity of the Person, 64 Nw. L. Rav. 1,
7-14 (1969) (juxtaposing Terry to Miranda-where the Court acted against a background of countless
confession cases).
..See note 422 supra. Concurring in a companion case, Justice Harlan pointed out that Terry had
"emphasized the special qualifications of an experienced police officer." Peters v. New York, 392 U.S.
40, 78 (1968).
'In another companion case, Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), the Court disapproved an
officer's action in forcing an encounter with a narcotics suspect and driving his hand into the suspect's
pocket without a preliminary pat-down. Again concurring in the result, Justice Harlan commented that
the case was distinguishable from Terry, where the "police officer judged that his suspect was about to
commit a violent crime." Id. at 73.
'On
this question, Justice Harlan was even more explicit. He insisted that "one important factor"
in stop and frisk cases is the "need for immediate action." "[l]t seems to me," he said, "that where immediate action is obviously required, a police officer is justified in acting on rather less objectively articuable evidence than when there is more time for consideration of alternative courses of action." Id. at
73, 78.
In light of footnote 16, see note 421 supra, it is inappropriate to say that the Court approved a
detention of the person on less than probable cause. Of course, laying the initial encounter to one side, it
is clear that Terry approved a limited search for weapons on some lesser standard. United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975).
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). See also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 98 S. Ct. 330 (1977)
(per curiam) (approving the practice of ordering motorists stopped for minor traffic offenses to get out
of their cars-regardless of whether the police have reason to fear that such motorists are armed).
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Terry had winked at the question whether a "stop" on less than probable cause
might be proper, Adams led off with the proposition that "[a] brief stop of a suspicious individual . . . may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the
'
officer at the time."429
While Terry had emphasized the personal observations of
an experienced officer, Adams approved warrantless action based on information received from an unnamed informant. And while Terry had emphasized a situation
in which an officer had to move rapidly to avert violent crime, Adams validated an
investigation of a suspect thought to be holding drugs.
A good many criticisms can be leveled against Adams. The informant's tip was
questionable at best, 43 0 and the search conducted after the detention was more extensive than anything approved in like circumstances in the past. 43' The most
telling criticism is that in seven pages the decision transformed the relatively narrow
exception to the probable cause standard, so tentatively agreed to in Terry, into a
virtual abrogation of the pre-existing law of arrest. Certainly, in combination, Adams
and Watson are at war with the preference for warrants and any meaningful judicial
supervision of criminal investigations. No longer must the police seek a magistrate's
'Some
of these facts are gathered from the lower court's opinion. Williams v. Adams, 441 F.2d 394
(2d Cir. 1971) (relying upon Judge Friendly's dissent from the panel's opinion, published at 436 F.2d
30 (2d Cir. 1970)). Justice Rehnquist neglected to say precisely where the narcotics and machete had
been found.
" 407 U.S. at 146.
'o Justice Rehnquist conceded that the unverified tip "may have been insufficient for a narcotics arrest
or search warrant," but insisted that "the information carried enough indicia of reliability to justify the
officer's forcible stop of Williams." Id. at 147. See note 384 supra. Looking back on the case, a student
commented that the Court had taken a startling step in approving police action based, not only on a
lesser quantum of reliable information, but upon information obtained in a less reliable manner. The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REv. 50, 177-79 (1972). The tip in Adams was even more
troubling. Dissenting from the panel's decision below, Judge Friendly pointed out that in the first suppression hearing the officer had not mentioned receiving a tip but rather had claimed to have relied on
a radio signal. It was only in a later hearing that "the informer appeared and the signal disappeared."
436 F.2d at 36 n.4. Cf. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 316 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (referring
to "Old Reliable, the informer").
"3Justice Rehnquist reasoned that finding the gun precisely where the informer said it would be
tended to corroborate the tip, including the allegation that the suspect had narcotics in his possession.
That verified information, "together with the surrounding circumstances" suggested "no lawful explanation for possession of the gun." Thus an arrest for unlawful possession of it was justified. Then, citing
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (the automobile search case), Justice Rehnquist approved
the search of the suspect's person and the car as incident to the arrest. 407 U.S. at 150. The analysis is
troubling on several grounds. First, while Rehnquist made clear that the gun had not been visible from
outside the car, he neglected to say whether it was hidden from view by the suspect's clothing or merely
the curvature of the body. If the officer was required to reach under the suspect's clothing to grasp the
weapon, one would have expected Sibron to control. See note 424 supra. Second, Rehnquist did not explain how the circumstances warranted the officer's supposed belief that the gun was possessed unlawfully.
As Justice Marshall's dissent pointed out, Connecticut law did not proscribe the possession of pistols in all
cases. If Justice Rehnquist rested on an assumption that the suspect could now be considered a narcotics
dealer and that the officer could act on the probability that dope peddlers do not have licenses for their
guns, his reasoning was dubious at best. Finally, if Justice Rehnquist genuinely intended to rely upon the
"search incident" rationale to support the further search of the suspect and the car, his explanation for
itwas again sorely lacking. At the outset, he failed to mention that since the events in this case had
occurred prior to Chimel the decision in that case would not control. See note 372 supra. Even if the
earlier cases would permit the search to extend throughout the car, however, he failed to explain how the
officer could delay any search until other officers arrived on the scene. See Preston v. United States, 376
U.S. 364 (1964) (demanding that searches incident toarrest be conducted contemporaneously). In addition, he did not explain how the officers identified the drugs as contraband when they were turned up.
See notes 316-19 and accompanying text supra. Again, Connecticut law did not condemn even all possession of narcotics. Finally, Rehnquist's citation to an automobile case was troubling. Carroll stands only
for the proposition that the police may search a car on probable cause to believe it contains contraband--on
the theory that if they leave to obtain a warrant the car may be gone when they return. There was apparently no showing of exigent circumstances in Adams. But see notes 491, 494-505 and accompanying text
infra (indicating that in more recent cases the Burger Court has not required a showing of exigent circumstances in each automobile case).
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determination of probable cause before they act, and if it appears later that their
own determination was in error, they can rest upon their parallel authority to detain
suspicious persons briefly for investigation.432 Indeed, these decisions have worked
a radical change in the meaning of "arrest." No longer must the police have probable
cause at the moment they interfere with a citizen's liberty. Henceforth, probable
cause is the standard of review for something that comes later. An "arrest" is the
decision to take a suspect into custody for a trip to the station, booking, and prosecution.45 In contrast, the police in the field may act on the basis of reasonable suspicion
alone.434 It is hardly necessary to point out that the evolving standard is little different from "reasonableness" or "fundamental fairness." At bottom, the Court is fast
approaching in its cases on detention of the person the very approach it has adopted
in other fourth amendment fields.
2. Search Incident to Arrest
In combination, Terry and Adams introduced into search and seizure law an
entirely new idea that reduced the individual's protection from coercive state power.
For the first time, the police were permitted to act on something less than probable
cause. 43 5 At the same time, however, the "stop and frisk" cases revived an older
notion that had long served to enhance the individual's protection. Terry was clear
on this point; the scope of a search must be justified by the purpose for which it is
undertaken. 436 The proposition is unremarkable. It is implicit in the requirement
of particularity in search warrants.. and explicit in the cases on search incident to
' I am sorry to say that in the lower court cases, this is precisely what the police are doing. E.g.,
United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that a suspect's flight at the first show of
official authority gave rise to "reasonable suspicion" and that his subsequent conduct built that into
probable cause for arrest); United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding no probable cause
initially for an arrest but approving an officer's action as a stop). Indeed, given the suggestion in Adams
the lower courts have extended the stop and frisk analysis to suspects traveling in automobiles. See Note,
Nonarrest Automobile Stops: UnconstitutionalSeizures of the Person, 25 STAN. L. REV. 865 (1973). In
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 546 n.1 (1976), the Court assumed arguendo that
motorists "slowed" but not actually "stopped" have nevertheless been "seized" within the meaning of
the fourth amendment. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 98 S. Ct. 330 (1977) (per curiam) (assuming that
a seizure occurred when a motorist was ordered out of his automobile after a stop for the purpose of
issuing a ticket).
',While some have used this definition for some time, e.g., W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO
TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTOnY (1965)

[hereinafter cited as ARREST], prior to the stop and frisk cases

any significant interference with liberty of the person had been viewed as an arrest and had been measured
against the probable cause standard. Compare Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959) with Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968). But see Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (suggesting in dictum
that a brief period of detention for the purpose of taking fingerprints might be valid in the absence of
probable cause to arrest the suspect).
" In Terry, Chief Justice Warren carefully avoided embracing this standard, and even in Adams
justice Rehnquist did not employ it expressly. Yet in referring back to those cases more recently, the Burger
Court has read the reasonable suspicion standard into them. E.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 882 (1975). See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (reading Terry to have
approved "an investigative stop based on less than probable cause to arrest"). So far has this Court
retreated from the probable cause standard that in United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977), when
it upheld the opening of international mail on "cause to suspect," it then found it unnecessary to decide
whether in that case the government had probable cause. A few years ago, the Court would have treated
the probable cause question first and reached the presumably more difficult issue whether "cause to suspect"
would suffice only if that step became necessary. E.g., Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (finding
probable cause for an arrest and failing to reach the question whether a Terry "stop" would have been
permissible).
"See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
,Id. at 18-19 (opinion of the Court).
4"It is this fundamental proposition to which a court responds when it invalidates the seizure of an
object not named in a search warrant because it was taken in a search that went beyond the intrusion
necessary to discover objects that were named. E.g., United States v. Clark, 531 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1976).
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arrest. Dissenting in Rabinowitz, Justice Frankfurter insisted that the only permissible objects of such a search were weapons or evidence that might be concealed
or destroyed in a sudden movement, and the search could therefore extend no further
than the area within the suspect's immediate physical control.4 38 Chimel, of course,
439
was to the same effect.

The emphasis in Terry upon the limited scope of a pat-down search for weapons
renewed interest in limitations on the scope of searches generally. Before long the
lower courts were taking the issue seriously. In Robinson, 4° a District of Columbia
police officer had arrested a suspect for operating a vehicle after the revocation of
his operator's permit. In accordance with standard operating procedure in the District,44 1 the officer had conducted a search of the suspect's clothing. Feeling a hard
object in the left breast pocket, he reached inside and withdrew a crumpled cigarette
package. He opened the package and extracted several capsules of white powder
later identified as heroin. 442 The circuit court took Terry as its point of departure,
reasoning that the search must be justified with respect to its purpose. Ordinarily,
the court offered, an arresting officer may have probable cause to believe the suspect
has evidence on his or her person and, if that is the case, a search for evidence is
valid. 44" Here, however, there could be no evidence of the offense for which the
suspect had been arrested. The only object of search, then, was a weapon that might
have been used to assault the officer and effect an escape. That danger could be
averted by a Terry-style pat-down of the suspect's outer garments. In this case, since
the officer had admitted from the stand that he had not taken the cigarette package
for a weapon but had removed it nonetheless, 444 the proper scope of the search for
weapons had been exceeded. The further inspection of the package itself was a
fortiorari invalid, and the evidence inadmissible.
In the Supreme Court, Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court reversed the
judgment. He said that in all the cases in which the Court had wrestled with
searches of the vicinity of an arrest it had never restricted the search of the suspect's
person, that in fact there was a good bit of dicta in the cases to the effect that no
" See note 348 and accompanying text supra. See also Note, Scope Limitations for Searches Incident
to Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 433 (1969) (suggesting that Rabinowitz could not survive Terry).
' See notes 357-64 and accompanying text supra.
' United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
'Some critics have seized upon the existence of rules and regulations in Robinson as a fair basis for
distinguishing it from the companion case, Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), in which a state
police officer exercised his own judgment without the guidance of rules. While I join those who would
settle search and seizure questions well above the constitutional floor by demanding that the police adhere
to clear and workable rules, I do not see that the regulations involved in Robinson fill the bill. I see
nothing in particular to be gained, and a good bit to be lost, through rules that mandate the most extensive intrusion upon liberty in every case. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 572 n.2
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.2 (1973) (reviewing
the rules in effect in the District of Columbia at the time of decision).
"'a Officer Jenks testified that he felt the package from the outside and determined that it contained
something other than cigarettes. Only then did he open it to discover what was inside. The Court stated
that Jenks "thought" the capsules were heroin, but that fact was verified only later by chemical analysis.
...
Judge Wright's broad-ranging opinion for a plurality drew a distinction between routine traffic
arrests, which ordinarily result only in the issuance of a citation, and more serious cases in which the
suspect is taken into custody. He concluded that in either case the police should be limited to searching
for evidence they have probable cause to believe the suspect is holding or, in the absence of probable
cause, to frisking the suspect's outer garments for self-protection. Indeed, following Terry, he said that
even the frisk for weapons would be appropriate only in cases in which the officer has a reasonable apprehension that the suspect is armed and dangerous. United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1097-98
(D.C. Cir. 1972). Accord, Aaronson & Wallace, A Reconsideration of the Fourth Amendment's Doctrine
of Search Incident to Arrest, 64 GEo. L.J. 53 (1975).
"' 471 F.2d at 1089.

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

such restriction was necessary, and that the common law authorities had never proposed anything else." 5 Coming to the critical holdings below, he said that the "extended exposure" of an officer who takes a suspect into custody justifies a "full"
search at the scene rather than the "frisk" that suffices when the encounter with the
suspect is brief.446 Gratuitously, it would seem, 447 he said that in any event the
Court could not require a police officer to make an ad hoc judgment in each case
on whether there is probable cause to believe that evidence will be found in a search
of a suspect's person. 448 In effect, Justice Rehnquist said that the police could do
precisely what the officer in Robinson had done. Said Officer Jenks, "I just searched
449
him. I didn't think about what I was looking for. I just searched him.
Most of the criticism of Robinson has focused on the essentially unexplained inspection of the cigarette package after it was removed from the suspect's reach. 450
Indeed, some commentators have found the rest of the Court's opinion "well-reasoned and persuasive."'45' To my mind, emphasis on the cigarette package only
" 414 U.S. at 227-35. The dissenters, of course, disputed Justice Rehnquist on all counts. Relying on
the familiar cases emphasizing the presumption in favor of warrants, they insisted that the circuit's result
was neither "novel" nor "unprecedented," as Rehnquist would have it, but rather consistent with the
weight of authority. Id. at 244-48.
"' Id. at 234-35. The argument is not without force. Expert testimony in the trial court showed that
suspects may harbor all manner of weaponry that cannot be turned up by a pat-down of outer clothing.
In a Terry situation, when the suspect is standing alone in full view of the officer, a "frisk" may be
enough to preclude his or her possession of a large, bulky weapon. But when the suspect is to be placed
in a squad car with time and opportunity to draw a razor blade from the hem of a coat, a prudent
officer may well want to search more thoroughly. Indeed, in his dissent in Robinson Justice Marshall
acknowledged that the issue was difficult for him and expressly declined to decide it. Id. at 253-54.
Accord, Dilemma, supra note 325, at 146-49. I do not discount all that, but in the end I am persuaded
by Judge Wright, who noted that the Government's expert admitted at trial that in order to be entirely
sure that a suspect does not possess some obscure weapon the officer would have to "spread-eagle the
arrestee, strip him of his clothes, and feel into his body cavities for weapons." 471 F.2d at 1100-01. A
line must be drawn somewhere, and like Judge Wright I conclude that it might as well be drawn where
Terry first put it. Indeed, as I think of it, I am not at all sure that by approving the "full" search in
Robinson the Court intended to validate the field strip search to which Judge Wright referred. If not, then
perhaps there are cases yet to be decided that will move the line somewhat closer to Terry than Robinson
left it. It is noteworthy, perhaps, that two months before the decision in Robinson was handed down, the
Court denied certiorari in a case in which the petitioner contested the validity of a border search of a
woman's vagina. Dissenting from that judgment, Justice Douglas took the position that "highly intrusive" searches of this kind should always be approved by a magistrate before the fact. Mason v.
United States, 414 U.S. 941 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See Note, From Bags to Body Cavities:
The Law of Border Search, 74 CoLUM. L. REV. 53 (1974).
...
Once the Court had decided that a "full" search for weapons was valid, it was really unnecessary
to deal with searches for evidence. If weapons could be so small and inconspicuous as the Court suggested,
the search for weapons would surely swallow up any concurrent search for something else.
"' While in many cases the decision would not be burdensome, because the same evidence that constitutes probable cause for an arrest also supports probable cause for a search for evidence, there will certainly be cases in which the officer would have to draw nice distinctions. The obvious example is an arrest
for an offense that was committed some time in the past. At the time of arrest, it is unlikely that the
suspect still has evidence on his or her person. See Dilemma, supra note 325, at 138-39. See also United
States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1094 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (rejecting the Government's claim that
the officer in Robinson might have been searching for a notice that his operator's license had been revoked-five years after it had been mailed to him). On the other hand, there is something disquieting in
a rule that permits the police to search when they have no idea what they are searching for. Burdensome
or not, I find the requirement that they have cause for what they do to be the least the Constitution can
demand.
'414 U.S. at 236 n.7. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 98 S. Ct. 330 (1977) (per curiam) (holding
that, on the facts of the individual case, motorists stopped for minor traffic offenses may be asked to get
out of the car without explanation).
S'414 U.S. at 256 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also White, supra note 149, at 201-03; Shapiro,
Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293, 329-30 (1976). But see Dilemma,
supra note 325, at 149 (commenting that it would be burdensome to require the officer to carry wallets,
purses, and other containers and packages to the station); Note, Restricting the Scope of Searches Incident
to Arrest: United States v. Robinson, 59 VA. L. REv. 724, 740 (1973).
4MShapiro, supra note 450, at 330.
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distracts attention from the more serious search and seizure issues in the case.
Suffice it to say that I find Judge Wright's circuit court opinion to be an admirable
treatment of the questions presented. It seems only sensible to permit a search for
evidence incident to an arrest only if the police have cause to believe that evidence
will be found, and surely a "frisk" for weapons will sufficiently protect the police
from attack.452 I must say, however, that nothing disturbs me so much as the language that appeared in the last paragraph of Justice Rehnquist's opinion. He said
that a "custodial arrest" on probable cause is a "reasonable intrusion under the
fourth amendment" and "that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest
requires no additional justification."4"' There is ambiguity here. Justice Rehnquist
went on to pronounce a "full search of the person" not only an exception to the
warrant requirement, but a "reasonable" search under the fourth amendment. 4 "
Yet, the italicized words stand out from the page. Read literally, Justice Rehnquist
seems to have said that the real issue in Robinson was not whether Officer Jenks
needed a search warrant or even probable cause to search, nor whether what he
did was otherwise "reasonable." The real issue was whether, after the arrest had
been accomplished, the suspect retained any expectation of privacy in his person to
hold the fourth amendment in play. To be sure, the question was one of scope.
But the scope of the fourth amendment itself, its very applicability to the case beyond the point of arrest, rather than the scope of a reasonable search under it,
captured the Court's attention.
The scope analysis was explicit in Justice Powell's concurring opinion. He wrote
'
only to emphasize the majority's "essential premise."455
I believe that an individual lawfully subjected to a custodial arrest retains no
significant Fourth Amendment interest in the privacy of his person. Under this
view the custodial arrest is the significant intrusion of state power into the privacy
of one's person. If the arrest is lawful, the privacy interest guarded by the Fourth
Amendment is subordinated to a legitimate and overriding governmental concern.
No reason then exists to frustrate law enforcement by requiring some independent
justification for a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest. This seems to me
the reason that a valid arrest justifies a full search of the person, even if that search
is not narrowly limited by the twin rationales of seizing evidence and disarming
the arrestee. The search incident to arrest is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the privacy interest protected by that constitutional guarantee is
456
legitimately abated by the fact of arrest.
...
See note 446 supra. I hasten to add that the long-run solution to the problem of search incident to
traffic arrests lies in the elimination of custodial arrests altogether in this context. Justice Stewart's concurring comment in Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1973), suggested the argument that the
arrest itself had been invalid in that case. But some have read that statement to refer to the possibility of
a sham arrest, see Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968), rather than a proposal to strike down all custodial arrests for traffic offenses. Compare Dilemma, supra note 325, at 158-60
with White, supra note 149, at 208. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 98 S. Ct. 330, 338-39 n.ll (1977)
(per curiam) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (assuming "perhaps somewhat naively" that the motorist stopped
for an expired license plate in that case could not without more have been subjected to a custodial arrest).
The states, of course, are free to restrict the authority of the police as they see fit. E.g., State v. Martin,
.... Minn ...... 253 N.W.2d 404 (1977) (holding that officers in Minnesota have no power to make custodial
arrests for petty offenses unless the suspect refuses to accept a citation).
'a414 U.S. at 235 (emphasis added).
'Id.

' Id.at 237.
'Id. at 237-38 (footnotes omitted).
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In a footnote, he quoted with approval language from an old Ninth Circuit opinion:
"'Once the body of the accused is validly subjected to the physical dominion of the
law, inspections of his person, regardless of purpose, cannot be deemed unlawful,
unless they violate the dictates of reason either because of their number or their
manner of perpetration.' """
In the next case, Edwards,458 the Powell view was apparently elevated to firm
constitutional doctrine. The suspect had been lawfully arrested without a warrant,
charged with burglary, and placed in a jail cell. Next morning, ten hours after the
arrest, the police took his clothing from him to be analyzed for traces of paint similar
to that on the window used in the burglary. On the facts, the "search incident"
theory seemed unavailable, because the seizure had not been contemporaneous with
the arrest. 59 Nor could the seizure rest on the "routine custom" '460 of examining a
suspect's effects incident to incarceration. Again, the clothing had been seized long
after the administrative process at the jail had come to an end.461' Nevertheless,
Justice White's opinion for the Court sustained the conviction. He relied, first, upon
a rule fashioned in the lower courts that when the police have authority to search
on the spot at the time of arrest, there is no constitutional infirmity in delaying the
search until the suspect arrives at the place of detention.4 6 2 Next, he proposed that
the suspect's clothing had been in the lawful custody of the police from the moment
of arrest, and inspection at any later time could rest on the cases upholding the inspection of impounded goods. 463 In Cooper,464 for example, the Court had held
the test to be "not whether it was reasonable to procure a warrant, but whether the
search itself was reasonable. '46 5 Finally, Justice White made it clear that he intended
' Id.at 237 n.1, quoting Charles v. United States, 278 F.2d 386, 388-89 (9th Cir. 1960).
' United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
'Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 523 (1971) (White, J., dissenting).
'United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 804 n.6 (1974).
' Two justifications are usually offered for station house inspections of suspects' effects. First, it is
argued that it is necessary to prevent the introduction of weapons or contraband into the jail, and, second,
it is argued that effects must be inventoried in order to ensure their safety in the hands of custodial
officers. In this case, the officers had not taken the suspect's clothing before placing him in the cell,
indicating that they viewed the clothing as safe in his possession. The Government conceded at oral
argument that the later search and seizure was not a continuing branch of the administrative process regarding incarceration. It was a search for evidence, based on probable cause to believe that paint scrapings from
the clothes would match those taken from the scene of the burglary. 415 U.S. at 810 n.2 (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
"Id. at 803. See, e.g., United States v. Manar, 454 F.2d 342 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Gonzalez-Perez, 426 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1970). The only Supreme Court precedent cited was Abel v.
United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960). To be sure, in that case, Justice Frankfurter wrote a 5-4 majority
opinion upholding the search of a deportation suspect's luggage after it had been removed from his hotel
room to a place of detention. However, Justice Frankfurter expressly adhered to the majority position in
Rabinowitz, presumably against his own judgment, and thus approved a search of the suspect's effects
at the scene of arrest. The subsequent search at Immigration and Naturalization Service headquarters was
at most a more thorough examination of what had already been inspected at the scene. In Edwards, the
officers had not attempted an on-the-scene search of the suspect's clothing. If they had, the case would
presumably have been controlled by Robinson, and Supreme Court review would have been unnecessary.
The delay in Edwards was hardly so insignificant as Justice White seemed to think. The point is that
whatever the Court's fears about restricting officers' freedom to search as they see fit in the field, in a
case such as this when the safety of the officers is not implicated and there is ample time to obtain a
magistrate's approval before taking action, there is simply no basis for warrantless search and seizure. Not,
at least, if the Court is serious about judicial supervision of criminal investigations.
"s 415 U.S. at 806.
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) (approving an inventory of the contents of an impounded
automobile).
" Id. at 61-62.
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to apply that test, drawn from the majority opinion in Rabinowitz,06 to the facts in
Edwards. He frankly acknowledged that he could find nothing unreasonable in
what the police had done. No different clothing had been available the night before,
"and it would certainly have been unreasonable for the police to have stripped
467
respondent of his clothing and left him exposed in his cell throughout the night.
If the Court had stopped there, the assault on the preference for warrants and the
principle of judicial supervision of criminal investigations would have been no
more serious than that in other recent cases. 468 But Justice White did not stop there.
Rather, without citing Justice Powell expressly, Justice White called up the fundamental idea of the Robinson concurrence. He insisted that the Court had not concluded that "the Warrant Clause is never applicable to post-arrest seizures of the
effects of an arrestee." 4 0 Nevertheless, he offered that the Fourth Circuit had
"captured the essence" of the matter: 470 "'While the legal arrest of a person should
not destroy the privacy of his premises, it does-for at least a reasonable time and to
a reasonable extent-take his own privacy out of the realm of protection from police
interest in weapons, means of escape, and evidence.' "471 To this language, he added
a footnote of his own:
Holding the Warrant Clause inapplicable in the circumstances present here
does not leave law enforcement officials subject to no restraints. This type of police
conduct "must [still] be tested by the Fourth Amendment's general proscription
against unreasonable searches and seizures." Terry v. Ohio . . . . But the Court
of Appeals here conceded that probable cause existed for the search and seizure
of respondent's clothing, and respondent complains only that a warrant should
have been secured. We thus have no occasion to express a view concerning those
circumstances surrounding custodial searches incident to incarceration which might
"violate the dictates of reason either because of their number or their manner of
perpetration." Cf.... Rochin v. California .... 412
On the face of it, one would have expected Justice White to limit his holding to approval of the warrantless action in Edwards. Then, since it was undisputed that the
officers had probable cause to take the clothing, he might have reserved the question
whether something less than probable cause for a search would have sufficed. But
a close reading of the quoted language reveals that he went further. Indeed, he
clearly stated that the standard was not probable cause but "reasonableness," citing
Terry. Then he blurred that standard into the due process prohibition on repetitive
or brutal searches, citing Rochin.4 7' All told, it appears that the probable cause that
existed in the case was unnecessary. After the lawful arrest, the police were au'See text at note 342 supra.
"' 415 U.S. at 805. Not that Justice White was particularly squeamish about the case. He commented,
for example, that "[s]urely, the clothes could have been brushed down and vacuumed while Edwards had
them on in the cell." Accordingly, he said, "it was similarly reasonable to take and examine them as
the police did." Id. at 806.
'See notes 400-16, 427-34 and accompanying text supra.
""415 U.S. at 808.
470 Id.

, Id. at 808-09, quoting United States v. DeLeo, 422 F.2d 487, 493 (1st Cir. 1970) (footnote omitted).
As I read this language, the suspect retains a legitimate interest in the privacy of his or her property as

opposed to his or her person. Cf. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 16 n.10 (1977) (recognizing
an arrestee's continuing expectation of the privacy of a footlocker in his possession at the time of arrest).
' 415 U.S. at 808 n.9 (citations omitted).
"' See notes 124-30 and accompanying text supra.
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thorized to conduct any search they desired without treating the suspect in a
fundamentally unfair fashion.
It is not too much to suggest that in Edwards the Burger Court has enthroned
an exception to the warrant requirement into the rule. Indeed, by denying the suspect's expectation of privacy following arrest, the Court has not only eliminated
the principle of judicial supervision from discussion, but has rejected the probable
cause standard and any fourth amendment test of "reasonableness" that can be distinguished from "fundamental fairness" under the due process clause. As a result,
looking back over all the recent decisions, we have entered upon an entirely new
state of affairs. The police are no longer required to seek judicial approval before
they arrest a suspect in a public place.47 4 If they doubt their own determination of
probable cause, they can rely on reasonable suspicion to accost the suspect for a brief
investigative detention. 475 Then, if something occurs in that encounter to establish
probable cause,47 6 or if a protective "frisk" of the suspect's clothing brings to light
something that justifies an arrest,477 the suspect can be taken into custody for a
"full" search-on the spot or at the station,4 78 contemporaneously with the arrest or
as much as a day later.4 79 The only standard applicable to the post-arrest search is
due process fairness, the fourth amendment having fallen out of the case when the
suspect lost his or her expectation of privacy after arrest.480
3. Automobile Searches
The framers of the fourth amendment could hardly have anticipated that the
most frequent application of their new constitutional provision would be in cases
involving numerous and highly mobile containers in which the average American
would one day spend a fair portion of every day. 48 1 Indeed, in the earliest times
emphasis was placed, first, upon the security of one's home or other structure and,
second, upon one's personal freedom of movement. Conveyances of the day were
viewed merely as tools of locomotion having no independent fourth amendment
significance. 482 The increasing importance of vehicles could not, however, be denied.
...
This is Watson, discussed in notes 403-16 and accompanying text supra.
" This is Adams' elaboration on Terry, discussed in notes 420-34 and accompanying text supra.
.7 The possibilities abound, but the most obvious case is one in which the police see identifiable evidence inside an automobile as they approach it for an investigative detention. E.g., United States v. Payne,
555 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Bertucci, 532 F.2d 1144 (7th Cir. 1976). Cf. United
States v. Thompson, 558 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1977) (resting a finding of probable cause on a "strong
odor of marijuana" coming from a van after an "investigatory stop"); United States v. Garcia-Rodriguez,
558 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1977) (same).
"' Both Terry and Adams involved arrests for unlawful possession of weapons found in a "frisk."
...
This is Robinson in combination with Edwards. See notes 435-49, 462-67 and accompanying text
supra.
47 Id. Accord, United States v. Chadwick, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 2487 (1977)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
'This,
of course, is my perhaps pessimistic reading of the concluding language in Robinson and
Edwards and particularly Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Robinson. I will say in passing, however,
that there is at least one other view-one that I must say I wish I could accept. Professor White guesses
that the citation to Rochin in these6 cases only reflects the Court's desire to avoid talking about Mapp.
White, supra note 149, at 209 n.8 . I will leave a discussion of the Burger Court's treatment of the
exclusionary rule for later. See notes 572-645 and accompanying text infra.
' In 1975, four out of five Americans over the age of 16 had operators' licenses. There were more
than 100,000,000 automobiles on the road in the United States, logging over 1,000,000,000,000 miles.
Each car traveled an average of 28 miles per day. U.S. DEP'T oF TRANSPORTATION, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION TRENDS AND CHOICES

86 (1977).

Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87
[hereinafter cited as Warrantless Searches].
'Note,

HARV.

L. REV. 835, 840 n.28 (1974)
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The test came during Prohibition, when moonshiners used automobiles to deliver
their wares wherever a market could be found, and federal agents were consistently
4
48
The leading case was Carroll1
confronted with the most illusive of adversaries.
Federal agents with probable cause to believe that their car was being used to transport illicit liquor stopped the Carrolls on the highway between Grand Rapids and
Detroit. The agents summarily searched the car, found and seized sixty-eight bottles
of contraband whiskey, and then arrested the Carrolls for violation of the Volstead
Act. Reflecting the historical doubt that the automobile itself presented a search
and seizure issue, the Supreme Court focused on the infringement of the suspects'
freedom of movement. The Court's opinion contained no discussion of any supposed invasion of privacy occasioned by the search of the car.4" The Court held
that it would be unreasonable to expect agents to procure a warrant before stopping
fast-moving automobiles for purposes of search and that the concomitant detention
of the occupants of the car for the period of the search must therefore be considered
reasonable and lawful under the fourth amendment. 8 0
Despite Carroll's seeming lack of interest in the issue, later decisions showed a
growing concern for the interest one has in the privacy of an automobile." 7 Gradually, the holding in the case was reworked to speak to that interest and, further, to
embrace the developing preference for warrants. Ultimately, Carroll came to stand
for the proposition that "a car may be searched or seized without a warrant if there
are both exigent circumstances and probable cause to believe that the car will yield
contraband or evidence useful for prosecution of crime. 48 8 During the Warren
Court years, the automobile search was the most familiar exception to the warrant
requirement. Ordinarily, an automobile's mobility established exigent circumstances
excusing failure to obtain a warrant and justified warrantless action based on the
officers' own determination of probable cause."' On the other hand, the Court
was emphatic that "[t]he word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence
the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears. '490 It was insisted that in every
case it must be shown that the police acted on probable cause and in exigent circumstances when they searched an automobile without a magistrate's approval.491
The arrival of the Nixon appointees has gradually altered the situation. Judging
the combined effect of the decisions in hindsight, it appears the new Justices have
made two important changes. First, as it has in virtually every other field of fourth
,' See notes 98-99 and accompanying text supra.
'Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
"SSee Warrantless Searches, supra note 482, at 837-40. Cf. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
176-77 (1949) (commenting that the issue in Carroll was the detention of the occupants rather than the
subsequent search of their car).
481267 U.S. at 153.
s Warrantless Searches, supra note 482, at 840-41.
Id. at 835. The inclusion of "evidence" in the Carroll doctrine was disputed by Justice Harlan in
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 62 n.7 (1970) (concurring and dissenting opinion). Harlan recalled
that Carroll itself had been concerned only with searches for contraband and that the discussion of
precedents in that case had emphasized as much.
Compare Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 221 (1968) (dictum) with Preston
v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 368 (1964) (finding an automobile in custody no longer mobile). See
generally Comment, Interference With the Right to Free Movement: Stopping and Search of Vehicles, 51
CAL. L. REV. 907 (1963).
"'Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-62 (1971). See Scher v. United States, 305 U.S.
251 (1938); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931) (indicating that a showing of potential
mobility may be enough).
"'Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 460 (1971).
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amendment law, the Burger Court has rejected the preference for warrants and has
reverted to the practice of reviewing warrantless police action only for reasonableness
on the facts of the particular case.492 No longer does the Court ask in any meaningful sense whether the police might reasonably have procured a warrant before
searching a car, but only whether the action they took without one was reasonable.
Second, this Court has revived the early doubt that the individual enjoys any privacy
in an automobile. In much the same way that the Court has questioned the suspect's
expectation of personal privacy after a lawful arrest,49 3 it has suggested that one has
only a diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile-chiefly because of the
many ways in which government regulates vehicular traffic on public highways and
the many circumstances in which the police may legitimately come into contact
with personal cars. To be sure, this second proposition partakes of the threshold
question of the fourth amendment's scope rather than the further question of the
standards it imposes in cases to which it applies, but the Burger Court has not distinguished neatly between those questions. It has relied upon the allegedly reduced
expectation of privacy in automobiles as one of many factors to be considered in determining whether police action in a particular case was reasonable.
The retreat from the warrant requirement was signaled in Chambers,4" 4 decided
shortly after the new Chief Justice took his seat. The facts were uncomplicated.
The police had apprehended four men in an automobile shortly after a service
station robbery. There was no question that at the time the police stopped the car
they had probable cause both to arrest the suspects and to search the car for weapons,
evidence tying them to the robbery, and most certainly the money taken from the
station less than an hour before. It was clear enough that under Carroll the police
might have conducted a warrantless search of the automobile on the spot.495 The
difficulty arose from the officers' decision to impound the car instead, to remove it
to the station, and to search it there-some time later and still without a warrant.
The obvious argument was that whatever the officers might have done in exigent
circumstances in the field, once they took the car into custody and removed it to
the station the circumstances were entirely different.4 6 With the car in their control, they had ample opportunity to obtain a warrant before undertaking a search.
Nevertheless, Justice White's opinion for the Court approved the officers' action. He
noted that they had been presented with a choice-either to search the car on the
spot without a warrant or to impound it, seek a warrant from a magistrate, and in
the meantime deny its use to persons otherwise entitled to it. He saw no difference
between the two courses and judged either to be reasonable within the meaning of
the fourth amendment.40 7 Then, turning to the intermediate course the police had
in fact taken-transporting the car to the station and still failing to obtain a warrant
'DSee notes 400-16, 475-80 and accompanying text supra.
"a

See notes 453-80 and accompanying text supra.

'' Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).

Id. at 52. Only Justice Harlan disputed the issue. He would have chosen a temporary impoundment of the vehicle while a warrant was obtained as the better and less intrusive course. Id. at 63-64
(concurring and dissenting opinion).
' Cf. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) (disapproving a warrantless search of an automobile removed from the place of arrest and held in police custody).
'o 399 U.S. at 52. Justice White thus rejected Justice Harlan's approach to the case-which would
have left it to the motorist concerned to decide which course was the most objectionable. Id. at 64-65.
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-he saw "little to choose" between that and a warrantless search in the field.49
He noted, moreover, that moving the car had been "reasonable." The arrest had
occurred "in a dark parking lot in the middle of the night," and a search on the
spot would have been "impractical" and perhaps even "unsafe."49 Furthermore, he
offered that it served "the owner's convenience and the safety of his car to have the
vehicle and the keys together at the station house." '
On its face, the opinion in Chambers squarely conflicted with the preference for
warrants. There was no persuasive argument to be made that in this automobile
case the circumstances had in fact been exigent. While Justice White insisted that
"the mobility of the car" still obtained at the station,5 0 ' he made no substantial effort
to explain how that was so. In retrospect, it appears that the real explanation lay in
White's fundamental resistance to the preference for warrants in automobile cases.
This much became clear in White.50 ' On first blush, the facts were very similar.
In White, the police again had probable cause to search a suspect's car in the field,
and again they chose instead to remove it to the station. Of course, they again neglected to procure a warrant. There was, however, a difference. The car in White
had been seized, not from a dark parking lot as in Chambers, but in front of the
First National Bank of Amarillo at 1:30 in the afternoon. 503 No argument was or
could have been made that a search on the spot would have been impractical or
unsafe. Still, a per curiam opinion approved the removal of the car and the later
warrantless search-reading Chambers to have held that it is always proper for
officers who have probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile
on the scene to delay the search until later at the station.5 0 4 The gist of the Court's
position could hardly have been clearer. Henceforth, automobiles, at least those
found in a public place, are evidently to be treated like people, also found in a public
place. If the police have probable cause to search and seize a car or to arrest a person, they may act without the prior approval of a magistrate even when there is a
reasonable opportunity to seek such approval.505
The border search and regulatory inspection cases, though arguably distinguish' Id. at 52. Again Justice Harlan objected, complaining that the Court had approved the search
"without even an inquiry into the officers' ability promptly to take their case before a magistrate." Id. at
63 n.8.
' Id. at 52 n.10.
10Id.
Wld. at 52.
W Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975).
Id. at 67.
Id. at 68. In dissent, Justice Marshall insisted that Chambers had held no such thing and that, just
as the police must show exigent circumstances to justify a search without a warrant, they must show some
reason to justify conducting a warrantless search at the station rather than in the field. In Chambers, the
Court had explained why the move to the station was reasonable, see notes 498-500 and accompanying
text supra, and Marshall demanded a similar explanation in White. He did not get it.
'i See notes 403-10 and accompanying text supra. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973)
(citing Chambers for the proposition that a search is not unreasonable simply because the public might be
protected by "less intrusive" means); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 527 (1971) (White, J.,
concurring and dissenting); United States v. Chuke, 554 F.2d 260, 263-64 (6th Cir. 1977) (upholding a
warrantless automobile search even after the police had "squandered" an opportunity to present their evidence to a magistrate before taking action); United States v. Mitchell, 538 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1976)
(en bane) (same). But see United States v. Pruett, 551 F.2d 1365, 1370 (5th Cir. 1977) (invalidating a
warrantless automobile seizure but only after "vigorously" searching for a "case on all fours" that would
release the court from its allegiance to Coolidge).
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able,50 have taken the matter a step further. Justice Powell has held the swing vote.
He concurred in Almeida-Sanchez0' and wrote the opinion in Ortiz 08s when the
Court held over strong dissents from Justice White and the Nixon appointees that
border police, operating in roving patrols or at fixed checkpoints, must have probable
cause to believe a car contains illegal aliens before it can be stopped and searched.
In other cases, however, he has drawn upon the "stop and frisk" analysis in TerryAdams..9 and the Camara-Biswel1510 line of inspection cases to strike "a balance
between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security." 1'
512
Thus, in Brignoni-Ponce
he held that roving patrols near the border may briefly
detain cars for an inquiry into the status of their occupants, so long as there is
51 4
reasonable suspicion that the cars carry illegal aliens.51 In Martinez-Fuere,
he
approved an entirely random selection of cars for a similar "brief questioning" at
fixed checkpoints. 15 To be sure, Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte approved
only a brief "seizure"5" of an automobile without probable cause and expressly
limited any accompanying "search" to a visual inspection from the outside.51 7 Yet,
in Opperman, 18 the inventory inspection case from South Dakota decided with
Martinez-Fuerte,Chief Justice Burger upheld a thorough inventory of an overparked
car-without a warrant and without probable cause.5" Although he declined to
The United States has a special interest in the control of international boundaries, and the Court
has recognized that Congress may authorize intrusions into privacy at the border or its functional
equivalents that would not be valid under the fourth amendment elsewhere. E.g., United States v. Ramsey,
431 U.S. 606 (1977) (upholding warrantless searches of international mail on less than probable cause).
See Note, Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 77 YALt L.J. 1007 (1968). As to regulatory
inspections, even as the Court has acknowledged that the fourth amendment applies to intrusions whose
purpose is not to seek evidence of crime, it has said that the warrant clause is "irrelevant" to such intrusions and that they must be judged "on other bases." United States v. Chadwick, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 2483
n.5 (1977). See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 370 n.5 (1976).
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
SUnited States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
'See
notes 420-34 and accompanying text supra.
" See notes 216-24 and accompanying text supra.
'United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
SUnited States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
Id
d. at 882. The Court was careful to point out that it had no occasion to decide whether state and
local law enforcement agencies can lawfully "conduct such limited stops as are necessary to enforce laws
regarding drivers' licenses, vehicle registration, truck weights, and similar matters." Id. at 883 n.8. That
issue has occupied a great many courts in recent years. See United States v. Montgomery, 561 F.2d 875
(D.C.4 Cir. 1977) (collecting the cases).
' United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
Id.at 56 6.
It was agreed in both cases that border "stops" of vehicles are "seizures" of the person within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). Indeed, in Martinez-Fuerte the Court assumed
arguendo that the border police had "seized" motorists passing through their checkpoint by merely
"slowing" their cars. 428 U.S. at 546 n.1. It is open to argument, of course, that automobiles are
"effects," see Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting), and that their seizure wholly apart from the seizure of occupants
implicates the fourth amendment. See also Note, Mobility Reconsidered: Extending the Carroll Doctrine
to Movable Items, 58 IOWA L. REv. 1134, 1156 (1973). The Court has, however, avoided that approach
-perhaps to skirt any discussion of the fourth amendment's protection for personal property divorced
from privacy concerns or even the individual's privacy interests in automobiles. Cf. Cady v. Dombrowski,
413 U.S. at 449-50 (failing to reach the question whether the search of a car located in an "open field"
needed "a search warrant at all").
" Indeed, read literally, Justice Powell's opinion in Martinez-Fuerte did not consider such a visual
inspection a "search" at all. He said: "Neither the vehicle nor its occupants are searched, and visual
inspection of the vehicle is limited to what can be seen without a search." 428 U.S. at 558. See notes
293-94 and accompanying text supra.
ms
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
m5
Id. at 370 n.5.
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hold that the inventory was not a "search" at all within the meaning of the fourth
amendment,5 2° the Chief Justice found the warrant requirement "unhelpful" in this
"noncriminal" case and so applied only the standard of "reasonableness," unrelated
to any cause to believe that evidence of crime would be found in the car.521 In the
end, he simply balanced the competing interests and concluded that the inspection
52 2
-reaching into an unlocked glove compartment-was not unreasonable.
The Burger Court's second departure-the proposition that one has only a
diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile and thus is entitled to less
fourth amendment protection in a car than, for example, a house-has appeared in
numerous recent opinions. Indeed, as early as Chambers Justice White distinguished
Vale,5 23 decided on the same day, on the ground that "for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment there is a constitutional difference between houses and cars. '524 Justice
Rehnquist's elusive opinion in Dombrowski525 noted that the extension of the fourth
' Id. at 370 n. 6 . Nor, to be sure, did he decide that the inventory was a "search."

Citing Wyman v.

James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), discussed in notes 233-39 and accompanying text supra, he commented that
some state courts had held that in the "benign noncriminal context of the intrusion" the fourth amendment would not apply. In this case, in any event, the State had conceded the applicability of the "reasonableness" standard. See 428 U.S. at 377 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that despite their "benign
purpose," inventories are invasions of privacy and hence "searches").
' 428 U.S. at 370 n.5. Accord, Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 454 n.21
(1977) (agreeing that the warrant requirement was not involved in the question whether Mr. Nixon's
presidential papers could be taken into government custody). Going on, the Chief Justice declined an
analogy to the warrant required in Camara, commenting only that the Court had never held that procedure
"applicable to automobile inspections for safety purposes." 428 U.S. at 367-68 n.2. That was true enough.
But, then, the Court had never addressed inventory searches of automobiles for "safety" purposes before
Opperman. See id. at 377 (Powell, J., concurring) (insisting that no precedents were dispositive of the
question whether the fourth amendment permits routine inventory searches of impounded automobiles).
"=Chief Justice Burger pointed out that the petitioner had not objected to the intrusion necessary to
secure objects in plain view from outside the car. When the officer climbed inside to obtain those objects,
"it was not unreasonable to open the unlocked glove compartment, to which vandals would have had
ready and unobstructed access once inside the car." 428 U.S. at 376 n.10 (emphasis added). The
italicized language offers food for thought. By limiting his holding to an unlocked compartment and a
situation in which no obstruction existed inside the car to thwart a wrongdoer able to get through the
door, the Chief Justice reserved the question whether entry into locked compartments or containers inside
impounded vehicles will be permitted without a warrant. In that sort of case, the owner's interest in the
safety of the contents would be served by simply leaving the compartment locked. Indeed, in this case
the officers found the trunk of the car locked and left it undisturbed. Id. at 380 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring).
Compare Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (approving a warrantless search of a locked trunk
in order to protect the public from harm should an intruder remove a revolver believed to be inside)
with Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 588 n.4 (1974) (noting that the trunk of the car had been
opened but that no evidence obtained from it had been introduced at trial). Hearing conflicting signals
from the Supreme Court, the lower courts have divided on the issue. Compare United States v. Martin,
566 F.2d 1143 (10th Cir. 1977) (approving a search of a locked trunk) with United States v. Edwards,
554 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1977) (invalidating an inventory reaching into a locked trunk and under the
carpet). On the other hand, by speaking to the case in which a burglar is able to get inside the car by
some means, the Chief Justice approved an intrusion broader than necessary to protect objects in plain
view from the outside. It is one thing to say that a watch lying on the dashboard of a car should be
removed lest it tempt a vandal to smash the windshield to get at it, and quite another to presume that a
burglar will smash the window without such an enticement and on that basis justify a further intrusion
into the glove compartment.
Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970), discussed in notes 363-64 and accompanying text supra.
" Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970).
5 Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). Of all the automobile cases, Dombrowski is perhaps
the most puzzling. The case involved a warrantless search of the locked trunk of a Chicago police
officer's wrecked automobile-for a service revolver the searching officers "were under the impression"
must be inside. Justice Rehnquist began safely enough by reciting the rule that warrantless searches are
per se unreasonable unless they fall within "certain carefully defined classes of cases." Id. at 439, quoting
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967). But then he launched into a discussion of
the special search and seizure problems associated with automobiles and ultimately relied for his decision
upholding the search on "principles that may be extrapolated from" the impoundment cases. E.g., Harris
v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967). Particularly, from
Cooper Justice Rehnquist drew the proposition that "[t]he Framers . . . have given us only the general
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amendment to the states introduced new problems into automobile search cases.
When the fourth amendment controlled only federal officers, who generally came
into contact with automobiles only in the investigation of interstate crime, the cases
were easier to control.526 State officers, in contrast, deal with automobiles in various
regulatory situations unrelated to the detection of crime. 27 Accordingly, he implied,
the individual in modern society is not entitled to expect privacy from police inspection in an automobile. Indeed, it appears Justice Rehnquist would say that the
only reasonable expectation is that the police will in some way come into contact
with the car. Similarly, Justice Blackmun's opinion for the plurality in Cardwell528
allowed that while "the exercise of a desire to be mobile does not, of course, waive
one's right to be free of unreasonable government intrusions," the individual has
a "lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle," which "seldom serves as one's
residence or as the repository of personal effects," and which "has little capacity
for escaping public scrutiny" as it "travels public thoroughfares where both its oc'
cupants and its contents are in plain view."529
Then, in Opperman, '3 ° Chief Justice
Burger marshalled all the arguments. He said that the inventory in that case had
been reasonable both because of "the inherent mobility of automobiles" '' and because "the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly
less than that relating to one's home or office. 532 Justifying the latter argument, he
restated the points made in Cardwell and Dombrowski.
Just how the Burger Court has arrived at the conclusion that automobiles are
not private is anything but clear-reflecting the fundamental fault in the Katz explanation of when the fourth amendment comes into play. At best, the Justices
merely describe what they perceive to be true of American life; they rely upon their
sense of prevailing attitudes about automobiles. Less well-placed Americans are
simply told what privacy they do or do not expect in their cars, that is, what expectations of privacy are reasonable or legitimate. Not only is the analysis suspicious
insofar as it is grounded in changing public attitudes, but the Justices' ability to
ascertain those attitudes at any point is open to serious question. What of the family
standard of 'unreasonableness' as a guide in determining whether searches and seizures meet the standard
of that Amendment in those cases where a warrant is not required." 413 U.S. at 448. At no point did
he suggest that when the officer broke into the trunk he had probable cause to search for the revolver.
The four dissenters focused on the lack of exigent circumstances in the case and insisted that the warrantless action was invalid. They did not indicate a view on whether a warrant might have issued. Id. at
450 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
...
See note 442 supra.
" He mentioned that all states require motor vehicles to be registered and operators to be licensed,
that there are extensive rules and regulations concerning the operation of automobiles on the public streets,
some requiring periodic inspections of vehicles, and that automobiles frequently become disabled or involved in accidents. In all these situations, he said, the "police-citizen contact" will be "substantially
greater than police-citizen contact in a home or oflce." 413 U.S. at 441.
'Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
6ld. at 582-83.
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
Id. at 367.
'ld. at 367 (footnote omitted). Of course, Opperman made it clear that the inventory rationale
would be available only on a showing that an automobile was inventoried as part of a routine program.
While some lower courts have recognized the limitation, e.g., United States v. Jamerson, 549 F.2d 1263
(9th Cir. 1977) (noting that a sham inventory for the purpose of finding evidence would be invalid),
I am amazed at the ability of others to disregard it entirely. E.g., United States v. McCambridge, 551
F.2d 865 (1st Cir. 1977) (a classic illustration of courts' occasional willingness to construct a string of
tenuous search and seizure holdings leading ultimately to the admission of evidence seized under the
most questionable circumstances).
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that lives in a mobile home or, at least during the month of August, in a recreational vehicle? 53 3 What of the traveling salesperson who leaves his or her sample
case, dirty socks, and old love letters in the backseat of the company sedan parked
outside the motel? What of the rest of us who live in overcrowded apartments
where the television set is always blasting, the phone is always ringing, and the
kids are always screaming? If we leave it all for a pleasant evening drive, who are
53 4
the Justices to say that by doing so we leave our expectations of privacy behind?
The truth is we often seek privacy on wheels. It is small wonder that most observors
of the Court's automobile decisions have assumed that they reflect, not a withdrawal
of fourth amendment protection peculiar to cars, but a broader retreat from the
principle of judicial supervision of criminal investigations generally. Thus, the talk
in the cases about a diminished expectation of privacy in automobiles has been
taken to be only another illustration of this Court's insistence that search and seizure
cases be decided by a fact-oriented balancing of competing interests rather than a
more predictable search in every case for some justification for police action without
prior judicial approval.
Finally, there was Chadwick at the very end of last Term.535 On first blush, the
decision seemed to look in a different direction. The facts were almost amusing.
Federal agents in San Diego observed two suspects, one of whom "matched a profile
used to spot drug traffickers,"536 load a footlocker-double-locked, overweight, and
leaking talcum powder--on board an Amtrak train bound for Boston. The information was relayed to other agents in Boston, and when the two suspects arrived at
the station to claim the footlocker they were put under surveillance. The suspects
obtained the footlocker, placed it on the floor, and promptly sat on it. At that point,
the agents released a dog near the footlocker, and in short order the dog "signaled
the presence of a controlled substance inside."5"' The agents held back until the footlocker had been moved outside to a waiting car, driven by a third suspect, Chadwick.
Then, just as the footlocker was lifted into the trunk of the car, while the hatch
' s
was still open, and "before the car engine had been started, 53
they moved in, ar5"One suspects that the Court would treat the common mobile home as a house and apply the warrant
clause. Americans who live in such homes surely expect to enjoy their privacy, and relatively few families
are prepared at the drop of a hat to shut off the water, detach the power line, and steal off into the night.
Cf. Simmons v. Tennessee, 210 Tenn. 443, 360 S.W.2d 10 (1962) (viewing a mobile home as a house
for fourth amendment purposes). But see United States v. Smith, 515 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975) (permitting an intrusion into a mobile home to make a "safety check" after the suspect was in custody). On
the other hand, so-called recreational vehicles may be entirely self-contained units-with running water
and electric power. They are often self-propelled and always heavily regulated. See B. HonEs & G.
ROBERsON, THE LAW OF MOBILE HoMEs 45-63 (3d ed. 1974). If the police should come upon a gassed-up
Winnebago, parked for the night at a roadside rest stop with its engine running to maintain the air
conditioner, the automobile cases may be ever so difficult to distinguish.
'I hasten to say that I am not the first to complain. See Weinreb, supra note 149, at 75-76.
'United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
'Id. at 3. The Court did not say, but presumably it did not mean to hold, that this alone was
sufficient for probable cause. See United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717 (6th Cir. 1977) (finding the
Drug Enforcement Administration "drug courier profile" insufficient by itself to justify a Terry detention).
See also Note, Drugs, Databanks and Dignity: Computerized Selection of Travelers for Intrusive Border
Searches, 56 B.U. L. REV. 940 (1976).
' 433 U.S. at 4. It should not go without notice that by letting this pass without comment the
Court may have implicitly rejected the cases holding that the use of a dog's sensitive nose to identify
the contents of a container is itself a "search" which demands justification under the fourth amendment.
See Elkins v. Ohio, 47 Ohio App. 2d 307, 354 N.E.2d 712 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 932 (1977)
(finding no substantial federal question). But see Peebles, The Uninvited Canine Nose and the Right to
Privacy: Some Thoughts on Katz and Dogs, 11 GA. L. REV. 75 (1976).
'3 433 U.S. at 4.

KANSAS LAW REvIEw

['Vol. 26

rested all three suspects, seized the footlocker, and moved everyone and everything
concerned with the case to the federal building. An hour and a half later, acting
without a warrant but concededly upon probable cause, the agents opened the footlocker and discovered the marijuana introduced at Chadwick's trial.3
Passing over less fundamental contentions in the Supreme Court, 54 0 the Government put as its chief argument the proposition that "movable personalty lawfully
seized in a public place should be subject to search without a warrant if there exists
probable cause to believe it contains evidence of a crime."54' The argument was
plainly inconsistent with the preference for warrants-at least in cases not involving
'
the home or similar "high privacy area."542
Chief Justice Burger would have none
of it. Dutifully, he ticked off the precedents in which the Court had insisted upon
a warrant outside the home, set forth the values served by objective determinations
of probable cause by neutral and detached magistrates, and described the strict
security at the federal building-leaving "not the slightest danger that the footlocker
or its contents could have been removed before a valid search warrant could be obtained.154 3 Coming to the Government's second argument, that the footlocker was
mobile and should therefore be treated like an automobile, permitting warrantless
search on probable cause, the Chief Justice maintained that the circumstances that
diminish the individual's expectation of privacy in automobiles did not apply to a
double-locked footlocker. The suspects had manifested an expectation that the footlocker would not be opened, and there were no exigent circumstances to justify
immediate warrantless action.5 44 Nor could the footlocker be searched merely because it had been seized at the time of arrest and searched "as soon thereafter as
was practicable." 45 Under Chimel, a search incident to an arrest has limits-the
area into which the suspect might reach to obtain a weapon or to conceal or destroy
evidence.5 4 0 Even if the footlocker could be viewed as in the control of the suspects
at the time of arrest, the search did not take place until later-after it had been
547
taken away from them and secured.
Read charitably, Chadwick appears to be a refreshing and hopeful sign that the
Burger Court has not yet discarded the preference for warrants and resurrected in
its stead the majority position in Rabinowitz. But on closer examination, there is
reason for caution. The Court's opinion was generously sprinkled with suggestions
for distinguishing it next time around. The next case, for example, might involve
'In an extraordinary footnote, the Court noted that the grant of certiorari in Chadwick had been
limited to the question whether the police should have obtained a warrant before searching the footlocker.
Accordingly, said the Chief Justice, the case presented "no issue of the application to the exclusionary
rule." Id. at 7 n.3.
" See notes 553-56 and accompanying text infra.
433 U.S. at 6.
Id. at 9 n.4.
4
ald.
I at 13.
"In
distinguishing the footlocker from automobiles, the Chief Justice again repeated the points made
in earlier cases about the detailed regulation of automobiles and their use on public streets and the public
exposure accompanying travel by car, and then added a new one-the frequent unavailability of secure
storage facilities for highly mobile automobiles. Footlockers, he said, are quite different. One tends to
use them to store personal items and to expect them to be safe from the public eye. As in this case,
storage facilities are generally available. Id. at 2484 n.7.
rId. at 14.
v" See note 359 and accompanying text supra.
r.I should say that it is not a little disturbing that the Court focused on the delayed search in this
case rather than squarely holding that a double-locked trunk cannot be within the "control" of an arrestee
as that term was construed in Chimel.
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a container the police have reason to think contains "some immediately dangerous
instrumentality."54 In that event, the Chief Justice was clear that it would be
"foolhardy to transport it to the station house without opening [it] and disarming
the weapon." 4 ' Further, he suggested, the next case might involve a container
"immediately associated with the person of the arrestee." 5 °' In that situation, he
implied, the container might be searched as was the cigarette package in Robinson.5""
Finally, he was clear that an inventory such as occurred in Opperman would be
permissible even in the absence of probable cause. 5 2 Carrying things a bit further,
Justice Blackmun's dissent contended that a greater effort on the Government's part
to show exigent circumstances might have brought a different result, even in this
case.5 3 Justice Blackmun would have entertained an argument that the police had
to delay their arrest of the first two suspects and seizure of the footlocker so that
they might also catch Chadwick in the net. Indeed, if the police had delayed just a
moment longer, the car's engine would have been started and they could have
54
searched the footlocker in the course of a warrantless search of the automobile.
Justice Blackmun would even have permitted a warrantless search of the footlocker
incident to the arrest of the three suspects-insisting that it was so close to them that
it must have been in their "control. 51 5 Having decided that, he would have drawn
an analogy from Chambers and allowed the agents to move their search to the federal
building, which to him provided a more appropriate place to do the work. 5 "
Chadwick must be digested with care, and the more so if Justice Blackmun's
dissent accurately states alternative theories on which the Government might have
won the case and bases for distinguishing it in the future. 5 7 Indeed, the decision must
be read as the exception that proves the rule. For the Burger Court was presented in
Chadwick with a proposition of fourth amendment law that was no more than a
fair gleaning from the Court's own decisions. What other conclusion was the Government to draw from a stream of search and seizure cases that have narrowed the
scope of the fourth amendment by denying the citizen's expectation of privacy in
various "public" places,55 denigrated the individual's interest in property divorced
from privacy concerns,"55 and excused the failure of the police to obtain prior judicial
s433 U.S. at 15 n.9.
mId. But see United States v. Martin, 562 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (decided before Chadwick)
(refusing to permit a warrantless search of a suitcase the police suspected contained a machine gun).
r433 U.S. at 16 n.10.
Id. See notes 440-49 and accompanying text supra.
433 U.S. at 10 n.5.
t'Justice Blackmun's essential position was that the Court should read its recent cases on custodial
arrest and automobile searches together and hold that "a warrant is not required to seize and search any
movable property in the possession of a person properly arrested in a public place." Id. at 19. While he
condemned the Government's position in the case as "extreme," id. at 17, Justice Blackmun's view was
really not so different-adding only the circumstance of a warrantless arrest at the time personalty is taken.
r'Cf. Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931) (finding exigent circumstances in a potentially
mobile car).
6"433 U.S. at 23.
S433 U.S. at 19. See notes 499-500 and accompanying text supra.
raJustice Brennan insisted that Justice Blackmun's suggestions were not supported by Supreme Court
precedents. He said it was "by no means clear that locked containers found inside a car are subject to
search" under the automobile exception, see note 522 supra, and that the locked footlocker could not be
considered within the suspects' "control" at the time of arrest. 433 U.S. at 17 nn.1-2. But see United
States v. Stevie, No. 77-1335 (8th Cir., filed Nov. 17, 1977) (distinguishing Chadwick and upholding
a search of a suitcase found inside a car).
' See notes 174-201 and accompanying text supra.
'See notes 249-54, 278-312 and accompanying text supra.
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approval for their actions? 5 .. I daresay that virtually every search and seizure case
the Burger Court has decided in the last seven years has pointed to the proposition
fixed to the top of the Government's brief in Chadwick. To be sure, it is disquieting
that the Federal Government should appear before the Court urging that such a
rule be adopted, 6 ' but it cannot be said that the precedents do not support it. For
the moment, the Court is uneasy about what it has wrought. Hence the retreat in
Chadwick. Whether the truth hurts enough to foster a change of course remains
to be seen. If the difference between Chadwick and White562 is that footlockers do
not have wheels and gasoline engines and are not driven about town under traffic
regulations, and the Court is satisfied with that explanation and content to leave
the automobile cases in place, then I for one do not see that much has changed."'
Similarly, if the difference between Chadwick and Robinson5" is that two hundredpound footlockers cannot be kept in an arrestee's breast pocket, and the Court is
comfortable with that explanation, then again I find nothing to cheer about. In the
end, the Court may only have balked at ignoring the warrant requirement in a
case involving a double-locked footlocker held in strict security under circumstances
in which a warrant could be easily obtained.
To be sure, in departing from the preference for warrants in all but a few exceptional situations, the Burger Court has only responded to long-standing doubts
about the courts' ability to supervise criminal investigations. The police have always
complained that any requirement that they seek magisterial approval before taking
action handcuffs them in their efforts to combat crime, and commentators have
maintained that the introduction of judges only complicates and debilitates the police
function. 5 ' Studies have shown that in practice judicial supervision is ineffective in
any event.5 6 Generally, the police do not seek warrants but act without them and
request judicial approval only after the fact. In the few cases in which warrants are
sought, they are usually issued perfunctorily by magistrates who see their task as
merely rubber-stamping the judgments of law enforcement officers.5 7 Indeed, in
many cases the affidavits filed by police officers are not even read. In view of the
facts, a strong argument can be made that we should drop the "fiction" of judicial
supervision before the fact and focus instead on more meaningful judicial review
'See notes 379-84, 400-10, 427-34, 445-80, 491-532 and accompanying text supra.
r' Justice Brennan allowed it was "deeply distressing that the Department of Justice, whose mission is
to protect the constitutional liberties of the people . . . should even appear to be seeking to subvert them
by extreme and dubious legal arguments." 433 U.S. at 16.
' See notes 502-05 and accompanying text supra.
'I will concede that Chadwick makes a case for finding a diminished subjective expectation of privacy
in automobiles as opposed to luggage, but I reject the underlying premise that the reach of the fourth
amendment is to be determined by learned attitudes apart from the Constitution itself. See notes 190201 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 445-80 and accompanying text supra.
" See, e.g., Imbau, Restrictions in the Law of Interrogation and Confessions, 52 Nw. L. REV. 77
(1957) (denying that the courts have authority to supervise the police apart from the enforcement of
rules of evidence); Peterson, Restrictions in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. L. Rv. 46 (1957).
'"Note, Philadelphia Police Practice and the Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. RV. 1182, 1183 (1952)
(showing that "[diespite the ease with which warrants may be obtained, the Philadelphia police almost
never use them").
SARRST, supra note 433, at 15-16, 51-53; Miller & Tiffany, Prosecutor Dominance of the Warrant
Decision: A Study of Current Practices, 1964 WASH. U. L.Q. 1. See Reed v. State, 162 Tenn. 643, 39
S.W.2d 749 (1931) (holding that it is for the magistrate to determine whether to read the affidavit provided by the police "plumb to the bottom" or merely to "sketch it over").
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later.5 6 s As Professor Fuller put it in another context, "Sooner or later we must
take down some keep off the grass signs and pave some paths cut by trespassing
feet."569
While I have no doubt that this description of the prevailing attitude is accurate,
it does seem to me that the Court has been all too quick to settle for after-the-fact
review with its many and obvious shortcomings. At the very least, I should have
thought the Court would insist that the police make some record of the evidence
upon which they rely before taking action-in order to provide a basis for meaningful
review later and to limit the influence of success on the determination whether the
police had sufficient grounds for taking action in the first instance."' More fundamentally, I frankly doubt that the Court has given judicial supervision a fair chance
before finding fault and shelving the idea. I am persuaded that if the Court were
to become serious about the warrant requirement and were to insist that the police
and judges turn square corners in the warrant process, judicial supervision might yet
become effective despite the shortcomings of the past. To date, however, the Court
has not so much as demanded that issuing officers be demonstrably qualified for
their extraordinarily difficult and important work, and in fact has asked for no
more than financial independence."' The truth is that by establishing so many
exceptions to the warrant requirement the Court has actually discouraged the police
from seeking warrants. By tolerating the issuance of rubber-stamp warrants in the
rare cases in which they are sought, the Court has made light of the very careful
and meaningful prior examination of the facts its rhetoric still occasionally insists is
essential to correct decision-making. In a real sense, the Court has simply never
committed the American criminal justice system to the principle of judicial supervision, and in the absence of such a commitment the Court is hard put to maintain
that the warrant requirement cannot be made to work.
C. The Question of Consequences
Search and seizure questions reach the Supreme Court only in cases in which
the Court's treatment of them makes some difference in the result. If it were otherwise, there would be no case or controversy and no jurisdictional basis for the Court's
examination. Accordingly, for as long as the Court has grappled with search and
seizure issues, it has wrestled as well with the critical question of consequences-what
follows from the decision that a search or seizure was unreasonable. Historically,
the law of remedies has been brought to bear, and the victim of such police action
has been entitled to a judgment in damages572 or a decree requiring that something
' See LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making and Reviewing Law
Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 987, 991-99 (1965) (suggesting that magistrates may ignore
entirely the evidence presented in affidavits so that it may even be true that the police acting without a
warrant give the facts in their knowledge closer scrutiny). This is essentially the position taken by Justice
Blackmun, dissenting in Chadwick. 433 U.S. at 20 (referring to obtaining a warrant as a mere
"formality").
" Fuller, Freedon-A Suggested Analysis, 68 HARv. L. REV. 1305, 1325 (1955), cited in Kamisar,
The Wiretapping-EavesdroppingProblem: A Professor's View, 44 MINN. L. REV. 891, 940 (1960).
'0 See KANsISAR, LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 103, at 289.
'"E.g., Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977) (reinforcing the well-settled rule that magistrates
cannot depend for their compensation on the number of warrants they issue).
"All the British cases were, of course, suits for money damages. See notes 23-47 and accompanying
text supra. See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing a federal
claim for damages against federal officers who violate the plaintiff's fourth amendment rights); Monroe v.
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wrongfully taken be returned.173 Of course, suits for damages against police officers
have rarely been successful in this country,57 4 and when the object unlawfully seized
is contraband the person who possessed it is not entitled to have it back despite the
constitutional violation that turned it up. 75 Other proposed remedies, usually contemplating some sort of police discipline, have also proved unsatisfactory in providing
the victim of police misconduct any meaningful satisfaction. 7' In the midst of the
confusion and controversy, the exclusionary rule has stood for a century--providing
not so much an answer to the question of consequences as a source of still more
practical and theoretical difficulty.
The literature concerning the rule is enormous, and within it there is substantial
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (recognizing a federal statutory claim based upon state officers' violation of the
due process protection against unreasonable search and seizure).
'TaThe Boyd and Weeks cases were decided on this ground. See notes 67-77, 86-97 and accompanying
text supra.
' See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 n.5 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring) (pointing out that
even if damage awards are made they will often fail to fully compensate the victim whose intangible
constitutional rights have been trampled); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41-44 (1949) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting); Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532,
1562-63 (1972) (worrying that limiting the victim to an action for damages may encourage the view
that the police are like contracting parties who are free to forsake their responsibilities so long as they
are prepared to pay damages for the breach); Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual
Rights, 39 MINN. L. REv. 493 (1955); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions,
77 HARV. L. REV. 209 (1963) (commenting that individual officers may be judgment proof but a judgment against Government may prompt desirable changes in policy that will diminish future misconduct);
Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117
U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1968) (rejecting state tort actions as an answer); Paulsen, Safeguards in the Law of
Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. L. REV. 65, 72 (1957) (concluding that "[bly the common consent of almost
all who have studied the problem, these remedies just do not work").
...
Cf. Clayton v. Shaw, 548 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that a claim for noncontraband
property after trial is cognizable in a civil rights action).
" in cases in which the police conduct under attack is an ongoing program of harassment, injunctions
can offer the individual prospective relief. See, e.g., Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966);
Wheeler v. Goodman, 298 F. Supp. 935 (W.D.N.C. 1969); Note, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy
for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143 (1968). But see Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976) (setting aside broad injunctive relief against supervisory officials). And there has been some talk
in the literature of imposing fines upon offending officers and distributing the proceeds to the victim of
their actions. Cf. LaPrade, An Alternative to the Exclusionary Rule Presently Administered Under the
Fourth Amendment, 48 CONN. B.J. 100 (1974) (discussing imposing fines on the government). But most
other plans, ranging from criminal prosecution of the officers involved through contempt citations to internal
police disciplinary measures, are addressed not so much to compensation of the present victim but to
avoidance of similar practices in the future. Ultimately, they speak to the different, but in no sense unimportant, question whether some means can be devised for deterring police misconduct. The literature,
generally styled as proposing alternatives to the exclusionary rule, is sizable. Illustrations include Blumrosen, Contempt of Court and Unlawful Police Action, 11 RUTGERS L. Rev. 526 (1957); Edwards,
Criminal Liability for Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 41 VA. L. R.v. 621 (1955); Note, Administration of Complaints by Civilians Against the Police, 77 HARV. L. REv. 499 (1964). The most popular
proposal in recent years has been that legislatures or police departments themselves develop exhaustive
rules to guide officers in the field. E.g., COLLEGE OF LAW OF ARsIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY & POLICE
4

FOUNDATION, MODEL RULES 17OR LAW ENFoRCEMENT (Project on Law Enforcement Policy and Rulemaking

series 1974). Then, departures from the rules can be punished even though they do not rise to constitutional violations. E.g., K. DAvIs, POLICE DISCRETION (1975); McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70
MICi. L. REv. 659 (1972); Quinn, The Eflect of Police Rulemaking on the Scope of Fourth Amendment Rights, 52 J. URBAN L. 25 (1974) (collecting the authorities). But see Allen, The Police and Substantive Rulemaking: Reconciling Principle and Expediency, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 62 (1976). Indeed, Professor Amsterdam has gone so far as to suggest that the fourth amendment may compel the development
of such rules. Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 416. Despite the Burger Court's apparent rejection of that
view in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), 1 am persuaded that without at least some prodding from
the courts, police departments and legislatures will not be moved to adopt such rules very soon. See
LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule-Part II: Defining the Norms
and Training the Police, 30 Mo. L. REv. 566 (1965) (commenting that legislators view the enforcement
of the fourth amendment as a judicial concern). While rules are clearly the best available means of preventing violations of fourth amendment rights, the recurring truth is that those rights are simply not
respected by decision-makers whose principal concern is the control of criminal behavior.
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disagreement over its theoretical foundations, its practical effects, and certainly its
desirability. Indeed, there is very little agreement about the rule at all. It is understood that it has roots in the common law of replevin,57 and, despite unfortunate
but recurring references in the literature, it is widely understood that it is not a
remedy-at least in the ordinary sense. That is, it does not compensate the victim
of police misconduct or in any wise make him or her whole, and it only indirectly
penalizes the perpetrator of the wrong so as to satisfy the victim that things have
somehow been made even.5 7 8 Yet, any further propositions offered concerning the
rule elicit immediate objections from those with views of their own. The best work
I know on the subject comes from Professors Schrock and Welsh. 7 They identify
two models. The unitary model sees all the events in a criminal prosecution as parts
of a single transaction for which government is ultimately responsible. It is just as
important to the fourth amendment whether a court takes account of the fruits of
a search as it is whether the intrusion that discovered the evidence was lawful. The
unitary model harbors two rationales for the exclusionary rule. First, it can be
deemed part of the individual's personal constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure. If the trial court were to sanction unlawful police action in the
field by making use of the illicit fruits, the court would forsake its fundamental
responsibility to respect the individual's constitutional rights. On this view, the trial
court does not merely condemn the unconstitutional acts of the police by refusing to
admit illegally seized evidence, but rather fails to perpetuate the wrong begun in
the field but continuing throughout the proceeding. By excluding such evidence,
the court only exercises its power of judicial review, ensuring that the individual is
treated constitutionally by all arms of government-including the court itself.58 0
This is the view of the exclusionary rule taken in the Weeks case."8 Second, the
exclusionary rule can be considered a judicially created rule of evidence, non- or
quasi-constitutional in origin, 82 instituted to avoid impugning the integrity of the
court by the introduction of unlawfully seized evidence. While under this rationale
the court is viewed as sharing responsibility with the police for the individual's
treatment under the Constitution, the focus is still on the court's separate interest in
maintaining its image of integrity. 8 3 The view partakes of the equitable notion
that litigants desiring favorable action must appear in court with clean hands, so
that in offering relief the court does not soil its own. The best illustrations of this

" See text at notes 91-97 supra.
'E.g., Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REV. 929, 951 (1965);
Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio At Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 335; Comment, Judicial Control
of Illegal Search and Seizure, 58 YALE L.J. 144, 153 (1948).
'Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59
MINN. L. REV. 251 (1974).
SIld. at 257.
'See note 90 and accompanying text supra; McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 339-40 (1943);
Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29-30 (1927) (reading Weeks to have announced a firm constitutional
proposition). Cf. Dodge v. United States, 272 U.S. 530, 532 (1926) (contending that the exclusion of
evidence avoids further infringement on constitutional rights) (opinion of Holmes, J.).
'5 See Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 COLLum. L. REV. 181 (1969). Note,
The Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1656 (1963).
.. Schrock and Welsh recognize that to the extent the Court defends itself from the excesses of the
police under the judicial integrity rationale, there is an overlap with the fragmentary model. Schrock &
Welsh, supra note 579, at 371-72. See notes 579-81 and accompanying text supra.
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thinking appear in the Holmes and Brandeis opinions in Silverthorne18 4 and Olnstead.5 The second model denies that the fourth amendment is concerned with all stages
of a criminal prosecution and insists that it governs only police action in the field.
The only obligation of the trial court is to ensure a fair trial, and so long as the
method by which evidence is obtained is not so outrageous as to deprive the entire
proceeding of fundamental fairness, 86 the court has no duty to exclude evidence
merely because it is the product of unlawful police action. Certainly nothing in the
Constitution demands that course. If unlawfully seized evidence is excluded, it is
because it is thought that some societal interest that outweighs the base line interest
in correct fact-finding at trial will be served. That interest, of course, is the privacy
of other, perhaps innocent people whose homes may be invaded if the police are
not deterred from further misconduct by the exclusionary rule. This fragmentary
model separates the police intrusion against which the individual has a fourth
amendment right from the proceedings at trial in which the question is merely one
of remedy-not a personal remedy for the victim but a collective remedy for the
broader social problem. It rejects out of hand the proposition that the individual
defendant has any personal right to exclude illegally seized evidence and doubts,
too, that judicial integrity is threatened by conduct outside the courtroom. Ultimately, this model seizes upon the deterrence rationale and embraces the exclusionary
17
rule as a judge-made rule of evidence, or better said, a species of privilege,58
thought
for the moment at least to serve the society's interest in avoiding police misconduct
in the future. The fragmentary model is, of course, illustrated by Justice Frankfurter's
opinion in the Wolf case.588
During the Warren years, the Court largely ignored the theoretically necessary
choice between the unitary and fragmentary models. In Mapp, 89 when the Court
set Wolf aside and relied heavily upon passages from Weeks and Olmstead,"9" the
issue was clouded by the incorporation wars and attention was diverted to the question of federalism. The opinion was ambiguous. Some language disparaged the
591
'
rather than "part and parcel"'59 2 of
notion that the rule was "one of evidence"
595
the fourth amendment, but other language referred to it as merely a "sanction
for the constitutional violation tied up in the police intrusion. Nowhere did the
Court squarely embrace either the unitary or fragmentary models. Indeed, it ultimately fastened the exclusionary rule on the states in reliance upon all the rationales
thus far proposed. Thus the Court said that the exclusionary rule is "an essential
'See
notes 93-94 and accompanying text supra. Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes labeled the
police action in the case an "outrage." 251 U.S. at 391.
's See notes 102-03 and accompanying text supra.
'E.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), discussed in notes 124-30 and accompanying text
supra.
'See McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 T~x. L. REv. 447 (1938)
(viewing the exclusionary rule as analogous to various privileges in the law of evidence that actually
retard the pursuit of truth at trial in order to further societal interests thought to be of superior importance).
'sSee notes 119-23 and accompanying text supra.
r' See notes 133-40 and accompanying text supra.
'Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1961), quoting Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392
(1914) and Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462 (1928).
...
367 U.S. at 649.
2
'
Id. at 651.
"' Id. at 655.
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part"" 4 of the individual's personal rights under the fourth and fourteenth amendments, that it gives to the courts "that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice," ' and also that its purpose "'is to deter-to compel respect
for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing
the incentive to disregard it.' """
The reaction to Mapp is well known. Criticism mounted immediately. The
arguments are familiar and need not be treated in detail here. It has been said that
the rule was never contemplated by the framers and was at best the creation of
judges too anxious to exercise nonconstitutional supervisory power over the lower
courts, 597 and that it lets the "criminal . . . go free because the constable has
blundered"5 and thus only compounds error rather than correcting it. 99 It has
also been said that the rule corrupts the police and prosecutors by encouraging them
to falsify reports in order to avoid the rule,60 penalizes the wrong officials too late
in the process to affect those really at fault,6 °1 handcuffs a highly professional police
force in this country that really needs no such check, 0 2 detracts from the determina..Id.at 657.
,id.
at 660.
'id. at 656, quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). In fairness, it should be
said that the Warren Court was not always so circumspect. At times, the Court was even eloquent in
embracing more lofty propositions than any found in the deterrence rationale:
Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be made party to lawless invasions
of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of
such invasions . . . . A ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial, we recognize, has the necessary
effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence ....
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).
" The most recent illustration appears in Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L.
REv. 1027 (1974). Without the slightest inquiry into counterarguments, Kaplan baldly states that it
"ismerely one arbitrary point on a continuum between deterrence of illegal police activity and conviction
of guilty persons." Id. at 1030. In the end, he contends that the argument for the rule "must stand or
fall simply on the basis of its demonstrated utility." Id. at 1029.
mPeople v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
r Dean Wigmore's famous hypothetical made the point:
'Titus, you have been found guilty of conducting a lottery; Flavius, you have confessedly violated
the Constitution. Titus ought to suffer imprisonment for crime and Flavius for contempt. But no!
We shall not punish Flavius directly, but shall do so by reversing Titus' conviction. This is our way
of teaching people like Flavius to behave, and of teaching people like Titus to behave, and incidentally of securing respect for the Constitution. Our way of upholding the Constitution is not to
strike at the man who breaks it, but to let off somebody else who broke something else.'
WIGMORE, supra note 79, at § 2184, at 31.
" Essentially, the argument is that the police find the exclusionary rule so inconsistent with good police
work, indeed rational criminal investigation, that they view it as merely something to get around in some
fashion rather than an aspect of law to be respected. In any particular case, the police may shade the
truth just enough to satisfy the court, which itself may be considered a hypercritical overseer that fails
to understand the reality of investigations in the field. See People v. McMurty, 64 Misc. 2d 63, 314
N.Y.S.2d 194 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1970); Sevilla, The Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjury, 11 SAN DIEGO
L. REa. 839 (1974); Comment, Police Perjury in the Narcotics "Dropsy" Cases: A New Credibility Gap,
60 GEO. L.J. 507 (1971).
' The rule is felt most keenly, of course, by the prosecutor at trial, who may have very little control
over police conduct in the field. The officers who committed the violation often never hear of the outcome
of the case and thus never feel personal disappointment. Going on, it is argued that search and seizure
doctrine is so complex in any event that, even if the police were affected by exclusion and wished to
conform to the law, they would be unable to do so. E.g., Burns, Mapp v. Ohio: An All American Mistake,
19 DEPAUL L. REV. 80, 100 (1969) (suggesting that not even an officer with a Ph.D. who goes to law
school at night can understand his or her responsibilities); Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the
Constable Blunders?, 50 TEx. L. REv. 736, 737-40 (1972).
' While, so far as I know anyway, no one has contended that the police need no supervision at all,
there certainly are those who would prefer only internal controls. They emphasize the practical necessity
of broad police powers of investigation-particularly if low-visibility, victimless crime is to be kept under
control. E.g., Coakley, Restrictions in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. L. REV. 2 (1957).
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tion of guilt,"0 ' causes delays,6"4 creates conflict between state and federal courts,"° '
breeds popular disrespect for the criminal justice system, G 6 protects only the guilty
whose property is seized rather than the innocent who may be injured but not
prosecuted,60 7 discourages the development of less Draconian remedies, 0 8s and finally
leads to the dilution of substantive fourth amendment standards by judges attempting
to avoid so severe a sanction.6 0 9

No question, these are weighty concerns. In response to them, the Warren Court
played on American utilitarianism by gradually increasing its reliance on the deter-

"oThis was one of Justice Black's complaints: "For me the importance of bringing guilty criminals
to book is a far more crucial consideration than the desirability of giving defendants every possible assistance
in their attempts to invoke an evidentiary rule which itself can result in the exclusion of highly relevant
evidence." Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 397 (1968) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting).
See Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-A Comment on People v. Cahan, 43
CAL. L. REV. 565 (1955); Wingo, Growing Disillusionment with the Exclusionary Rule, 25 Sw. L.J.
573 (1971).
'ABA

SECTION

OF

JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION,

MAJORITY

REPORT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

FEDERAL

LEGISLATION (studying S. 2657, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)), reprinted in 119 CONG. REC. 4237-40 (1973).

Id.
o Here, the Chief Justice has said:
As a result of the way in which the public hears about suppression cases a majority of laymen
tend to accept and sympathize with the policeman's view of the matter rather than that of the
courts . . . . The impact of the doctrine is dramatic and easily understood, while the important
reasons underlying it are almost beyond comprehension to most laymen, including most police officers.
This is one of the major causes of popular discontent with the administration of the criminal law.
Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 Am. U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1964).
'Dissenting in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949), Justice Jackson said:
Only occasional and more flagrant abuses come to the attention of the courts, and then only
those where the search and seizure yields incriminating evidence and the defendant is at least
sufficiently compromised to be indicted. If the officers raid a home, an office, or stop and search an
automobile but find nothing incriminating, this invasion of the personal liberty of the innocent too
often finds no practical redress. There may be, and I am convinced that there are, many unlawful
searches of homes and automobiles of innocent people which turn up nothing incriminating, in
which no arrest is made, about which the courts do nothing, and about which we never hear.
Accord, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1968). See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 156 (1931).
Professor Oaks has suggested:
The enormous concentration and reliance upon the exclusionary rule may forestall the development of alternative mechanisms for controlling improper behavior by the police. By a peculiar form
of federal preemption, the Mapp decision may sap state officials' energy and determination to control
law enforcement officials in alternative ways that might prove just as effective and even more
comprehensive than the exclusionary rule.
Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. REV. 665, 753 (1970).
"oKamisar, Illegal Searches or Seizures and Contemporaneous Incriminating Statements: A Dialogue
on a Neglected Area of Criminal Procedure, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 78, 145. State judges in particular have
taken every opportunity to avoid applying the rule. And certainly, at least until quite recently, little interest has been shown in using the various state constitutions to exclude evidence the Federal Constitution
would admit. Compare Collings, Toward Workable Rules of Search and Seizure: An Amicus Curiae
Brief, 50 CAL. L. REV. 421 (1962) with Wilkes, A Most Deplorable Paradox: Admitting Illegally Obtained Evidence in Georgia-Past,Present, and Future, 11 GA. L. REV. 105 (1976). Of course, all the
state constitutions contain search and seizure provisions that parallel the fourth amendment, 35 CORNELL
L.Q. 625, 626 n.9 (1950) (collecting them), and it is possible that, with sufficient prodding from Justices
Marshall and Brennan, the state courts may yet take a more active role. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 97
S. Ct. 711, 714 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 338-39 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 489 (1977). Indeed, after the Supreme Court upheld the inventory inspection in South Dakota
v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), against a fourth amendment challenge, the South Dakota court excluded the evidence on remand by referring to state law. State v. Opperman, .... S.D ..... , 247 N.W.2d
673 (S.D. 1976). While I am inclined to say it is too soon to tell whether a trend is developing, others
have noted a revival of interest in state law in at least some jurisdictions. See, e.g., Howard, State Courts
and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976); Wilkes, The New
Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974);
Wilkes, More on the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L.J. 873 (1975).
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rence rationale. In Linkletter,"10 for example, the Court held the Mapp decision to
be prospective only, because the deterrent purpose would not be advanced by upsetting convictions obtained before Mapp was decided. In addition, the Warren
Court found various excuses for restricting the rule's application. It refused to
apply the rule when the defendant lacked "standing" to complain,"" when the evidence was offered only to impeach testimony at trial,6 12 and when the connection
13
between the unlawful police intrusion and the evidence introduced was attenuated.
The change had its casualties. If the rule was applied not to conform to the fourth
amendment in the case at bar but rather to deter unreasonable search and seizure
in other cases, it was difficult to contend that the individual defendant had any
personal right to it. Rather, any particular defendant must be only a private attorney
general who is entitled to relief only for the benefit of others. 1 4 Perhaps in recognition of the point, the Court gradually let the personal right rationale disappear
from its decisions. Similarly, if in some identifiable cases the Court would not allow
the defendant the benefit of the rule despite a showing that the police had misbehaved, then it appeared that judicial integrity must not be offended by the mere
admission of illegally seized evidence and that the critical issue was always the
effect of exclusion on future events. Unlike the personal right rationale, judicial integrity did not fall out of the cases altogether. Nevertheless, it was demonstrably reduced to a make-weight concern next to the primary, deterrent purpose of the rule.6""
"Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). See Bender, The Retroactive Eflect of an Overruling
Constitutional Decision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 650 (1962) (urging in a pre-Linkletter argument that retrospective application would not serve the deterrent purpose).
6
"E.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). See Section 2255, supra note 170, at 38990; Comment, Standing to Object to an UnreasonableSearch and Seizure, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 342 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Standing]. Of course, the Court recognized that an accused has a sufficient stake in
the admission of evidence at trial to satisfy article III, and the Court's "standing" rules are not in any
sense mandated by the Constitution. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 (1969). See Sedler,
Standing to Assert Constitutional Ius Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599, 656-58 (1962).
"E.g., Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). Although Walder came early and perhaps cannot fairly be considered a Warren Court decision, the case was not repudiated in the 1960s but rather
continued to serve as a basis for avoiding the distasteful rule. Nor did the Court depart from Frisbie v.
Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) (holding that the trial court will not inquire into the means by which the
Government produces the accused in court). See Scott, Criminal Jurisdiction of a State over a Defendant
Based upon Presence Secured by Force or Fraud, 37 MINN. L. REV. 91 (1953). The Frisbie doctrine, too,
provided an excuse for avoiding the rule. But see United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cit. 1974)
(refusing to permit the Government to produce a suspect for trial through cruel and unusual conduct
amounting to a patent violation of due process).
"5 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). See Section 2255, supra note 170, at 389-90;
Note, Fruit of the Poisonous Tree-A Plea for Relevant Criteria, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1136 (1967).
" See Burger, supra note 606, at 12.
61E.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). See Comment, Judicial Integrity and Judicial
Review: An Argument for Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1129
(1973). The evidence on whether the rule actually does deter police misconduct is at best inconclusive.
Comparative studies of Canada and the United Kingdom, where the rule is not followed, are undercut by
differences in the substantive law in those societies. Spiotto, for example, must concede that his study of
the Canadian experience may say little about what abandonment of the rule here would bring-since
Canada still recognizes writs of assistance. It may well be that other remedies suffice when the substantive
restrictions upon the police are relaxed. See Spiotto, The Search and Seizure Problem-Two Approaches:
The Canadian Tort Remedy and the United States Exclusionary Rule, 1 J.P.S. & AD. 36 41-42 (1973).
It is equally dangerous to infer from an increase in motions to suppress following Mapp that the police
have become even more lawless. For the increase can be explained as easily, and certainly more persuasively, as indicating that defense counsel have now come to recognize the substantial benefits to their
clients in raising search and seizure issues. Nagel, Testing the Eflects of Excluding Illegally Seized Evidence, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 283, 289. Various other empirical studies have turned up little hard evidence
one way or the other. E.g., P. CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER: POLICE ABUSES IN NEW YORK CITY (1969);
B. COHEN, THE POLICE INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN NEW YORK CITY (1970); K. DAVIS,
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA (1975); A. REISS, THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC (1971);
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The Burger Court has amplified doubts about the rule and set about building
upon the exceptions to its applcation.61 6 In a series of opinions, the Court has refused to apply the rule in grand jury proceedings,117 civil forfeiture matters, 618 and

federal habeas corpus cases in which the petitioner has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the search and seizure claim in state court. 1 9 More fundamentally,
62
this Court has reached deeper into the underlying theory. In Calandra,
Justice
(1973); J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966); J. WILSON, VARIETIES
See Batey, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations Through Police Disciplinary Reform, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 245 (1976) (collecting the authorities). The truth is that no one
has really improved upon Professor Oaks' monumental work. Oaks, supra note 608. The only intuitive
argument I have ever found persuasive is that, whether or not the rule deters police misconduct, any
sudden departure from it would send entirely the wrong signal to officers who have never been fond of
search and seizure restrictions. Even the Chief Justice agrees. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,
403 U.S.
388, 421 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
"8 The Chief Justice has taken the lead both on and off the Court. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 492-93 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411-12 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Burger, supra note 606.
'" E.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
"E.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
'°E.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (making an earlier "covert attack" on the exclusionary rule). Cover &
Aleinihoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977); Note,
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisonersand the Fourth Amendment, 52 N.C. L. REV. 633, 643 (1974).
Very recently, the Court has suggested but not yet squarely adopted another exception to the rule--the
"inevitable discovery" doctrine. The notion that illegally seized evidence should nevertheless be admitted if, had the unlawful police conduct not occurred, the evidence would have been turned up lawfully,
has appeared from time to time in the lower courts. E.g., Somer v. United States, 138 F.2d 790 (2d Cir.
1943) (opinion of Hand, J.). See generally Comment, The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary Rules, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 88 (1974). The doctrine is worrisome, of course, because it relaxes the protection of the fourth amendment in "the very cases in which by the government's
own admission, there is no reason for an unlawful search." United States v. Paroutian, 299 F.2d 486,
489 (2d Cir. 1962). On the other hand, it is not all so different from the "independent source" rule, see
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), or, for that matter, the harmless error
doctrine. See also Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963). Accordingly, it came as no surprise when
last Term in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), the Court implied that the inevitable discovery
doctrine might be recognized. In Brewer, the Court held that the suspect's answers to questions put by
the police in defiance of counsel's instructions must be excluded under the sixth amendment. But in a
footnote, the Court said that it dealt only with the admissibility of the suspect's statements--telling the
police where the victim's body could be found. It left open the question of whether, on retrial, the
prosecution might introduce "evidence of where the body was found and its condition." That information, the Court implied, might come in on the theory "that the body would have been discovered in any
event, even had incriminating statements not been elicited from Williams." Id. at 406-07 n.12. The
quoted language, together with a citation to Killough v. United States, 336 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1964)
(embracing the inevitable discovery doctrine), may indicate that the Supreme Court is about to recognize
yet another exception to the exclusionary rule. Compare Owens v. Twomey, 508 F.2d 858 (7th Cir.
1974) (embracing the inevitable discovery doctrine) with United States v. Kelly, 547 F.2d 82 (8th Cir.
1977) (leaving the question open). But see Parker v. Estelle, 498 F.2d 625, 629-30 n.12 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
Given the Court's demonstrable attitude toward the exclusionary rule in recent years, I suspect it is
useless to urge reconsideration. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to view this new animal with caution.
First, the very idea that unlawfully obtained evidence would inevitably have been discovered by lawful
means is at best conjectural-much more so even than the harmless error doctrine, I would guess. But even
putting that to one side, the Court should understand that at least in some inevitable discovery cases its
emerging position that evidence seized in a "flagrantly abusive" manner must be excluded will logically
have to apply. The obvious example is a case in which one police officer storms unannounced into a
suspect's home and terrorizes an entire family while conducting a particularly intrusive search. Even if a
second officer arrives at the door with a valid search warrant just as the first finishes, it seems clear
that by the Court's own reasoning the evidence must be kept out. Exclusion will, in this sort of case,
act as a deterrent to the first officer, who knew or should have known that the brutal, warrantless search
was unlawful. And that, after all, is why the Burger Court still recognizes the exclusionary rule--to
specifically deter affected officers. See notes 618-19 and accompanying text infra. Cf. United States v.
Ragsdale, 470 F.2d 24, 32-33 (5th Cir. 1972) (Rives, J., concurring) (insisting that "the mandate of
the exclusionary rule is not directed to the collective intellect of an amorphous government entity, but
to the individual searching officer").
" United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
J. RUBENSTEIN, CITY POLICE
OF POLICE BEHAVIOR (1968).
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Powell's opinion for the Court embraced the fragmentary model, clearly distinguishing between the individual's fourth amendment right against unreasonable search
and seizure and the exclusionary rule as "a judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather
than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." '21 Going on, in Peltier,22
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion made explicit the inferences about the judicial
integrity rationale that had been lurking in the background for some time. He conceded that the maintenance of judicial integrity remains a purpose of the exclusionary
rule. Yet, the various exceptions to the rule's application indicate that judicial integrity is offended, not by the mere admission of unlawfully seized evidence, but
by judicial conduct that encourages further police misconduct. That, in turn, occurs
only when the admission of such evidence provides an incentive to unreasonable
search and seizure or, to put it another way, when application of the rule deters
such practices.111 Rehnquist thus collapsed the "imperative of judicial integrity '
into the deterrence rationale-to be satisfied so long as the exclusionary rule is used
so as to maximize its deterrent effect. Taking the matter a step further, he implied
that the only case in which the rule can be expected to deter, and thus the only case
in which this Court will continue to apply it, is one in which the police have acted
willfully or at least negligently to violate the defendant's fourth amendment rights."2'
That is the sort of case in which the exclusion of evidence may affect conscious police
decisions in the field. The essential difference is between good and bad faith police
actions. The Court is prepared to exclude evidence obtained by "flagrantly abusive"
means, but it appears that "technical" violations of the fourth amendment will no
longer invoke the rule. 26
The Court's emerging position is not unexpected, really. To the extent it finds
significance in the police "purpose" or "motive" it is consistent with related Burger
'Id. at 348.
'United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
'd. at 536-39.
'd. at 537, quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
S422 U.S. at 539, citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
447 (1974) (treating a retroactivity
question concerning the Miranda rules). Cf. Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: 4 Reply
to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. CH. L. REv. 719, 751 (1966) (insisting that Holmes and Brandeis were concerned only with "clear and inexcusable abuses").
'See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 607-12 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring). I read Powell's concurring opinion in Brown, joined by Justice Rehnquist, to be a fair statement of the Burger Court's present
position with regard to the exclusionary rule. To be sure, no majority opinion has yet employed it in a
direct review case to suspend the rule when Mapp would have it apply. But it obviously speaks for the
two Justices whose names it bears, and the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun are on record with even
stronger antirule positions. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 416-17 (1977) (Burger, C.., dissenting)
(taking the view that the rule should not be applied to nonegregious police conduct); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 510 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice Black that "the
Fourth Amendment supports no exclusionary rule" whatever). It is worth noting that Blackmun's opinion
for the Court in Brown excluded a confession obtained through an unlawful arrest only after making it
clear that the illegality in the case "had a quality of purposefulness." 422 U.S. at 605. And Justice White,
whose views on the scope and standards questions have resulted in less rather than more protection for
the individual, concurred in the judgment only insofar as the Court held that a confession is inadmissible
if obtained by officers who "knew or should have known" that they were acting without probable cause.
Id. at 606. Accord, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 536 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (proposing that
the exclusionary rule be "modified so as to prevent its application in those many circumstances where
the evidence at issue was seized by an officer acting in the good faith belief that his conduct comported
with existing law and having reasonable grounds for his belief"). White may now be listed with the
Nixon appointees, and it appears that the proposition that suppression of evidence is the ordinary consequence of unreasonable search and seizure no longer has five votes.
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Court innovations of late. 27 Indeed, it may only bring the scope of the exclusionary
rule into line with general principles of police liability for unconstitutional action
now taking shape in the cases.628 Nor, certainly, is it radical. The Scottish courts
have adopted essentially the same case-by-case approach to the matter,6 2a and commentators in this country have been urging a "substantial violation" 30 test for
years. 63 ' The same sort of thing has been proposed in the Congress 63 2 and adopted
6'E.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)
(holding that a purpose to discriminate must be the motivating factor in equal protection cases); Mount
Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (extending the "motivating factor" analysis
to first amendment cases); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (holding that in order to state
a cognizable claim under the eighth amendment a prisoner must allege "acts or omissions sufficiently
harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs"); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976) (holding that proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a
violation of equal protection). Of course, Doyle, Arlington Heights, Gamble, and Davis indicate that
improper motive is part and parcel of the underlying right against a denial of equal protection, suppression of
protected expression, or cruel and unusual punishment. In the exclusionary rule cases, the Court has not
suggested that "technical" missteps by the police are for that reason not violations of the fourth amendment at all. It is only proposed that when violations are "technical" the rule should not apply-because
its deterrent purpose would not be served. Thus the Court's emerging position regarding the exclusionary
rule tracks its handling of the potential liability of the police for money damages. Cf. Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that subjective motivation relates only to a determination of the appropriate remedy and not to the substantive question whether the eighth amendment has
been violated).
Any emphasis upon the subjective state of the officer's mind raises enormous problems of proof, not
to mention perplexing substantive questions. What if Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971), should
arise again? Can an officer who believes and acts upon a radio report that other officers have obtained
an arrest warrant now insist that evidence seized incident to the arrest is admissible even though it turns
out that the report was incorrect? Justice Brennan has offered an even more troubling case--one in which
an officer acts lawfully in obtaining evidence but thinks his or her conduct is unconstitutional. United States
v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 560-61 (1975) (dissenting opinion). Cf. United States v. Hellman, 556 F.2d 442
(9th Cir. 1977) (rejecting the contention that an automobile search was justifiable as an inventory when the
officer involved testified that he had impounded the car for the purpose of conducting an investigatory
search).
While the Court has not allowed the police the absolute immunity it has afforded prosecutors, see
Imblcr v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), it has enthusiastically embraced the qualified immunity of
police officers recognized in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). In cases evidently controlling whenever executive officers are sued for allegedly violating constitutional rights, the Court held in Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) and Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) that such officials have a
two-part defense. No liability can be found if the defendant proves that he or she did not act from
malice and that the conduct under attack did not violate "clearly settled constitutional rights," justifying
an inference of malice. Developments in the Law--Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REv.
1133, 1214 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. Summing up in Scheuer, the Court said that
"[i]tis the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the
circumstances coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity." 416 U.S.
at 247-48.
'E.g., Lawrie v. Muier, [ 1950] Scots Sess. Cas. 19, 27 (H.C.J. 1949):
Whether any given irregularity ought to be excused depends upon the nature of the irregularity
and the circumstances under which it was committed. In particular, the case may bring into play
the discretionary principle of fairness to the accused which has been developed so fully in our law
in relation to the admission in evidence of confessions or admissions by a person suspected or
charged with crime. That principle would obviously require consideration in any case in which
the departure from the strict procedure had been adopted deliberately with a view to securing the
admission of evidence obtained by an unfair trick.
Accord, M'Govern v. H.M. Advocate, [1950] Scots Sess. Cas. 33 (H.C.J. 1949) (excluding evidence because "it would have been very simple for the police to have adopted the appropriate procedure in
relation to a search of [the suspect's] person"). See H. FIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 260-61 (1967).
' Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives, 1975 WASH.
U. L.Q. 621, 686.
'E.g., Bator & Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the Right to Counsel: Basic Problems
and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COLuM. L. REv. 62, 77 (1966) (proposing that exclusion should not
be mandated "where the officer did not know and had no reason to know that in some minor technicality
he was violating a rule"); Hill, supra note 582, at 184; Wright, supra note 601, at 744. See Kamisar,
supra note 609, at 144 (emphasis in original) (noting that "[t]he trouble is that 'illegal' arrests and
'unreasonable' searches signify many different things: barely, mildly illegal, clearly illegal, flagrantly,
outrageously illegal").
nSenator Bentsen introduced bills in both the 92d, S. 2657, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), and 93d
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by the American Law Institute 33 On the other hand, there are real and serious
difficulties with the course the Burger Court has chosen. At the outset, by accepting
the fragmentary model the Court has taken the theoretical step the Warren Court
avoided-putting some distance between the rule and the Constitution itself. That
alone would seem to dispose of both the personal right and judicial integrity rationales, but the Court goes on to expressly reject the one and to blur the other with the
deterrence rationale. Having relegated the exclusionary rule to the murky status of
a judicially-created federal rule of evidence, the Court then applies it where it will-in
cases in which the police action under attack was "flagrantly abusive." Various objections come to mind.
First, the Court has offered no intellectually satisfying justification for resurrecting
the Wolf dichotomy between right and remedy and for rejecting the model embraced
by Weeks and some language in Mapp. To be sure, the Court can fairly re-examine
precedents by calling attention to intermediate decisions that undermine their basic
tenets,63 4 but in the exclusionary rule cases the Burger Court has gone too far too
fast. It is not enough simply to announce that there is no personal right to the rule
without explaining wherein Weeks was in error. Nor is it enough to announce
that judicial integrity is not offended by the admission of illegally seized evidence
without explaining the justifications for the exceptions to the rule the Warren Court
began and this Court has continued. Surely it must be clear that Justice Frankfurter
fashioned the fragmentary model in Wolf only in response to the incorporationists
in dissento 5 and that the recent emphasis on deterrence and increasing the exceptions
to the rule's application has come in response to pressures that can only be described
as political. 36 The Court must be realistic, of course, but above all it must be principled. In rejecting the unitary model and resting the rule entirely upon the deterrence rationale, the Court has unnecessarily launched itself into the very judicial
legislation it so desperately wishes to avoid. Federal common law it may be, 63 7 but
Congresses, S. 881, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). His proposals were made in response to Chief Justice
Burger's suggestion in his dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and
were supported by the Division of Judicial Administration of the American Bar Association. See 119 CoNG.
REc. 4236-40 (remarks of Senator Bentsen and Majority Report of the Committee on Federal Legislation). The bills received mixed reviews, compare Comment, The Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure: Examination and Prognosis, 20 KAN. L. REV. 768 (1972) with Comment, Excluding the Exclusionary Rule: Congressional Assault on Mapp v. Ohio, 61 Geo. L.J. 1453 (1973), and never won
passage. Further legislative activity on the Bentsen model would seem unlikely now that the Burger
Court has swung round to the position taken in the bills without the help of the Congress. On the other
hand, Congress has amended the Federal Tort Claims Act to make the government independently liable
for any "assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution"
committed by a federal law enforcement officer. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (Supp. IV 1974).

The legislative

history indicates that the change was prompted by Bivens. See Gilligan, The Federal Tort Claims ActAn Alternative to the Exclusionary Rule?, 66 J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOOV 1 (1975).

'ALI

MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE

§ 290.2 (2) (1975).

are days when I think the Burger Court's loose talk about the limits of the exclusionary rule
is designed to lay the groundwork for outright rejection of Mapp in precisely this way. See Israel, Gideon
v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 SuP. CT. REv. 211.
See notes 119-23 and accompanying text supra; Katz, The Supreme Court and the States: An Inquiry
into Mapp v. Ohio in North Carolina. The Model, the Study and the Implications, 45 N.C. L. REv.
119 (1966).
Or practical. It hardly need be noted that the turn to deterrence in Linkletter was a very convenient way in which to avoid opening the jailhouse door to countless prisoners convicted prior to Mapp.
" See Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
HARv. L. REv. 1 (1975). While Professor Monaghan concedes his own doubts about the earlier analysis,
he places responsibility for the deconstitutionalization of the exclusionary rule squarely on the shoulders
of the Burger Court. To be sure, analogies to other suppression doctrines, certainly the Miranda rules and
the yet-to-be-discarded rules governing the admission of eye-witness identifications, lend support to the
'There
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the exclusionary rule is ever so better justified as "part and parcel" of the fourth
amendment itself-resting upon the familiar principle of judicial review.
Second, even if the deterrence rationale is accepted as the primary ground of
the exclusionary rule, the Court has offered no justification for emphasizing specific
as opposed to general deterrence in its analysis. The Warren Court never supposed
that particular police officers would be deterred from misconduct by the application
of the rule, but rather viewed the rule as operating more generally to discourage
8
unreasonable search and seizure by removing the incentive for such practices.
The idea has always been that the existence of the rule will build respect for the
fourth amendment into criminal investigatons, perhaps resulting in more top-down
control of questionable search practices in order to develop standard police procedures
that will ensure the admissibility of any evidence obtained.639 The truth is that
the rule has never been thought to affect the constable who blunders; the evil with
which it has been concerned is departmental policy that encourages, even rewards,
unconstitutional search and seizure. The Burger Court's focus on specific deterrence
simply misses the point. 640
Third, the Court's impending rejection of the rule in many, if not most, cases
jeopardizes its own ability to consider applying it in any. For it is plain that the
rule has always been the principal vehicle for getting fourth amendment issues to
thesis that the rule is not itself part of the Constitution. Yet in those cases the Court was clear that if
the Congress or perhaps even state legislatures were to take a hand and develop some equally effective
procedure the rules fashioned by the Court might not have to be followed. United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 239 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). The fourth amendment rule announced in Boyd and Weeks did not come wrapped in such conciliatory language. Only in Wolf was
there talk of legislative action affecting the rule, see note 123 supra, and that is hardly a decision upon
which to build an argument as to the foundation of the rule since Mapp.
"United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 556-57 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Accord, Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 431; Oaks, supra note 608, at 709-10.
" The constable has in all probability not blundered at all but followed departmental policy, written
or unwritten, in violating the Constitution in order to obtain evidence. It makes very little sense to
limit the exclusionary rule to those cases in which the individual officer knows or should know the
wrongfulness of his or her conduct, that is, to put a premium on constitutional ignorance. We have little
enough incentive for police departments to teach their operatives how to work within the law. The fault
in all this lies in the very superficial, and result-serving, notion that what counts is what the officer in
the field thinks. In a real sense, he or she cannot think at all but must make split-second decisions on
how to proceed-decisions that are most difficult to criticize in hindsight. See Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 499 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting). On the other hand, police captains can and must think
if we are to have meaningful protection from arbitrary searches and seizures. That is where application
of the exclusionary rule may bring pressure.
640 Of course, it can be argued that even if the deterrence rationale is substituted for the personal
right
and judicial integrity approaches, the exclusionary rule still should apply to all illegally seized evidence.
If deterrence is the goal, then what is important is the state of mind of the police. And the exclusion of
evidence in any case in which the police overstep their bounds arguably serves the purpose. But see
Section 2255, supra note 170 (suggesting that the rule need be applied only in enough cases to keep the
police guessing). Cf. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting)
(proposing that the harmless error doctrine be applied in at least some exclusionary rule cases); Chapman
v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 44 n.2 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring) (same). Calling up what amounts
to the regulatory model of the fourth amendment, see notes 161-71 and accompanying text supra,
some recent works have contended that emphasis upon deterrence should logically lead to the rejection of the "standing" exception to the rule. If by applying the rule in any case the Court hopes only
to affect the thinking of the police, then it should make no difference who calls attention to police misconduct. The effect-on the police-is the same. E.g., Standing, supra note 611. See People v. Martin,
45 Cal. 2d 755 ...... 290 P.2d 855, 857 (1955) (adopting a "vicarious standing" position). Cf. Allen, supra
note 123, at 22 (suggesting that the standing rules in search and seizure stem from the historical intermingling of fourth and fifth amendment analysis). On the other hand, it is to avoid the personal right
and judicial integrity rationales, which would have the rule apply in any case in which a court is asked
to approve unlawful police conduct by admitting its fruits into evidence, that the Burger Court emphasizes
specific deterrence. Having come this far, the Court is hardly likely to expand the rule's application to
reach any case in which an argument for deterrence can be made.
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427

the Court. Application of the rule provides an occasion for judicial review that
may well disappear if the Court is left to expound on search and seizure doctrine
only in civil actions. 641 Indeed, assuming the Court means to apply the rule only
when the officer involved willfully violated the fourth amendment and that no such
finding is possible unless there is a clear precedent condemning a search on identical
facts, Justice Brennan has suggested that the emerging position "could stop dead
in its tracks judicial development of Fourth Amendment rights." ' 2 For if no such
precedent can be found, the trial court's "first duty ... will be to deny the accused's

motion to suppress" because, irrespective of the outcome of a fourth amendment
analysis in the particular case, the rule cannot apply and the evidence must be
643
admitted in any event,
However all that may be, the real criticism of the Court's new approach is that
it boils down to yet another dimension of the flexible, case-by-case approach to constitutional adjudication for which the Burger Court reaches in virtually every fourth
amendment context. The Court does not reject the exclusionary rule out of hand
but merely limits its application to cases in which the police undertake flagrant and
abusive searches and seizures, when they know or should know that what they do
is invalid but do it nevertheless in bad faith. At bottom, the Court cares very little
whether the fourth amendment is violated. Rather, it is concerned with just how
bad the police conduct really is. That, it seems to me, is essentially the position
the Court takes in dealing with the other fundamental problems regarding search
and seizure-the questions of scope and standards. 4 4 The Court simply sifts the
facts of the particular case, weighing and balancing the competing interests, and
applies the exclusionary rule or not according to the character of the police action
under attack. Ultimately, the fourth amendment analysis at the consequences stage,
like that employed in determining whether the fourth amendment applies or whether
it has been violated, is fundamentally indistinguishable from the fact-oriented approach associated with flexible due process. Illegally seized evidence is to be excluded only when "fundamental fairness" demands it. While the Court finds the
Wolf approach to the exclusionary rule a convenient escape from the theoretical
bases of Weeks and to some lesser extent Mapp, the key case here, as elsewhere,
is Rochin.645
o'See note 97 and accompanying text supra; Oaks, supra note 608, at 756.
'United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 554 (1975) (dissenting opinion).
Id. The point is that while the Supreme Court can select the issues it will consider, see, e.g., United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 n.3 (1977), discussed in note 539 supra; United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435 (1976) (dealing with the substantive fourth amendment issue and failing to reach the
exclusion question), a trial court can only decide cases.
6"See notes 200-01, 232-35, 333-35, 434, 473, 522 and accompanying text supra.
'I say even this with caution. While it has never been clear that the operating analysis is a suppression doctrine, it has, I think, been generally assumed that a nonharmless denial of due process fairness
vitiates a criminal conviction. That was the crux of Rochin, where the brutality of the stomach-pumping
permeated the entire proceeding. Yet last Term, in United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174 (1977), the
Court indicated some doubt. In an opinion by the Chief Justice, the Court held that neither the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination nor the due process clause required that a suspect's grand
jury testimony must be excluded from a subsequent trial for perjury, because at the time he appeared
before the grand jury he had been under investigation for criminal activity and had not been given the
Miranda warnings. The circuit court had also rejected the fifth amendment claim but had held for the
defendant on the due process ground. In passing, and without further elaboration, the Chief Justice
dropped a most troubling footnote: "The Court of Appeals did not suggest why, assuming a due process
violation had occurred, suppression of respondent's testimony was constitutionally required." Id.
at 179 n.6. Whether the Court will expand upon this comment and consider admitting evidence obtained
in a fundamentally unfair manner is anything but clear. If that is what Chief Justice Burger has in
mind, then even the diluted version of the exclusionary rule emerging from Calandra, Peltier, and Brown
may have a questionable future.
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III. CONCLUSION

Summing up, the Burger Court has substantially merged fourth amendment
doctrine with the flexible approach to constitutional adjudication associated with
due process. In deciding whether the fourth amendment applies, whether given its
application it has been violated, and whether given a violation the fruits should be
admissible in evidence, the Court rejects the more structured search and seizure
analysis begun in the early years and developed during the Warren era and replaces
it with a fact-oriented, case-by-case approach indistinguishable in most respects from
the "fundamental fairness" inquiry conducted by the Court just prior to the practical
triumph of incorporation theory. With few exceptions, this Court is concerned
only that criminal investigations be conducted in a manner that befits a fair-minded,
reasonable people. The analysis is unprincipled and unpredictable, leaving it to the
lower courts to judge the essential fairness of the police conduct under attack in
the particular case-subject only to occasional review in the Supreme Court itself.
The reasons for the Court's departures in search and seizure cases are by no means
clear, but some plausible explanations are suggested in the decisions.
First, this Court is less enamored than was its immediate predecessor of the
Court's role as the defender of minority and individual rights against, in Phillip
'
Kurland's phrase, "the incursions of the Leviathan."646
For the first century and a
half of our history, the Supreme Court was seen as the champion of property interests
against the perceived threat posed by the masses and their democratically elected
representatives. 4 7 With the coming of the Roosevelt appointees the Court assumed
a new and entirely different character, permitting the legislative and executive
branches substantial leeway in ordering economic affairs and concerning itself instead with protecting the individual from majoritarian tyranny.64 8 This fundamental
change in the Court's perception of itself in turn formed the philosophical background for the Warren Court's criminal procedure decisions. It was in criminal
prosecutions that the power of the state was arrayed most clearly against the individual.64 The Burger Court, in contrast, seems less persuaded that the Court fulfills
its assigned function by protecting the individual from the excesses of majoritarian
power. While there certainly has been no discernible revival of the old Court's
'4 Kurland, 1970 Term: Notes on the Emergence of the Burger Court, 1971 Sup. CT. REv. 265, 321.
'In

a 1908 speech the President of Yale, Arthur Twining Hadley, put the matter bluntly:
The fundamental division of powers in the Constitution of the United States is between the
voters on the one hand and property owners on the other. The forces of democracy on the one
side, divided between the executive and the legislature, are set over against the forces of property
on the other side, with the judiciary as arbiter between them; the Constitution itself not only
forbidding the legislature and the executive to trench upon the rights of property, but compelling
the judiciary to define and uphold those rights in a manner provided by the Constitution itself ....
This theory of American politics has not been often stated. But it has been universally acted upon.
Hadley, The Constitutional Position of Property in America, 64 THE INDEPENDENT 838 (1908). General
authorities on the period and its jurisprudence are legion. See, e.g., F. RODELL, NINE MEN (1955).
"Again, the materials are well known. See GUNTHER, supra note 118, at 564-96.
See Allen, supra note 123, at 2:
The conviction has steadily grown that, in protecting and vindicating basic individual freedoms
and immunities, the Court performs its most vital function, and that in this field the Court may
justifiably abandon many of the self-imposed limitations on judicial power generally recognized in
other types of constitutional adjudication. There is no want of evidence that the Court, itself--or,
at least, many of its members-has proceeded on much the same assumption.
See generally C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960); Rostow, The Democratic Character of
Judicial Review, 66 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1952).
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preoccupation with economic liberty,6" ° it is demonstrably true that the Burger Court
is extremely deferential to other branches of government in its individual liberty
cases. 65' I count the Court's general approval of regulatory inspection schemes, its
deference to legislative statements as to the power of the police, and its move toward
legislatively defined sanctions for police misconduct as ready examples.
While deference to democratic majorities hardly offends ordinary notions of
American government, coming from the Supreme Court it is disturbing at best.
For, in this country at least, legislative majorities have been notoriously insensitive
to individual liberty. The very existence of the Bill of Rights and its analogue, the
fourteenth amendment, attests to the truth that the majority must be held in check
if individual liberty is to be preserved. The only institution that can make constitutional guarantees meaningful is the Court. Free in large measure from the day-today political pressures that may cloud the vision of legislators, the Court can take
the long view and come to principled decisions that serve the ultimate ends of a
free society by maintaining firm safeguards for the individual. If the Burger Court
means to forsake its task, we can expect ever-expanding inroads upon individual
liberty before new members appear to take it up again. I daresay that the executive
and legislative branches stand ready to eat up any slack this Court gives them. It
must be recalled that it was the Attorneys General of California and Ohio who
asked the Court to approve the extraordinary abuses in Rochin and Mapp.5 2 More
recently, it was the Solicitor General who appeared at bar in Chadwick to propose
a view of the fourth amendment even the dissenters thought "extreme."'65 If anything, the legislatures have even dimmer records. The new criminal procedure codes
cropping up in most states and the rules proposed to guide the police seem invariably
to seek the constitutional floor-permitting, even encouraging, the police to consider
the bare minimum constitutional standards as the norm.65 4 Defending the Warren
Court's decisions some years ago, Professor Amsterdam referred to "a vast abnegation of responsibility" by the executive and legislative branches. "Of course, the
'
Court has responded by being 'activist,' " he said, "it has had to."655
It appears the
Burger Court does not agree. The cost of that disagreement, I am afraid, will be
borne by the individual.
Second, the Burger Court recognizes that the rising crime rate that plagues
modern American life generates widespread public demand for efficiency in the
criminal justice system. 6 " Responding to that demand, the Court has distinguished
'See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (noting that the Court has invalidated a
wholly economic regulation solely on equal protection grounds in only one case in the past half-century
and taking the opportunity to set that decision aside).
'Rydell, Mr. Justice Rehnquist and Judicial Self-Restraint, 26 HASTINGS L. REV. 875 (1975).
"See notes 125, 134 and accompanying text supra.
'See note 553 supra.
'To
support this apparently bold assertion, I suggest a close reading of the commentary accompanying
the American Law Institute's newly-completed Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure. All too often,
it seems to me, the commentary indicates that the rules are designed to meet only minimum constitutional
requirements. To be sure, clarity in rules is a necessity, and the police can hardly be expected to understand the Court's constitutional line-drawing. But I should have thought that if legislative bodies are
genuinely interested in assuming some of the burden of striking the proper balance between the individual
and state power, the rules devised would do more than simply clarify existing constitutional doctrine.
'Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV.
785, 790 (1970).
'NATIONAL

1-2 (1973); R.

ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REPORT ON POLICE
HARRIS, FEAR OF CRIME (1968); Bazelon, Civil Liberties-Protecting Old Values in the

KANSAS LAw REvI.Ew

[Vol. 26

between constitutional safeguards necessary to ensure correct fact-finding at trial and
those that have to do, not with the guilt or innocence of the accused, but the protection of extraneous interests-such as those protected by the fourth amendment. 57
In cases in which there is substantial doubt as to the defendant's criminal responsi-

bility, the Court still musters sensitivity.6 5s But when the constitutional values the
defendant insists upon actually retard the pursuit of truth-as when there is an
attempt to exclude reliable evidence because it was seized unlawfully-the Court
increasingly turns a deaf ear. Plainly, the Burger Court believes that the Nation
can no longer afford procedural niceties and expansive interpretations of the Bill of

Rights. Rather, the focus in criminal cases has come to a hard-minded concern for
guilt or innocence of the defendant in the dock.
Once again, there is reason for pause. This Court's apparent acceptance of the
Crime Control model 59 is in the last analysis at war with the Bill of Rights. The
Court trusts the police to exercise good judgment even without judicial supervision
and often even assumes that their excesses affect only guilty suspects.600 The Bill of
Rights, on the other hand, reflects a basic distrust of law enforcement authorities
and assumes in the absence of unanswerable evidence that suspects are innocent. 66 '
Indeed, in order to foster the sort of climate in which respect for individual liberty
can flourish, the Bill of Rights offers the guilty quite the same safeguards afforded
the innocent.16 2 It is hardly accidental that most of the Bill of Rights safeguards
New Century, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 505, 509 (1976) (contending that "street crime has replaced anarchism
and communism as our cause for alarm"). See Lamb, The Making of a Chief Justice: Warren Burger on
Criminal Procedure, 1956-1969, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 743 (1975) (surveying Burger's work on the court
of appeals and identifying his definite pro-prosecution bent).
57E.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
See Stephens, The Burger Court: New
Dimensions in Criminal Justice, 60 GEo. L.J. 249, 270 (1971) (identifying a "growing resistance to the
rigorous application of fourth amendment standards in defense of privacy").
'E.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (holding under the due process clause that the
prosecution must prove the absence of mitigating factors as an element of higher grades of homicide);
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (using a due process analysis to invalidate a conviction
when the accused was not permitted to cross-examine a key witness and the local hearsay rule excluded
other exculpating evidence).
' I will concede that I over-generalize. But in my judgment the Burger Court's approach to these
problems comes much closer to Professor Packer's Crime Control Model than to its opposite, the Due
Process Model. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968).
' In the White case, for example, the Court rested its decision on the proposition that "one contemplating illegal activities" takes the risk that what he or she says to a confederate will reach the wrong ears.
See note 184 and accompanying text supra. Cf. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y.
1923) (opinion of Hand, J.) (insisting that the innocent man convicted is a myth and that the task is
to avoid formalism and other barriers to efficient prosecution of criminals).
' In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required
by due process before an individual can be convicted of a crime). See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 573 n.4 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (insisting that good faith on the part of the
police "has never sufficed in this tribunal to substitute as a safeguard for personal freedoms or to remit
our duty to effectuate constitutional guarantees"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) (stating that
"good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not enough"); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)
(same).
'See United States v, Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (offering that
"the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people");
Watts v. State, 282 Ala. 245, 248, 210 So. 2d 805, 808 (1968) (insisting that the "worst wretch that
walks the earth is entitled to a fair trial"). On the bright side of things, it appears that Mr. Ford's only
appointee to the Court, Mr. Justice Stevens, is in agreement. E.g., Codd v. Velger, 97 S. Ct. 882, 886 n.2
(1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting with approval Justice Douglas' famous comment that "[when
we deny even the most degraded person the rudiments of a fair trial, we endanger the liberties of everyone"). Indeed, Stevens has evidenced some concern about the majority's willingness to trust the police.
E.g., United States v. Lovasco, 429 U.S. 884 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (taking exception to the
Court's failure to find a denial of due process in a delayed arrest and suggesting that the police be made
to justify such delay); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 98 S. Ct. 330 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (insisting
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speak to criminal investigation and trials. For the liberty of Americans is tested
most obviously and directly by the process of singling out certain persons for punishment by the state. In that process, it makes all the difference in the world whether
the Constitution is seen as only a loose structure for the processing of guilty persons
by objective authorities, or as establishing stringent guidelines for holding overzealous officials in check."6 ' Assumptions about guilt and insensitivity to larger
libertarian ideals undermine a free society. While I certainly do not mean to minimize
the need for effective law enforcement and efficient criminal prosecutions, we can
hardly pay a price for them that debilitates the American democracy the criminal
justice system is designed to protect."6 4
Third, it is apparent that the Burger Court brings to its constitutional decisions
a renewed appreciation for the concept of federalism. The Nixon appointees are on
record not merely with the obligatory nod in the direction of decentralized government, but with sweeping statements on the merit of federalism as a fundamental
tenet of the American scheme.6"' To be sure, the Court has always paid lip service
to federalism even as civil liberties have been increasingly nationalized, but this
Court has built surprising, even startling, decisions on the notion. 6 6 The criminal
procedure cases provide numerous illustrations. While the Warren Court undoubtedly distrusted state criminal process and accordingly used its power of judicial
review to impose minimum standards on state trials, the Burger Court at times
demonstrates a preference for state proceedings. 6 7 This Court evidently would
deconstitutionalize some issues altogether and farm others out to the state forum
that the police be asked to justify requiring motorists to get out of their cars-because, for example, a
"woman stopped at night may fear for her own safety; a person in poor health may object to standing
in the cold or rain; another who left home in haste to drive children or spouse to school or to the train
may not be fully dressed").
'See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (commenting
that "where one comes out on a case depends on where one goes in").
' See Edwards, Order and Civil Liberties: A Complex Role for the Police, 64 MICH. L. REV. 47
(1965) (maintaining that there is no necessary inconsistency between court decisions protecting the individual and the society's need to combat urban crime).
'I have treated the matter elsewhere. Yackle, supra note 4, at 526-29. See generally Developments,
supra note 628.
6See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding the 1974 Amendments
to the Fair Labor Standards Act unconstitutional on the theory that in extending federal minimum wage
and maximum hour regulations to state employees Congress had interfered with the prerogatives of the
states); Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to
Essential Governmental Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1977) (finding in the case support for doctrinal
departures I suspect, and Professor Tribe concedes, the Court does not contemplate). See Michelman,
States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86
YALE L.J. 1165 (1977).
'E.g., Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977): "It goes without saying that preventing
and dealing with crime is much more the business of the States than it is the Federal Government . . .
and that we should not lightly construe the Constitution so as to intrude upon the administration of
justice by the individual States." See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (the most recent in the
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), line of access decisions); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)
(the habeas corpus case); Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 64-68 (1976) (testimony of Arych Neier and Burt Neuborne); SOCIETY OF AMERICAN LAW TEACHERS,
SUPREME COURT DENIAL OF CITIZEN ACCESS TO FEDERAL COURTS TO CHALLENGE UNCONSTITUTIONAL

OR

OTHER UNLAWFUL ACTIONS: THE RECORD OF THE BURGER COURT (1976); Neuborne, The Myth of Parity,
90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (arguing that the federal forum is generally superior to state courts and

that the Burger Court's decisions favoring the latter may have an effect on substantive decision-making);
Developments, supra note 628, at 1282 (offering forum allocation as a possible explanation of the Court's
access decisions). Cf. Anderson, The Line Between Federal and State Court Jurisdiction, 63 MICH. L.
REv. 1203 (1965) (suggesting that to avoid conflict between two court systems most business might be
handled by a unified system of federal courts).
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whenever possible. Perhaps most significantly with regard to search and seizure issues, there is abundant evidence that the Court's most recent appointees would never
have joined the Warren Court's adoption, however selective, of Justice Black's incorporation theory. 6 " This Court's persistent yearning for the Twining approach
to decision-making may thus evidence an inarticulate revitalization of pre-incorporationist thinking.
It is true, of course, that discussions of individual rights in this country have
often been submerged in concerns for federalism.'6 The Barron decision670 and
the ambiguity surrounding the fourteenth amendment ensured that. The Frankfurter due process opinions that have so influenced the Burger Court were written
in an obvious attempt to strike the proper balance between state and federal power
as much as to build meaningful doctrine for the protection of the individual from
either. When the Warren Court rejected that approach and chose selective incorporration instead, the dissenters insisted that "states rights" would suffer even as "individual rights" prevailed.6 7 1 All that is accepted history, and it must be expected
that the newly-constituted Court will take account of it. The difficulty comes in
this Court's apparent willingness to permit federalism to go on obscuring individual
liberty questions. With due respect to those who think otherwise, I must say that
federalism in American constitutional law is in most respects a fraud. We live,
after all, in the latter half of the twentieth century, and the serious governmental
organization questions are transnational. Viewed from the bridge of Spaceship Earth,
the United States is neither a very large nor populous nation state, and internal talk
of decentralization seems at best unrealistic. Why is it that a nation that is necessarily
more cohesive as time goes on should attach such significance to the historical accident
of settlement by disparate bands of displaced people whose authorization came from
different European monarchs? To be sure, ample evidence supports the conventional
wisdom that the framers foresaw a "federal" government. But, again, the Court
can hardly let us be governed by the generation-bound notions of eighteenth century
men. Just as the Court has allowed federal arms to reach further than the framers
intended in other fields, it can and must recognize the necessity of national standards
72
for police conduct.'
Make no mistake. I carry no brief against decentralization in any form. My only
concern is that the Burger Court seems to value federalism in the air, federalism
detached from empirical evidence that it serves identifiable human or governmental
interests. I would have the Court take a closer look and identify those fields in which
... E.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Apodaca v. Oregon,
406 U.S. 404, 369 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring) (opinion found in text of Johnson v. Louisiana, 406
U.S. 356 (1972)).
'See B. MARSHALL, FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1964); Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal
Procedure,
70 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1956); Developments, supra note 628, at 1135.
7
0 Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
071 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
072 It comes to mind here that some observers, and particularly Justices Brandeis and Harlan, have
contended that uniformity would abrogate the states' capacity to serve as laboratories for the testing of
different approaches to the problems that face them. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 193 (1968)
(Harlan, J., dissenting); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). I should have thought the states' record on that account would lay the argument to rest. So
far as I am aware, at least in the field of criminal procedure, the states have conducted few "experiments";
and those that have been undertaken have hardly advanced the individual's interests. See, e.g., Apodaca
v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (approving a less-than-unanimuus verdict); Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78 (1970) (approving a six-member jury).
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decentralized control serves a real purpose. I should have thought, for example, that
the most telling criticism of the proposed new Federal Criminal Code is not that it
may contain a few questionable provisions on espionage,673 but that it contains so
many on much less glamorous criminal activity. While I fully agree that what
criminal statutes the federal government has should be collected in an accessible
code, I do not agree at all that we need so much federal substantive criminal law
overlapping parallel state law. Such a federal code makes necessary a national police
force with untold resources for intruding upon liberty in the investigation of federal
crime and, to think dark thoughts as we surely must in this field, for restricting
individual liberty in some other ways should the national government one day
determine that greater regimentation in society serves its own interests. I would
prefer the relative safety of a diffused law enforcement mechanism. On the other
hand, I would be delighted with a federal procedure code that lays down procedural
safeguards effective against both state and federal authorities.674 In lieu of interest
on this front from the executive and legislative branches, I am content to build
something of the sort from the Bill of Rights.67 The point is, of course, that national uniformity that serves individual liberty brings with it many advantages and
none of the risks associated with the centralization of governmental power.
None of these explanations is completely satisfying. The Burger Court's deference
to the other branches of government and its concern about the crime rate do not
explain the Court's choice of analytical tools, and its renewed appreciation for federalism does not explain the use of the same tools in both state and federal cases.
Something more is needed. I judge it to be a new mood, a neo-conservatism that is
fast having its effect on this Court and all that look to it for guidance. It has become
fashionable of late to worry in print over what is seen as the politization of the
Supreme Court."6" The line-drawing done by the Warren Court, criticized enough at
the time, has come under new scrutiny.67 7 It is true, of course, that when the Warren
Court offered up doctrinal innovations to deal with the problems of the criminal
justice system, it engaged in judicial legislation.6 78 Anyone who pauses to reflect on
the cases sees, for example, the practical engineering behind the introduction of the
fifth amendment privilege into the stationhouse and counsel into line-ups. The Court
wanted desperately to reduce the incidence of coerced confessions in the one case
and misidentifications in the other. When due process, the obvious constitutional
standard, proved unsuccessful, the Court fashioned an alternative structure that
'At this writing, it appears that Chapter 11 of the proposed code, which has been the subject of
some substantial criticism from civil libertarians, has been amended to simply readopt present law. See S.
1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (April 28, 1977).
' Professor Cox, at least, has suggested that the Congress might impose such a code on the states
through its enforcement power under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965
Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REv.
91, 108 (1966).
" Judge Friendly, like so many others, permits blind faith in federalism to cloud the underlying individual liberty issues. See Friendly, supra note 578.
" E.g., Strong, Bicentennial Benchmark: Two Centuries of Evolution of Constitutional Process, 55

N.C. L. REv. 1 (1976) (expressing concern that the modern Court may be doing for personal liberty
what the old Court did for economic liberty and property rights).
'A.
Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1976); Cox, The New
Dimensions of Constitutional Adjudication, 51 WASH. L. REv. 791 (1976) (worrying over class action
decisions in which broad-ranging "systemic" relief is sought).
" 0SSee Friendly, The Constitution, in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE BICENTENNIAL LECTURE SERIES, EQUAL
JUSTICE UNDER LAW (1976).
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would bring results. The same can be said of the Warren Court's work in the
search and seizure field. Certainly, I should have thought, Mapp can fairly be lumped
with Miranda679 and Wade-Gilbert."' To some, those decisions now seem troubling.
The mood of many, including, I think, a majority of the Justices now sitting, is
that this is a time for less legislating and more judging.
The Court's attitude is born of the Realist movement in the middle third of this
century."' When people recognize that the language of the Constitution itself is
far too ambiguous to serve as more than a point of departure, they understandably
hesitate over far-reaching decisions that extend the constitutional text in directions
of their own choosing. Small wonder, indeed, that this Court prefers to sift the
facts and considerations in the individual case and arrive at a just resolution of the
dispute between the litigants at bar.6 2 But the very statement of what the Court
attempts to do signals its essential inadequacy. For, to put the matter plainly, the
only post-1925 understanding of Supreme Court adjudication that can fairly lay
claim to realism is one that views the cases and controversies that reach the Court as
no more than convenient vehicles for pronouncements upon the law.68 3 In a time
'Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
'United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
This is, of course, no place for any fair description of Realism in American law, as it began among
young law teachers at Columbia and Yale in the 1920s or certainly as it has progressed to the point that
we are all realists of some shade. Let only a few citations suffice. E.g., B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 112-14 (1921); M. COHEN, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER 112-47 (1933); W. TWINING, KARL
LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 1-83 (1973); Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L.
REv. 429 (1934). A recent work sketches the bridge between Dean Pound and Professor Llewellyn.
White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudenceand Social Change in Early TwentiethCentury America, 58 VA. L. REv. 999 (1972).
'New York v. Earl, 431 U.S. 943 (1977), is a good example. The facts presented a relatively routine
opportunity for the application of the Terry-Adams "stop and frisk" analysis. The state court found
fault, and New York sought review in the Supreme Court. As anyone might have predicted, the Court's
majority saw nothing earth-shaking in the case and denied the writ-without, of course, commenting
on the merits. The Chief Justice, however, wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Blackmun and
Rehnquist, in which he did little more than set forth the facts and insist that the state court had misapplied settled law. He identified no innovative issue lurking beneath the surface. Nor, indeed, did he
offer any basis for reviewing the case save his view that the lower court had been wrong. The last paragraph was most telling. The Chief Justice conceded that the Court's docket is crowded and that it certainly cannot hear every erroneous holding it comes across. But in this case, he said, the departure from
prior law was so "clear,"

and the issue so "squarely presented by the petition for certiorari and the

response," that "the matter could be easily resolved in a summary fashion." Id. at 949. Nothing could
be plainer. While other members of the Court passed over Earl to reach cases in which law could be
"made," the Chief and two other Nixon appointees were prepared to spend at least some time seeing
that this case was correctly decided. See also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 607 (1977) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) (contending that the issue should be narrowed to the "question actually presented: Does
the Eighth Amendment's ban against cruel and unusual punishment prohibit the State of Georgia from
executing a person who has, within the space of three years, raped three separate women, killing one and
attempting to kill another, who is serving prison terms exceeding his probable lifetime and who has not
hesitated to escape confinement at the first available opportunity?"); N.Y. Times, July 4, 1971, at 20,

col. 1 (interview with Chief Justice Burger in which he stated that his conception of the primary role
of the Court is "to decide cases").
' The best statement of the point I know comes from a layman.

R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE at x

(1976):
It is to these insulated nine men, then, that the nation has increasingly brought its most vexing
social and political problems. They come in the guise of private disputes between only the litigating
parties, but everybody understands that this is a legal fiction and merely a convenient political
device. American society thus reduces its most troubling controversies to the scope-and translates
them into the language-of a lawsuit. In no other way has the nation contrived to frame these
problems for a definitive judgment that applies to a vast land, a varied people, a whole age.
It has not been entirely lost on the Burger Court. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827 (1977)
(noting that "a court addressing a discretionary review petition is not primarily concerned with the correctness of the judgment below," but rather "review is generally granted only if a case raises an issue of
significant public interest or jurisprudential importance or conflicts with controlling precedent").
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when the Court controls its own docket and thus carefully chooses fact situations in
which to elaborate on the meaning of the Constitution, it makes no sense whatever
to conceive of the judicial task in such cases as doing justice-to the particular parties
fortunate enough to appear in Washington."' If the interests of the parties were
paramount, there would be little to choose among the thousands of petitions the
Court receives every year. Professor Freund pointed out some time ago that it is
a paradox of the Court's work that its constitutional power depends upon the existence of a concrete case or controversy, while the 1925 Act and practicality limit its
consideration to those that raise issues of broad concern the society over. 85 In the
latter half of this century we have finally put to one side the silly notion that the
Supreme Court does not make law. 6 We have faced the reality that it does and
must. The continuation of the case or controversy base serves now only as a vehicle
for presenting important issues to the Court, providing the Court with information
and argument necessary for intelligent decision-making and, in some cases, an opportunity to say only so much and no more.
If this realist sense of Supreme Court decision-making does violence to Article
III, then so be it. There is quite simply no way to avoid it, and in this light the
Burger Court's extraordinary record of denying constitutional questions a federal
forum is all the more astonishing. It is as though the Court has suddenly realized
that it can make law, that it in fact does make law, and that it indeed is expected to
make law. In sheer terror the Court has withdrawn from the fray. Confronted with
its awesome responsibility as the third branch of the national government, the Court
is understandably hesitant to work its way on the public. Isaiah Berlin was once

'See Gressman, Much Ado About Certiorari, 52 GEo. L.J. 742, 744 (1964) (contending that the
Court has been generally successful in "selecting for review, among the many filings, those cases and issues
which have permitted the tribunal to come to full flower as arbiter of constitutional and legal problems of
national import"); Jurisdiction of Circuit Court of Appeals and Supreme Court: Hearings Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 33, at 2 (1922) (comments of Chief Justice Taft).
'P. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 16 (1961). See LaFave, supra note 576,
at 590 (commenting that when an appellate court lays down a search and seizure "rule" that reaches
beyond the facts of the immediate case it becomes involved in legislation for which it is not equipped,
but when it grooms its lawmaking to the facts it provides little guidance to the police). But see Wright,
The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society-Judicial Activism or Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 24 (1968) (insisting that in criminal procedure cases the Court has a "special competence and a
special responsibility"). In demanding more analysis from the Burger Court, I need not revive the debate
over whether there are or can be "neutral principles of constitutional law" that govern adjudication in the
Supreme Court. Compare Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1 (1959) and Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73
HARV. L. REv. 84 (1959) with Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor
Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959) (assailing Wechsler) and Arnold, The Theology of Professor Hart,
73 HARv. L. REV. 1298 (1960) (attacking Hart). See generally Mueller & Schwartz, The Principle of
Neutral Principles,7 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 571 (1960) (keeping the score). I need only assert that the Supreme
Court is not merely another "power organ," Monaghan, Book Review, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1362, 1363 n.6
(1977), but rather an institution limited by reason in its lawmaking function. I do not for a moment
believe that the Court can or should set about resolving the great questions of the day in a value-free
atmosphere. But I most certainly do believe that if it performs its vital function well, it will do its very
best to set down for all to see the value judgments it necessarily makes as it goes along. See Miller &
Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 661, 682 (1960).
In my view, Charles Black has always taken the best approach. See Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960).
'See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622-29 (1965) (justifying prospective overruling on the
understanding that new decisions change prior law); Burger, Rulemaking by Judicial Decision: A Critical
Review, reprinted in Hearings on the Nomination of Warren E. Burger Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1969) (stating that in deciding cases and controversies courts "frequently
'make' law").
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heard to say that there is an apparent shortage of sages in the world."7 I suspect the
Court senses that shortage in its Friday conferences. s s Nevertheless, the Court is
called upon to do what must be done. In a time when social problems of enormous
complexity and consequence press for resolution and answers stubbornly evade our
grasp, there is something to be said for a system that selects out a few outstanding
persons and engages in the fiction that they can succeed where others fail. The
Supreme Court decides questions not because it can but because it must, because the
questions demand answers. When the Court comes to a judgment the public in
large measure accepts it, again not because it is correct but because there is no alternative. In this scheme, the fiction that the Court is not a committee of nine men
but an institution smoothes the way of public acceptance. The Nation needs the
fiction much more than the truth, because the fiction makes it possible to accept
Supreme Court judgments that so desperately need acceptance.
There is no room in all this for a narrow focus on the facts of the case at handthat is, in fourth amendment cases, the guilt or innocence of the accused. There is
no room for judicial opinions groomed to the circumstances of the particular case,
law for this day and this case only. The Supreme Court of the United States simply
does not sit to decide whether, in the particular case, the accused received a fair trial.
The Court chooses the cases it decides; it orchestrates its exercise of the federal
judicial power. The cases are merely vehicles for broad statements to guide not only
the parties directly involved but lower courts, prosecutors and defense counsel, the
police, and ultimately the rest of us. What is required is principled decision-making.
The Court is not the Congress, fumbling its way through compromise after compromise toward passage of some bit of legislation, nor Mr. Vance, leaping from crisis
to crisis in foreign policy in a desperate attempt to hold the world together for another day. The Court speaks rarely. It simply must speak meaningfully.
This Article has become an over-long defense of what is perhaps an unremarkable thesis. In all I have written, I have attempted merely to say that the Burger
Court has forsaken its critical law declaration function and left the participants in
the criminal justice system adrift without guidance in grappling with search and
seizure issues. Told that the horse it is attempting to draw will inevitably emerge
as a camel, this Court has given up trying. The result is lawlessness, no less. For
while each of us knows that at some point reason will fail us and the logical consistency of our models will falter, we at the same time know intuitively that a rudderless meander through our problems promises much worse. To the extent the Burger
Court defers to the other branches of government, emphasizes the control of crime
over competing individual liberty values, exalts the notion of federalism over protection of those values, and reduces its opinions to murky ad hoc balancing, the Court
fails to come to grips with its responsibility. In consequence, the ordering of the
individual's relations with government we have come to expect and revere in this
society is put in the gravest jeopardy. There was a time when the Supreme Court
understood its task. It adopted a value-oriented model that permitted the fourth
'See Freund, Mr. Justice Brandeis: A Centennial Memoir, 70 HARV. L. REV. 769, 791 (1957). In a
similar vein, Judge Hand's aversion to being ruled by a "bevy of Platonic Guardians" is well known.
HAND, supra note 5, at 73.
'See, e.g., Rehnquist, supra note 9, at 704 (conceding that his judgment is very likely no better
than that of anyone else who might find a way to the Supreme Court bench).
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amendment to speak to new threats not foreseen by the original draftsmen, developed the principle of judicial supervision in order to control police discretion, and
embraced the exclusionary rule to build into the system a fundamental respect not
only for the individual defendant's constitutional rights but for the vicarious interests
of all Americans. Above all, the Court recognized that when it spoke in a search
and seizure case it spoke not only for the litigants at bar but for the public at large.sO
The Burger Court, in contrast, has blurred the lines drawn by its predecessors and
generally uprooted the search and seizure doctrine of the past. 9° In its place, this
Court has offered only a search for rough fairness in the particular case. When government's interest in order is balanced against the individual's constitutional safeguards, it is order that invariably wins out." 1 The present posture of search and
seizure law is untenable. Dramatic change simply must come-and promptly. I do
not discount the difficulty of the task. But I must protest the Court's failure even
to attempt it.

'See notes 31, 47, 68 and accompanying text supra. For Warren Court examples, my mind runs to
Chimel, Coolidge, and Terry. Unsettling as the technique may have been at the time, when the Court in
those cases skipped over the threshold question whether the police had properly arrested or stopped the
suspect and passed on to a discussion of the subsequent search, it showed clearly enough that it understood
full well why those cases had been brought to the Supreme Court for decision. It certainly was not to
put an end to relatively trifling disputes between the litigants. See notes 358, 374, and 421 supra.
'mI should say at this point that I do not wish to be understood as insisting that the Burger Court
adhere to Warren Court precedents on the principle of stare decisis. While I have made clear my preferences
on that score in this paper, I have no quarrel with this Court's occasional statements that constitutional
interpretations are more subject to re-examination than, for example, constructions of federal statutes. E.g.,
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974). And I will concede that some decisions I would retain
may appropriately be set aside by the newly-constituted Court in the present period of "unsettlement."
Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735 (1949). What I do insist upon, however, is that Warren
Court precedents be fairly treated. In the Burger Court, it is not that precedents are consolidated behind
a single principle unclear in the precedents themselves, or that the cases are narrowed and circumscribed
and artfully distinguished, or even that they are forthrightly overruled. They are simply, and far too
often, ignored. See LEvy, supra note 3, at 138; Shapiro, supra note 450. Nor do I mean to reject the

obvious truth that public law issues are always reducible to a balancing of individual and governmental
interests. My point is that if there must be balancing let it be definitional rather than ad hoc. See
Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and
Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REv. 935 (1968).
See Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE
L.J. 1149 (1960); Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1943).

